The erratic
manner in which the foreign affairs of the Reich were conducted
was due to a lack of sound guiding principles for the formation
of practical and useful alliances. Not only was this state of
affairs continued after the Revolution, but it became even
worse.
For the
confused state of our political ideas in general before the War
may be looked upon as the chief cause of our defective
statesmanship; but in the post-War period this cause must be
attributed to a lack of honest intentions. It was natural that
those parties who had fully achieved their destructive purpose
by means of the Revolution should feel that it would not serve
their interests if a policy of alliances were adopted which
must ultimately result in the restoration of a free German
State. A development in this direction would not be in
conformity with the purposes of the November crime. It would
have interrupted and indeed put an end to the
internationalization of German national economy and German
Labour. But what was feared most of all was that a successful
effort to make the Reich independent of foreign countries might
have an influence in domestic politics which one day would turn
out disastrous for those who now hold supreme power in the
government of the Reich. One cannot imagine the revival of a
nation unless that revival be preceded by a process of
nationalization. Conversely, every important success in the
field of foreign politics must call forth a favourable reaction
at home. Experience proves that every struggle for liberty
increases the national sentiment and national
self-consciousness and therewith gives rise to a keener
sensibility towards anti-national elements and tendencies. A
state of things, and persons also, that may be tolerated and
even pass unnoticed in times of peace will not only become the
object of aversion when national enthusiasm is aroused but will
even provoke positive opposition, which frequently turns out
disastrous for them. In this connection we may recall the
spy-scare that became prevalent when the war broke out, when
human passion suddenly manifested itself to such a heightened
degree as to lead to the most brutal persecutions, often
without any justifiable grounds, although everybody knew that
the danger resulting from spies is greater during the long
periods of peace; but, for obvious reasons, they do not then
attract a similar amount of public attention. For this reason
the subtle instinct of the State parasites who came to the
surface of the national body through the November happenings
makes them feel at once that a policy of alliances which would
restore the freedom of our people and awaken national sentiment
might possibly ruin their own criminal existence.
Thus we may
explain the fact that since 1918 the men who have held the
reins of government adopted an entirely negative attitude
towards foreign affairs and that the business of the State has
been almost constantly conducted in a systematic way against
the interests of the German nation. For that which at first
sight seemed a matter of chance proved, on closer examination,
to be a logical advance along the road which was first publicly
entered upon by the November Revolution of 1918.
Undoubtedly a
distinction ought to be made between (1) the responsible
administrators of our affairs of State, or rather those who
ought to be responsible; (2) the average run of our
parliamentary politicasters, and (3) the masses of our people,
whose sheepish docility corresponds to their want of
intelligence.
The first
know what they want. The second fall into line with them,
either because they have been already schooled in what is afoot
or because they have not the courage to take an uncompromising
stand against a course which they know and feel to be
detrimental. The third just submit to it because they are too
stupid to understand.
While the
German National Socialist Labour Party was only a small and
practically unknown society, problems of foreign policy could
have only a secondary importance in the eyes of many of its
members. This was the case especially because our movement has
always proclaimed the principle, and must proclaim it, that the
freedom of the country in its foreign relations is not a gift
that will be bestowed upon us by Heaven or by any earthly
Powers, but can only be the fruit of a development of our inner
forces. We must first root out the causes which led to our
collapse and we must eliminate all those who are profiting by
that collapse. Then we shall be in a position to take up the
fight for the restoration of our freedom in the management of
our foreign relations.
It will be
easily understood therefore why we did not attach so much
importance to foreign affairs during the early stages of our
young movement, but preferred to concentrate on the problem of
internal reform.
But when the
small and insignificant society expanded and finally grew too
large for its first framework, the young organization assumed
the importance of a great association and we then felt it
incumbent on us to take a definite stand on problems regarding
the development of a foreign policy. It was necessary to lay
down the main lines of action which would not only be in accord
with the fundamental ideas of our Weltanschhauung but
would actually be an expansion of it in the practical world of
foreign affairs.
Just because
our people have had no political education in matters
concerning our relations abroad, it was necessary to teach the
leaders in the various sections of our movement, and also the
masses of the people, the chief principles which ought to guide
the development of our foreign relations. That was one of the
first tasks to be accomplished in order to prepare the ground
for the practical carrying out of a foreign policy which would
win back the independence of the nation in managing its
external affairs and thus restore the real sovereignty of the
Reich.
The
fundamental and guiding principles which we must always bear in
mind when studying this question is that foreign policy is only
a means to an end and that the sole end to be pursued is the
welfare of our own people. Every problem in foreign politics
must be considered from this point of view, and this point of
view alone. Shall such and such a solution prove advantageous
to our people now or in the future, or will it injure their
interests? That is the question.
This is the
sole preoccupation that must occupy our minds in dealing with a
question. Party politics, religious considerations,
humanitarian ideals – all such and all other
preoccupations must absolutely give way to this.
Before the
War the purpose to which German foreign policy should have been
devoted was to assure the supply of material necessities for
the maintenance of our people and their children. And the way
should have been prepared which would lead to this goal.
Alliances should have been established which would have proved
beneficial to us from this point of view and would have brought
us the necessary auxiliary support. The task to be accomplished
is the same today, but with this difference: In pre-War times
it was a question of caring for the maintenance of the German
people, backed up by the power which a strong and independent
State then possessed, but our task today is to make our nation
powerful once again by re-establishing a strong and independent
State. The re-establishment of such a State is the prerequisite
and necessary condition which must be fulfilled in order that
we may be able subsequently to put into practice a foreign
policy which will serve to guarantee the existence of our
people in the future, fulfilling their needs and furnishing
them with those necessities of life which they lack. In other
words, the aim which Germany ought to pursue today in her
foreign policy is to prepare the way for the recovery of her
liberty tomorrow. In this connection there is a fundamental
principle which we must keep steadily before our minds. It is
this: The possibility of winning back the independence of a
nation is not absolutely bound up with the question of
territorial reintegration but it will suffice if a small
remnant, no matter how small, of this nation and State will
exist, provided it possesses the necessary independence to
become not only the vehicle of' the common spirit of the whole
people but also to prepare the way for the military fight to
reconquer the nation's liberty.
When a people
who amount to a hundred million souls tolerate the yoke of
common slavery in order to prevent the territory belonging to
their State from being broken up and divided, that is worse
than if such a State and such a people were dismembered while
one fragment still retained its complete independence. Of
course, the natural proviso here is that this fragment must be
inspired with a consciousness of the solemn duty that devolves
upon it, not only to proclaim persistently the inviolable unity
of its spiritual and cultural life with that of its detached
members but also to prepare the means that are necessary for
the military conflict which will finally liberate and re-unite
the fragments that are suffering under oppression.
One must also
bear in mind the fact that the restoration of lost districts
which were formerly parts of the State, both ethnically and
politically, must in the first instance be a question of
winning back political power and independence for the
motherland itself, and that in such cases the special interests
of the lost districts must be uncompromisingly regarded as a
matter of secondary importance in the face of the one main
task, which is to win back the freedom of the central
territory. For the detached and oppressed fragments of a nation
or an imperial province cannot achieve their liberation through
the expression of yearnings and protests on the part of the
oppressed and abandoned, but only when the portion which has
more or less retained its sovereign independence can resort to
the use of force for the purpose of reconquering those
territories that once belonged to the common fatherland.
Therefore, in
order to reconquer lost territories the first condition to be
fulfilled is to work energetically for the increased welfare
and reinforcement of the strength of that portion of the State
which has remained over after the partition. Thus the
unquenchable yearning which slumbers in the hearts of the
people must be awakened and restrengthened by bringing new
forces to its aid, so that when the hour comes all will be
devoted to the one purpose of liberating and uniting the whole
people. Therefore, the interests of the separated territories
must be subordinated to the one purpose. That one purpose must
aim at obtaining for the central remaining portion such a
measure of power and might that will enable it to enforce its
will on the hostile will of the victor and thus redress the
wrong. For flaming protests will not restore the oppressed
territories to the bosom of a common Reich. That can be done
only through the might of the sword.
The forging
of this sword is a work that has to be done through the
domestic policy which must be adopted by a national government.
To see that the work of forging these arms is assured, and to
recruit the men who will bear them, that is the task of the
foreign policy.
In the first
volume of this book I discussed the inadequacy of our policy of
alliances before the War. There were four possible ways to
secure the necessary foodstuffs for the maintenance of our
people. Of these ways the fourth, which was the most
unfavourable, was chosen. Instead of a sound policy of
territorial expansion in Europe, our rulers embarked on a
policy of colonial and trade expansion. That policy was all the
more mistaken inasmuch as they presumed that in this way the
danger of an armed conflict would be averted. The result of the
attempt to sit on many stools at the same time might have been
foreseen. It let us fall to the ground in the midst of them
all. And the World War was only the last reckoning presented to
the Reich to pay for the failure of its foreign policy.
The right way
that should have been taken in those days was the third way I
indicated: namely, to increase the strength of the Reich as a
Continental Power by the acquisition of new territory in
Europe. And at the same time a further expansion, through the
subsequent acquisition of colonial territory, might thus be
brought within the range of practical politics. Of course, this
policy could not have been carried through except in alliance
with England, or by devoting such abnormal efforts to the
increase of military force and armament that, for forty or
fifty years, all cultural undertakings would have to be
completely relegated to the background. This responsibility
might very well have been undertaken. The cultural importance
of a nation is almost always dependent on its political freedom
and independence. Political freedom is a prerequisite condition
for the existence, or rather the creation, of great cultural
undertakings. Accordingly no sacrifice can be too great when
there is question of securing the political freedom of a
nation. What might have to be deducted from the budget expenses
for cultural purposes, in order to meet abnormal demands for
increasing the military power of the State, can be generously
paid back later on. Indeed, it may be said that after a State
has concentrated all its resources in one effort for the
purpose of securing its political independence a certain period
of ease and renewed equilibrium sets in. And it often happens
that the cultural spirit of the nation, which had been
heretofore cramped and confined, now suddenly blooms forth.
Thus Greece experienced the great Periclean era after the
miseries it had suffered during the Persian Wars. And the Roman
Republic turned its energies to the cultivation of a higher
civilization when it was freed from the stress and worry of the
Punic Wars.
Of course, it
could not be expected that a parliamentary majority of feckless
and stupid people would be capable of deciding on such a
resolute policy for the absolute subordination of all other
national interests to the one sole task of preparing for a
future conflict of arms which would result in establishing the
security of the State. The father of Frederick the Great
sacrificed everything in order to be ready for that conflict;
but the fathers of our absurd parliamentarian democracy, with
the Jewish hall-mark, could not do it.
That is why,
in pre-War times, the military preparation necessary to enable
us to conquer new territory in Europe was only very mediocre,
so that it was difficult to obtain the support of really
helpful allies.
Those who
directed our foreign affairs would not entertain even the idea
of systematically preparing for war. They rejected every plan
for the acquisition of territory in Europe. And by preferring a
policy of colonial and trade expansion, they sacrificed the
alliance with England, which was then possible. At the same
time they neglected to seek the support of Russia, which would
have been a logical proceeding. Finally they stumbled into the
World War, abandoned by all except the ill-starred
Habsburgs.
The
characteristic of our present foreign policy is that it follows
no discernible or even intelligible lines of action. Whereas
before the War a mistake was made in taking the fourth way that
I have mentioned, and this was pursued only in a halfhearted
manner, since the Revolution not even the sharpest eye can
detect any way that is being followed. Even more than before
the War, there is absolutely no such thing as a systematic
plan, except the systematic attempts that are made to destroy
the last possibility of a national revival.
If we make an
impartial examination of the situation existing in Europe today
as far as concerns the relation of the various Powers to one
another, we shall arrive at the following results:
For the past
three hundred years the history of our Continent has been
definitely determined by England's efforts to keep the European
States opposed to one another in an equilibrium of forces, thus
assuring the necessary protection of her own rear while she
pursued the great aims of British world-policy.
The
traditional tendency of British diplomacy ever since the reign
of Queen Elizabeth has been to employ systematically every
possible means to prevent any one Power from attaining a
preponderant position over the other European Powers and, if
necessary, to break that preponderance by means of armed
intervention. The only parallel to this has been the tradition
of the Prussian Army. England has made use of various forces to
carry out its purpose, choosing them according to the actual
situation or the task to be faced; but the will and
determination to use them has always been the same. The more
difficult England's position became in the course of history
the more the British Imperial Government considered it
necessary to maintain a condition of political paralysis among
the various European States, as a result of their mutual
rivalries. When the North American colonies obtained their
political independence it became still more necessary for
England to use every effort to establish and maintain the
defence of her flank in Europe. In accordance with this policy
she reduced Spain and the Netherlands to the position of
inferior naval Powers. Having accomplished this, England
concentrated all her forces against the increasing strength of
France, until she brought about the downfall of Napoleon
Bonaparte and therewith destroyed the military hegemony of
France, which was the most dangerous rival that England had to
fear.
The change of
attitude in British statesmanship towards Germany took place
only very slowly, not only because the German nation did not
represent an obvious danger for England as long as it lacked
national unification, but also because public opinion in
England, which had been directed to other quarters by a system
of propaganda that had been carried out for a long time, could
be turned to a new direction only by slow degrees. In order to
reach the proposed ends the calmly reflecting statesman had to
bow to popular sentiment, which is the most powerful
motive-force and is at the same time the most lasting in its
energy. When the statesman has attained one of his ends, he
must immediately turn his thoughts to others; but only by
degrees and the slow work of propaganda can the sentiment of
the masses be shaped into an instrument for the attainment of
the new aims which their leaders have decided on.
As early as
1870-71 England had decided on the new stand it would take. On
certain occasions minor oscillations in that policy were caused
by the growing influence of America in the commercial markets
of the world and also by the increasing political power of
Russia; but, unfortunately, Germany did not take advantage of
these and, therefore, the original tendency of British
diplomacy was only reinforced.
England
looked upon Germany as a Power which was of world importance
commercially and politically and which, partly because of its
enormous industrial development, assumed such threatening
proportions that the two countries already contended against
one another in the same sphere and with equal energy. The
so-called peaceful conquest of the world by commercial
enterprise, which, in the eyes of those who governed our public
affairs at that time, represented the highest peak of human
wisdom, was just the thing that led English statesmen to adopt
a policy of resistance. That this resistance assumed the form
of an organized aggression on a vast scale was in full
conformity with a type of statesmanship which did not aim at
the maintenance of a dubious world peace but aimed at the
consolidation of British world-hegemony. In carrying out this
policy, England allied herself with those countries which had a
definite military importance. And that was in keeping with her
traditional caution in estimating the power of her adversary
and also in recognizing her own temporary weakness. That line
of conduct cannot be called unscrupulous; because such a
comprehensive organization for war purposes must not be judged
from the heroic point of view but from that of expediency. The
object of a diplomatic policy must not be to see that a nation
goes down heroically but rather that it survives in a practical
way. Hence every road that leads to this goal is opportune and
the failure to take it must be looked upon as a criminal
neglect of duty.
When the
German Revolution took place England's fears of a German world
hegemony came to a satisfactory end.
From that
time it was not an English interest to see Germany totally
cancelled from the geographic map of Europe. On the contrary,
the astounding collapse which took place in November 1918 found
British diplomacy confronted with a situation which at first
appeared untenable.
For
four-and-a-half years the British Empire had fought to break
the presumed preponderance of a Continental Power. A sudden
collapse now happened which removed this Power from the
foreground of European affairs. That collapse disclosed itself
finally in the lack of even the primordial instinct of
self-preservation, so that European equilibrium was destroyed
within forty-eight hours. Germany was annihilated and France
became the first political Power on the Continent of
Europe.
The
tremendous propaganda which was carried on during this war for
the purpose of encouraging the British public to stick it out
to the end aroused all the primitive instincts and passions of
the populace and was bound eventually to hang as a leaden
weight on the decisions of British statesmen. With the
colonial, economical and commercial destruction of Germany,
England's war aims were attained. Whatever went beyond those
aims was an obstacle to the furtherance of British interests.
Only the enemies of England could profit by the disappearance
of Germany as a Great Continental Power in Europe. In November
1918, however, and up to the summer of 1919, it was not
possible for England to change its diplomatic attitude; because
during the long war it had appealed, more than it had ever done
before, to the feelings of the populace. In view of the feeling
prevalent among its own people, England could not change its
foreign policy; and another reason which made that impossible
was the military strength to which other European Powers had
now attained. France had taken the direction of peace
negotiations into her own hands and could impose her law upon
the others. During those months of negotiations and bargaining
the only Power that could have altered the course which things
were taking was Germany herself; but Germany was torn asunder
by a civil war, and her so-called statesmen had declared
themselves ready to accept any and every dictate imposed on
them.
Now, in the
comity of nations, when one nation loses its instinct for
self-preservation and ceases to be an active member it sinks to
the level of an enslaved nation and its territory will have to
suffer the fate of a colony.
To prevent
the power of France from becoming too great, the only form
which English negotiations could take was that of participating
in France's lust for aggrandizement.
As a matter
of fact, England did not attain the ends for which she went to
war. Not only did it turn out impossible to prevent a
Continental Power from obtaining a preponderance over the ratio
of strength in the Continental State system of Europe, but a
large measure of preponderance had been obtained and firmly
established.
In 1914
Germany, considered as a military State, was wedged in between
two countries, one of which had equal military forces at its
disposal and the other had greater military resources. Then
there was England's overwhelming supremacy at sea. France and
Russia alone hindered and opposed the excessive aggrandizement
of Germany. The unfavourable geographical situation of the
Reich, from the military point of view, might be looked upon as
another coefficient of security against an exaggerated increase
of German power. From the naval point of view, the
configuration of the coast-line was unfavourable in case of a
conflict with England. And though the maritime frontier was
short and cramped, the land frontier was widely extended and
open.
France's
position is different today. It is the first military Power
without a serious rival on the Continent. It is almost entirely
protected by its southern frontier against Spain and Italy.
Against Germany it is safeguarded by the prostrate condition of
our country. A long stretch of its coast-line faces the vital
nervous system of the British Empire. Not only could French
aeroplanes and long-range batteries attack the vital centres of
the British system, but submarines can threaten the great
British commercial routes. A submarine campaign based on
France's long Atlantic coast and on the European and North
African coasts of the Mediterranean would have disastrous
consequences for England.
Thus the
political results of the war to prevent the development of
German power was the creation of a French hegemony on the
Continent. The military result was the consolidation of France
as the first Continental Power and the recognition of American
equality on the sea. The economic result was the cession of
great spheres of British interests to her former allies and
associates.
The
Balkanization of Europe, up to a certain degree, was desirable
and indeed necessary in the light of the traditional policy of
Great Britain, just as France desired the Balkanization of
Germany.
What England
has always desired, and will continue to desire, is to prevent
any one Continental Power in Europe from attaining a position
of world importance. Therefore England wishes to maintain a
definite equilibrium of forces among the European States –
for this equilibrium seems a necessary condition of England's
world-hegemony.
What France
has always desired, and will continue to desire, is to prevent
Germany from becoming a homogeneous Power. Therefore France
wants to maintain a system of small German States whose forces
would balance one another and over which there should be no
central government. Then, by acquiring possession of the left
bank of the Rhine, she would have fulfilled the pre-requisite
conditions for the establishment and security of her hegemony
in Europe.
The final
aims of French diplomacy must be in perpetual opposition to the
final tendencies of British statesmanship.
Taking these
considerations as a starting-point, anyone who investigates the
possibilities that exist for Germany to find allies must come
to the conclusion that there remains no other way of forming an
alliance except to approach England. The consequences of
England's war policy were and are disastrous for Germany.
However, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that, as things
stand today, the necessary interests of England no longer
demand the destruction of Germany. On the contrary, British
diplomacy must tend more and more, from year to year, towards
curbing France's unbridled lust after hegemony. Now, a policy
of alliances cannot be pursued by bearing past grievances in
mind, but it can be rendered fruitful by taking account of past
experiences. Experience should have taught us that alliances
formed for negative purposes suffer from intrinsic weakness.
The destinies of nations can be welded together only under the
prospect of a common success, of common gain and conquest, in
short, a common extension of power for both contracting
parties.
The ignorance
of our people on questions of foreign politics is clearly
demonstrated by the reports in the daily Press which talk about
"friendship towards Germany" on the part of one or the other
foreign statesman, whereby this professed friendship is taken
as a special guarantee that such persons will champion a policy
that will be advantageous to our people. That kind of talk is
absurd to an incredible degree. It means speculating on the
unparalleled simplicity of the average German philistine when
he comes to talking politics. There is not any British,
American, or Italian statesman who could ever be described as
'pro-German'. Every Englishman must naturally be British first
of all. The same is true of every American. And no Italian
statesman would be prepared to adopt a policy that was not
pro-Italian. Therefore, anyone who expects to form alliances
with foreign nations on the basis of a pro-German feeling among
the statesmen of other countries is either an ass or a
deceiver. The necessary condition for linking together the
destinies of nations is never mutual esteem or mutual sympathy,
but rather the prospect of advantages accruing to the
contracting parties. It is true that a British statesman will
always follow a pro-British and not a pro-German policy; but it
is also true that certain definite interests involved in this
pro-British policy may coincide on various grounds with German
interests. Naturally that can be so only to a certain degree
and the situation may one day be completely reversed. But the
art of statesmanship is shown when at certain periods there is
question of reaching a certain end and when allies are found
who must take the same road in order to defend their own
interests.
The practical
application of these principles at the present time must depend
on the answer given to the following questions: What States are
not vitally interested in the fact that, by the complete
abolition of a German Central Europe, the economic and military
power of France has reached a position of absolute hegemony?
Which are the States that, in consideration of the conditions
which are essential to their own existence and in view of the
tradition that has hitherto been followed in conducting their
foreign policy, envisage such a development as a menace to
their own future?
Finally, we
must be quite clear on the following point: France is and will
remain the implacable enemy of Germany. It does not matter what
Governments have ruled or will rule in France, whether Bourbon
or Jacobin, Napoleonic or Bourgeois-Democratic, Clerical
Republican or Red Bolshevik, their foreign policy will always
be directed towards acquiring possession of the Rhine frontier
and consolidating France's position on this river by disuniting
and dismembering Germany.
England did
not want Germany to be a world Power. France desired that there
should be no Power called Germany. Therefore there was a very
essential difference. To-day we are not fighting for our
position as a World-Power but only for the existence of our
country, for national unity and the daily bread of our
children. Taking this point of view into consideration, only
two States remain to us as possible allies in Europe - England
and Italy.
England is
not pleased to see a France on whose military power there is no
check in Europe, so that one day she might undertake the
support of a policy which in some way or other might come into
conflict with British interests. Nor can England be pleased to
see France in possession of such enormous coal and iron mines
in Western Europe as would make it possible for her one day to
play a role in world-commerce which might threaten danger to
British interests. Moreover, England can never be pleased to
see a France whose political position on the Continent, owing
to the dismemberment of the rest of Europe, seems so absolutely
assured that she is not only able to resume a French
world-policy on great lines but would even find herself
compelled to do so. The bombs which were once dropped by the
Zeppelins might be multiplied by the thousand every night. The
military predominance of France is a weight that presses
heavily on the hearts of the World Empire over which Great
Britain rules.
Nor can Italy
desire, nor will she desire, any further strengthening of
France's power in Europe. The future of Italy will be
conditioned by the development of events in the Mediterranean
and by the political situation in the area surrounding that
sea. The reason that led Italy into the War was not a desire to
contribute towards the aggrandizement of France but rather to
deal her hated Adriatic rival a mortal blow. Any further
increase of France's power on the Continent would hamper the
development of Italy's future, and Italy does not deceive
herself by thinking that racial kindred between the nations
will in any way eliminate rivalries.
Serious and
impartial consideration proves that it is these two States,
Great Britain and Italy, whose natural interests not only do
not contrast with the conditions essential to the existence of
the German nation but are identical with them, to a certain
extent.
But when we
consider the possibilities of alliances we must be careful not
to lose sight of three factors. The first factor concerns
ourselves; the other two concern the two States I have
mentioned.
Is it at all
possible to conclude an alliance with Germany as it is today?
Can a Power which would enter into an alliance for the purpose
of securing assistance in an effort to carry out its own
offensive aims – can such a Power form an alliance with a
State whose rulers have for years long presented a spectacle of
deplorable incompetence and pacifist cowardice and where the
majority of the people, blinded by democratic and Marxist
teachings, betray the interests of their own people and country
in a manner that cries to Heaven for vengeance? As things stand
today, can any Power hope to establish useful relations and
hope to fight together for the furtherance of their common
interests with this State which manifestly has neither the will
nor the courage to move a finger even in the defence of its
bare existence? Take the case of a Power for which an alliance
must be much more than a pact to guarantee a state of slow
decomposition, such as happened with the old and disastrous
Triple Alliance. Can such a Power associate itself for life or
death with a State whose most characteristic signs of activity
consist of a rampant servility in external relations and a
scandalous repression of the national spirit at home? Can such
a Power be associated with a State in which there is nothing of
greatness, because its whole policy does not deserve it? Or can
alliances be made with Governments which are in the hands of
men who are despised by their own fellow-citizens and
consequently are not respected abroad?
No. A
self-respecting Power which expects something more from
alliances than commissions for greedy Parliamentarians will not
and cannot enter into an alliance with our present-day Germany.
Our present inability to form alliances furnishes the principle
and most solid basis for the combined action of the enemies who
are robbing us. Because Germany does not defend itself in any
other way except by the flamboyant protests of our
parliamentarian elect, there is no reason why the rest of the
world should take up the fight in our defence. And God does not
follow the principle of granting freedom to a nation of
cowards, despite all the implications of our 'patriotic'
associations. Therefore, for those States which have not a
direct interest in our annihilation no other course remains
open except to participate in France's campaign of plunder, at
least to make it impossible for the strength of France to be
exclusively aggrandized thereby.
In the second
place, we must not forget that among the nations which were
formerly our enemies mass-propaganda has turned the opinions
and feelings of large sections of the population in a fixed
direction. When for years long a foreign nation has been
presented to the public as a horde of 'Huns', 'Robbers',
'Vandals', etc., they cannot suddenly be presented as something
different, and the enemy of yesterday cannot be recommended as
the ally of tomorrow.
But the third
factor deserves greater attention, since it is of essential
importance for establishing future alliances in Europe.
From the
political point of view it is not in the interests of Great
Britain that Germany should be ruined even still more, but such
a proceeding would be very much in the interests of the
international money-markets manipulated by the Jew. The
cleavage between the official, or rather traditional, British
statesmanship and the controlling influence of the Jew on the
money-markets is nowhere so clearly manifested as in the
various attitudes taken towards problems of British foreign
policy. Contrary to the interests and welfare of the British
State, Jewish finance demands not only the absolute economic
destruction of Germany but its complete political enslavement.
The internationalization of our German economic system, that is
to say, the transference of our productive forces to the
control of Jewish international finance, can be completely
carried out only in a State that has been politically
Bolshevized. But the Marxist fighting forces, commanded by
international and Jewish stock-exchange capital, cannot finally
smash the national resistance in Germany without friendly help
from outside. For this purpose French armies would first have
to invade and overcome the territory of the German Reich until
a state of international chaos would set in, and then the
country would have to succumb to Bolshevik storm troops in the
service of Jewish international finance.
Hence it is
that at the present time the Jew is the great agitator for the
complete destruction of Germany. Whenever we read of attacks
against Germany taking place in any part of the world the Jew
is always the instigator. In peace-time, as well as during the
War, the Jewish-Marxist stock-exchange Press systematically
stirred up hatred against Germany, until one State after
another abandoned its neutrality and placed itself at the
service of the world coalition, even against the real interests
of its own people.
The Jewish
way of reasoning thus becomes quite clear. The Bolshevization
of Germany, that is to say, the extermination of the patriotic
and national German intellectuals, thus making it possible to
force German Labour to bear the yoke of international Jewish
finance – that is only the overture to the movement for
expanding Jewish power on a wider scale and finally subjugating
the world to its rule. As has so often happened in history,
Germany is the chief pivot of this formidable struggle. If our
people and our State should fall victims to these oppressors of
the nations, lusting after blood and money, the whole earth
would become the prey of that hydra. Should Germany be freed
from its grip, a great menace for the nations of the world
would thereby be eliminated.
It is certain
that Jewry uses all its subterranean activities not only for
the purpose of keeping alive old national enmities against
Germany but even to spread them farther and render them more
acute wherever possible. It is no less certain that these
activities are only very partially in keeping with the true
interests of the nations among whose people the poison is
spread. As a general principle, Jewry carries on its campaign
in the various countries by the use of arguments that are best
calculated to appeal to the mentality of the respective nations
and are most likely to produce the desired results; for Jewry
knows what the public feeling is in each country. Our national
stock has been so much adulterated by the mixture of alien
elements that, in its fight for power, Jewry can make use of
the more or less 'cosmopolitan' circles which exist among us,
inspired by the pacifist and international ideologies. In
France they exploit the well-known and accurately estimated
chauvinistic spirit. In England they exploit the commercial and
world-political outlook. In short, they always work upon the
essential characteristics that belong to the mentality of each
nation. When they have in this way achieved a decisive
influence in the political and economic spheres they can drop
the limitations which their former tactics necessitated, now
disclosing their real intentions and the ends for which they
are fighting. Their work of destruction now goes ahead more
quickly, reducing one State after another to a mass of ruins on
which they will erect the everlasting and sovereign Jewish
Empire.
In England,
and in Italy, the contrast between the better kind of solid
statesmanship and the policy of the Jewish stock-exchange often
becomes strikingly evident.
Only in
France there exists today more than ever before a profound
accord between the views of the stock-exchange, controlled by
the Jews, and the chauvinistic policy pursued by French
statesmen. This identity of views constitutes an immense,
danger for Germany. And it is just for this reason that France
is and will remain by far the most dangerous enemy. The French
people, who are becoming more and more obsessed by negroid
ideas, represent a threatening menace to the existence of the
white race in Europe, because they are bound up with the Jewish
campaign for world-domination. For the contamination caused by
the influx of negroid blood on the Rhine, in the very heart of
Europe, is in accord with the sadist and perverse lust for
vengeance on the part of the hereditary enemy of our people,
just as it suits the purpose of the cool calculating Jew who
would use this means of introducing a process of bastardization
in the very centre of the European Continent and, by infecting
the white race with the blood of an inferior stock, would
destroy the foundations of its independent existence.
France's
activities in Europe today, spurred on by the French lust for
vengeance and systematically directed by the Jew, are a
criminal attack against the life of the white race and will one
day arouse against the French people a spirit of vengeance
among a generation which will have recognized the original sin
of mankind in this racial pollution.
As far as
concerns Germany, the danger which France represents involves
the duty of relegating all sentiment to a subordinate place and
extending the hand to those who are threatened with the same
menace and who are not willing to suffer or tolerate France's
lust for hegemony.
For a long
time yet to come there will be only two Powers in Europe with
which it may be possible for Germany to conclude an alliance.
These Powers are Great Britain and Italy.
If we take
the trouble to cast a glance backwards on the way in which
German foreign policy has been conducted since the Revolution
we must, in view of the constant and incomprehensible acts of
submission on the part. of our governments, either lose heart
or become fired with rage and take up the cudgels against such
a regime. Their way of acting cannot be attributed to a want of
understanding, because what seemed to every thinking man to be
inconceivable was accomplished by the leaders of the November
parties with their Cyclopean intellects. They bowed to France
and begged her favour. Yes, during all these recent years, with
the touching simplicity of incorrigible visionaries, they went
on their knees to France again and again. They perpetuaily
wagged their tails before the Grande Nation. And in each
trick-o'-the-loop which the French hangmen performed with his
rope they recognized a visible change of feeling. Our real
political wire-pullers never shared in this absurd credulity.
The idea of establishing a friendship with France was for them
only a means of thwarting every attempt on Germany's part to
adopt a practical policy of alliances. They had no illusions
about French aims or those of the men behind the scenes in
France. What induced them to take up such an attitude and to
act as if they honestly believed that the fate of Germany could
possibly be changed in this way was the cool calculation that
if this did not happen our people might take the reins into
their own hands and choose another road.
Of course it
is difficult for us to propose England as our possible ally in
the future. Our Jewish Press has always been adept in
concentrating hatred against England particularly. And many of
our good German simpletons perch on these branches which the
Jews have limed to capture them. They babble about a
restoration of German sea power and protest against the robbery
of our colonies. Thus they furnish material which the
contriving Jew transmits to his clansmen in England, so that it
can be used there for purposes of practical propaganda. For our
simple-minded bourgeoisie who indulge in politics can take in
only little by little the idea that today we have not to fight
for 'sea-power' and such things. Even before the War it was
absurd to direct the national energies of Germany towards this
end without first having secured our position in Europe. Such a
hope today reaches that peak of absurdity which may be called
criminal in the domain of politics.
Often one
becomes really desperate on seeing how the Jewish wire-pullers
succeeded in concentrating the attention of the people on
things which are only of secondary importance today, They
incited the people to demonstrations and protests while at the
same time France was tearing our nation asunder bit by bit and
systematically removing the very foundations of our national
independence.
In this
connection I have to think of the Wooden Horse in the riding of
which the Jew showed extraordinary skill during these years. I
mean South Tyrol.
Yes, South
Tyrol. The reason why I take up this question here is just
because I want to call to account that shameful canaille who
relied on the ignorance and short memories of large sections of
our people and stimulated a national indignation which is as
foreign to the real character of our parliamentary impostors as
the idea of respect for private property is to a magpie.
I should like
to state here that I was one of those who, at the time when the
fate of South Tyrol was being decided – that is to say,
from August 1914 to November 1918 – took my place where
that country also could have been effectively defended, namely,
in the Army. I did my share in the fighting during those years,
not merely to save South Tyrol from being lost but also to save
every other German province for the Fatherland.
The
parliamentary sharpers did not take part in that combat. The
whole canaille played party politics. On the other hand, we
carried on the fight in the belief that a victorious issue of
the War would enable the German nation to keep South Tyrol
also; but the loud-mouthed traitor carried on a seditious
agitation against such a victorious issue, until the fighting
Siegfried succumbed to the dagger plunged in his back. It was
only natural that the inflammatory and hypocritical speeches of
the elegantly dressed parliamentarians on the Vienna Rathaus
Platz or in front of the Feldherrnhalle in Munich could not
save South Tyrol for Germany. That could be done only by the
fighting battalions at the Front. Those who broke up that
fighting front betrayed South Tyrol, as well as the other
districts of Germany.
Anyone who
thinks that the South Tyrol question can be solved today by
protests and manifestations and processions organized by
various associations is either a humbug or merely a German
philistine.
In this
regard it must be quite clearly understood that we cannot get
back the territories we have lost if we depend on solemn
imprecations before the throne of the Almighty God or on pious
hopes in a League of Nations, but only by the force of
arms.
Therefore the
only remaining question is: Who is ready to take up arms for
the restoration of the lost territories?
As far as
concerns myself personally, I can state with a good conscience
that I would have courage enough to take part in a campaign for
the reconquest of South Tyrol, at the head of parliamentarian
storm battalions consisting of parliamentarian gasconaders and
all the party leaders, also the various Councillors of State.
Only the Devil knows whether I might have the luck of seeing a
few shells suddenly burst over this 'burning' demonstration of
protest. I think that if a fox were to break into a poultry
yard his presence would not provoke such a helter-skelter and
rush to cover as we should witness in the band of
'protesters'.
The vilest
part of it all is that these talkers themselves do not believe
that anything can be achieved in this way. Each one of them
knows very well how harmless and ineffective their whole
pretence is. They do it only because it is easier now to babble
about the restoration of South Tyrol than to fight for its
preservation in days gone by.
Each one
plays the part that he is best capable of playing in life. In
those days we offered our blood. To-day these people are
engaged in whetting their tusks.
It is
particularly interesting to note today how legitimist circles
in Vienna preen themselves on their work for the restoration of
South Tyrol. Seven years ago their august and illustrious
Dynasty helped, by an act of perjury and treason, to make it
possible for the victorious world-coalition to take away South
Tyrol. At that time these circles supported the perfidious
policy adopted by their Dynasty and did not trouble themselves
in the least about the fate of South Tyrol or any other
province. Naturally it is easier today to take up the fight for
this territory, since the present struggle is waged with 'the
weapons of the mind'. Anyhow, it is easier to join in a
'meeting of protestation' and talk yourself hoarse in giving
vent to the noble indignation that fills your breast, or stain
your finger with the writing of a newspaper article, than to
blow up a bridge, for instance, during the occupation of the
Ruhr.
The reason
why certain circles have made the question of South Tyrol the
pivot of German-Italian relations during the past few years is
quite evident. Jews and Habsburg legitimists are greatly
interested in preventing Germany from pursuing a policy of
alliance which might lead one day to the resurgence of a free
German fatherland. It is not out of love for South Tyrol that
they play this role today – for their policy would turn
out detrimental rather than helpful to the interests of that
province – but through fear of an agreement being
established between Germany and Italy.
A tendency
towards lying and calumny lies in the nature of these people,
and that explains how they can calmly and brazenly attempt to
twist things in such a way as to make it appear that we have
'betrayed' South Tyrol.
There is one
clear answer that must be given to these gentlemen. It is this:
Tyrol has been betrayed, in the first place, by every German
who was sound in limb and body and did not offer himself for
service at the Front during 1914–1918 to do his duty
towards his country.
In the second
place, Tyrol was betrayed by every man who, during those years
did not help to reinforce the national spirit and the national
powers of resistance, so as to enable the country to carry
through the War and keep up the fight to the very end.
In the third
place, South Tyrol was betrayed by everyone who took part in
the November Revolution, either directly by his act or
indirectly by a cowardly toleration of it, and thus broke the
sole weapon that could have saved South Tyrol.
In the fourth
place, South Tyrol was betrayed by those parties and their
adherents who put their signatures to the disgraceful treaties
of Versailles and St. Germain.
And so the
matter stands, my brave gentlemen, who make your protests only
with words.
To-day I am
guided by a calm and cool recognition of the fact that the lost
territories cannot be won back by the whetted tongues of
parliamentary spouters but only by the whetted sword; in other
words, through a fight where blood will have to be shed.
Now, I have
no hesitations in saying that today, once the die has been
cast, it is not only impossible to win back South Tyrol through
a war but I should definitely take my stand against such a
movement, because I am convinced that it would not be possible
to arouse the national enthusiasm of the German people and
maintain it in such a way as would be necessary in order to
carry through such a war to a successful issue. On the
contrary, I believe that if we have to shed German blood once
again it would be criminal to do so for the sake of liberating
200,000 Germans, when more than seven million neighbouring
Germans are suffering under foreign domination and a vital
artery of the German nation has become a playground for hordes
of African negros.
If the German
nation is to put an end to a state of things which threatens to
wipe it off the map of Europe it must not fall into the errors
of the pre-War period and make the whole world its enemy. But
it must ascertain who is its most dangerous enemy so that it
can concentrate all its forces in a struggle to beat him. And
if, in order to carry through this struggle to victory,
sacrifices should be made in other quarters, future generations
will not condemn us for that. They will take account of the
miseries and anxieties which led us to make such a bitter
decision, and in the light of that consideration they will more
clearly recognize the brilliancy of our success.
Again I must
say here that we must always be guided by the fundamental
principle that, as a preliminary to winning back lost
provinces, the political independence and strength of the
motherland must first be restored.
The first
task which has to be accomplished is to make that independence
possible and to secure it by a wise policy of alliances, which
presupposes an energetic management of our public affairs.
But it is
just on this point that we, National Socialists, have to guard
against being dragged into the tow of our ranting bourgeois
patriots who take their cue from the Jew. It would be a
disaster if, instead of preparing for the coming struggle, our
Movement also were to busy itself with mere protests by word of
mouth.
It was the
fantastic idea of a Nibelungen alliance with the decomposed
body of the Habsburg State that brought about Germany's ruin.
Fantastic sentimentality in dealing with the possibilities of
foreign policy today would be the best means of preventing our
revival for innumerable years to come.
Here I must
briefly answer the objections which may be raised in regard to
the three questions I have put.
1. Is it
possible at all to form an alliance with the present Germany,
whose weakness is so visible to all eyes?
2. Can the
ex-enemy nations change their attitude towards Germany?
3. In other
nations is not the influence of Jewry stronger than the
recognition of their own interests, and does not this influence
thwart all their good intentions and render all their plans
futile?
I think that
I have already dealt adequately with one of the two aspects of
the first point. Of course nobody will enter into an alliance
with the present Germany. No Power in the world would link its
fortunes with a State whose government does not afford grounds
for the slightest confidence. As regards the attempt which has
been made by many of our compatriots to explain the conduct of
the Government by referring to the woeful state of public
feeling and thus excuse such conduct, I must strongly object to
that way of looking at things.
The lack of
character which our people have shown during the last six years
is deeply distressing. The indifference with which they have
treated the most urgent necessities of our nation might
veritably lead one to despair. Their cowardice is such that it
often cries to heaven for vengeance. But one must never forget
that we are dealing with a people who gave to the world, a few
years previously, an admirable example of the highest human
qualities. From the first days of August 1914 to the end of the
tremendous struggle between the nations, no people in the world
gave a better proof of manly courage, tenacity and patient
endurance, than this people gave who are so cast down and
dispirited today. Nobody will dare to assert that the lack of
character among our people today is typical of them. What we
have to endure today, among us and around us, is due only to
the influence of the sad and distressing effects that followed
the high treason committed on November 9th, 1918. More than
ever before the word of the poet is true: that evil can only
give rise to evil. But even in this epoch those qualities among
our people which are fundamentally sound are not entirely lost.
They slumber in the depths of the national conscience, and
sometimes in the clouded firmament we see certain qualities
like shining lights which Germany will one day remember as the
first symptoms of a revival. We often see young Germans
assembling and forming determined resolutions, as they did in
1914, freely and willingly to offer themselves as a sacrifice
on the altar of their beloved Fatherland. Millions of men have
resumed work, whole-heartedly and zealously, as if no
revolution had ever affected them. The smith is at his anvil
once again. And the farmer drives his plough. The scientist is
in his laboratory. And everybody is once again attending to his
duty with the same zeal and devotion as formerly.
The
oppression which we suffer from at the hands of our enemies is
no longer taken, as it formerly was, as a matter for laughter;
but it is resented with bitterness and anger. There can be no
doubt that a great change of attitude has taken place.
This
evolution has not yet taken the shape of a conscious intention
and movement to restore the political power and independence of
our nation; but the blame for this must be attributed to those
utterly incompetent people who have no natural endowments to
qualify them for statesmanship and yet have been governing our
nation since 1918 and leading it to ruin.
Yes. If
anybody accuses our people today he ought to be asked: What is
being done to help them? What are we to say of the poor support
which the people give to any measures introduced by the
Government? Is it not true that such a thing as a Government
hardly exists at all? And must we consider the poor support
which it receives as a sign of a lack of vitality in the nation
itself; or is it not rather a proof of the complete failure of
the methods employed in the management of this valuable trust?
What have our Governments done to re-awaken in the nation a
proud spirit of self-assertion, up-standing manliness, and a
spirit of righteous defiance towards its enemies?
In 1919, when
the Peace Treaty was imposed on the German nation, there were
grounds for hoping that this instrument of unrestricted
oppression would help to reinforce the outcry for the freedom
of Germany. Peace treaties which make demands that fall like a
whip-lash on the people turn out not infrequently to be the
signal of a future revival.
To what
purpose could the Treaty of Versailles have been exploited?
In the hands
of a willing Government, how could this instrument of unlimited
blackmail and shameful humiliation have been applied for the
purpose of arousing national sentiment to its highest pitch?
How could a well-directed system of propaganda have utilized
the sadist cruelty of that treaty so as to change the
indifference of the people to a feeling of indignation and
transform that indignation into a spirit of dauntless
resistance?
Each point of
that Treaty could have been engraved on the minds and hearts of
the German people and burned into them until sixty million men
and women would find their souls aflame with a feeling of rage
and shame; and a torrent of fire would burst forth as from a
furnace, and one common will would be forged from it, like a
sword of steel. Then the people would join in the common cry:
"To arms again!"
Yes. A treaty
of that kind can be used for such a purpose. Its unbounded
oppression and its impudent demands were an excellent
propaganda weapon to arouse the sluggish spirit of the nation
and restore its vitality.
Then, from
the child's story-book to the last newspaper in the country,
and every theatre and cinema, every pillar where placards are
posted and every free space on the hoardings should be utilized
in the service of this one great mission, until the
faint-hearted cry, "Lord, deliver us," which our patriotic
associations send up to Heaven today would be transformed into
an ardent prayer: "Almighty God, bless our arms when the hour
comes. Be just, as Thou hast always been just. Judge now if we
deserve our freedom. Lord, bless our struggle."
All
opportunities were neglected and nothing was done.
Who will be
surprised now if our people are not such as they should be or
might be? The rest of the world looks upon us only as its
valet, or as a kindly dog that will lick its master's hand
after he has been whipped.
Of course the
possibilities of forming alliances with other nations are
hampered by the indifference of our own people, but much more
by our Governments. They have been and are so corrupt that now,
after eight years of indescribable oppression, there exists
only a faint desire for liberty.
In order that
our nation may undertake a policy of alliances, it must restore
its prestige among other nations, and it must have an
authoritative Government that is not a drudge in the service of
foreign States and the taskmaster of its own people, but rather
the herald of the national will.
If our people
had a government which would look upon this as its mission, six
years would not have passed before a courageous foreign policy
on the part of the Reich would find a corresponding support
among the people, whose desire for freedom would be encouraged
and intensified thereby.
The third
objection referred to the difficulty of changing the ex-enemy
nations into friendly allies. That objection may be answered as
follows:
The general
anti-German psychosis which has developed in other countries
through the war propaganda must of necessity continue to exist
as long as there is not a renaissance of the national
conscience among the German people, so that the German Reich
may once again become a State which is able to play its part on
the chess-board of European politics and with whom the others
feel that they can play. Only when the Government and the
people feel absolutely certain of being able to undertake a
policy of alliances can one Power or another, whose interests
coincide with ours, think of instituting a system of propaganda
for the purpose of changing public opinion among its own
people. Naturally it will take several years of persevering and
ably directed work to reach such a result. Just because a long
period is needed in order to change the public opinion of a
country, it is necessary to reflect calmly before such an
enterprise be undertaken. This means that one must not enter
upon this kind of work unless one is absolutely convinced that
it is worth the trouble and that it will bring results which
will be valuable in the future. One must not try to change the
opinions and feelings of a people by basing one's actions on
the vain cajolery of a more or less brilliant Foreign Minister,
but only if there be a tangible guarantee that the new
orientation will be really useful. Otherwise public opinion in
the country dealt with may be just thrown into a state of
complete confusion. The most reliable guarantee that can be
given for the possibility of subsequently entering into an
alliance with a certain State cannot be found in the loquacious
suavity of some individual member of the Government, but in the
manifest stability of a definite and practical policy on the
part of the Government as a whole, and in the support which is
given to that policy by the public opinion of the country. The
faith of the public in this policy will be strengthened all the
more if the Government organize one active propaganda to
explain its efforts and secure public support for them, and if
public opinion favourably responds to the Government's
policy.
Therefore a
nation in such a position as ours will be looked upon as a
possible ally if public opinion supports the Government's
policy and if both are united in the same enthusiastic
determination to carry through the fight for national freedom.
That condition of affairs must be firmly established before any
attempt can be made to change public opinion in other countries
which, for the sake of defending their most elementary
interests, are disposed to take the road shoulder-to-shoulder
with a companion who seems able to play his part in defending
those interests. In other words, this means that they will be
ready to establish an alliance.
For this
purpose, however, one thing is necessary. Seeing that the task
of bringing about a radical change in the public opinion of a
country calls for hard work, and many do not at first
understand what it means, it would be both foolish and criminal
to commit mistakes which could be used as weapons in the hands
of those who are opposed to such a change.
One must
recognize the fact that it takes a long time for a people to
understand completely the inner purposes which a Government has
in view, because it is not possible to explain the ultimate
aims of the preparations that are being made to carry through a
certain policy. In such cases the Government has to count on
the blind faith of the masses or the intuitive instinct of the
ruling caste that is more developed intellectually. But since
many people lack this insight, this political acumen and
faculty for seeing into the trend of affairs, and since
political considerations forbid a public explanation of why
such and such a course is being followed, a certain number of
leaders in intellectual circles will always oppose new
tendencies which, because they are not easily grasped, can be
pointed to as mere experiments. And that attitude arouses
opposition among conservative circles regarding the measures in
question.
For this
reason a strict duty devolves upon everybody not to allow any
weapon to fall into the hands of those who would interfere with
the work of bringing about a mutual understanding with other
nations. This is specially so in our case, where we have to
deal with the pretentions and fantastic talk of our patriotic
associations and our small bourgeoisie who talk politics in the
cafes. That the cry for a new war fleet, the restoration of our
colonies, etc., has no chance of ever being carried out in
practice will not be denied by anyone who thinks over the
matter calmly and seriously. These harmless and sometimes
half-crazy spouters in the war of protests are serving the
interests of our mortal enemy, while the manner in which their
vapourings are exploited for political purposes in England
cannot be considered as advantageous to Germany.
They squander
their energies in futile demonstrations against the whole
world. These demonstrations are harmful to our interests and
those who indulge in them forget the fundamental principle
which is a preliminary condition of all success. What thou
doest, do it thoroughly. Because we keep on howling against
five or ten States we fail to concentrate all the forces of our
national will and our physical strength for a blow at the heart
of our bitterest enemy. And in this way we sacrifice the
possibility of securing an alliance which would reinforce our
strength for that decisive conflict.
Here, too,
there is a mission for National Socialism to fulfil. It must
teach our people not to fix their attention on the little
things but rather on the great things, not to exhaust their
energies on secondary objects, and not to forget that the
object we shall have to fight for one day is the bare existence
of our people and that the sole enemy we shall have to strike
at is that Power which is robbing us of this existence.
It may be
that we shall have many a heavy burden to bear. But this is by
no means an excuse for refusing to listen to reason and raise
nonsensical outcries against the rest of the world, instead of
concentrating all our forces against the most deadly enemy.
Moreover, the
German people will have no moral right to complain of the
manner in which the rest of the world acts towards them, as
long as they themselves have not called to account those
criminals who sold and betrayed their own country. We cannot
hope to be taken very seriously if we indulge in long-range
abuse and protests against England and Italy and then allow
those scoundrels to circulate undisturbed in our own country
who were in the pay of the enemy war propaganda, took the
weapons out of our hands, broke the backbone of our resistance
and bartered away the Reich for thirty pieces of silver.
The enemy did
only what was expected. And we ought to learn from the stand he
took and the way he acted.
Anyone who
cannot rise to the level of this outlook must reflect that
otherwise there would remain nothing else than to renounce the
idea of adopting any policy of alliances for the future. For if
we cannot form an alliance with England because she has robbed
us of our colonies, or with Italy because she has taken
possession of South Tyrol, or with Poland or Czechoslovakia,
then there remains no other possibility of an alliance in
Europe except with France which, inter alia, has robbed us of
Alsace and Lorraine.
There can
scarcely be any doubt as to whether this last alternative would
be advantageous to the interests of the German people. But if
it be defended by somebody one is always doubtful whether that
person be merely a simpleton or an astute rogue.
As far as
concerns the leaders in these activities, I think the latter
hypothesis is true.
A change in
public feeling among those nations which have hitherto been
enemies and whose true interests will correspond in the future
with ours could be effected, as far as human calculation goes,
if the internal strength of our State and our manifest
determination to secure our own existence made it clear that we
should be valuable allies. Moreover, it is necessary that our
incompetent way of doing things and our criminal conduct in
some matters should not furnish grounds which may be utilized
for purposes of propaganda by those who would oppose our
projects of establishing an alliance with one or other of our
former enemies.
