The strength
of the old state rested on three pillars: the monarchical form
of government, the civil service, and the army. The Revolution
of 1918 abolished the form of government, dissolved the army
and abandoned the civil service to the corruption of party
politics. Thus the essential supports of what is called the
Authority of the State were shattered. This authority nearly
always depends on three elements, which are the essential
foundations of all authority.
Popular
support is the first element which is necessary for the
creation of authority. But an authority resting on that
foundation alone is still quite frail, uncertain and
vacillating. Hence everyone who finds himself vested with an
authority that is based only on popular support must take
measures to improve and consolidate the foundations of that
authority by the creation of force. Accordingly we must look
upon power, that is to say, the capacity to use force, as the
second foundation on which all authority is based. This
foundation is more stable and secure, but not always stronger,
than the first. If popular support and power are united
together and can endure for a certain time, then an authority
may arise which is based on a still stronger foundation,
namely, the authority of tradition. And, finally, if popular
support, power, and tradition are united together, then the
authority based on them may be looked upon as invincible.
In Germany
the Revolution abolished this last foundation. There was no
longer even a traditional authority. With the collapse of the
old Reich, the suppression of the monarchical form of
government, the destruction of all the old insignia of
greatness and the imperial symbols, tradition was shattered at
a blow. The result was that the authority of the State was
shaken to its foundations.
The second
pillar of statal authority, namely power, also ceased to exist.
In order to carry through the Revolution it was necessary to
dissolve that body which had hitherto incorporated the
organized force and power of the State, namely, the Army.
Indeed, some detached fragments of the Army itself had to be
employed as fighting elements in the Revolution. The Armies at
the front were not subjected in the same measure to this
process of disruption; but as they gradually left farther
behind them the fields of glory on which they had fought
heroically for four-and-half years, they were attacked by the
solvent acid that had permeated the Fatherland; and when they
arrived at the demobilizing centres they fell into that state
of confusion which was styled voluntary obedience in the time
of the Soldiers' Councils.
Of course it
was out of the question to think of founding any kind of
authority on this crowd of mutineering soldiers, who looked
upon military service as a work of eight hours per day.
Therefore the second element, that which guarantees the
stability of authority, was also abolished and the Revolution
had only the original element, popular support, on which to
build up its authority. But this basis was extraordinarily
insecure. By means of a few violent thrusts the Revolution had
shattered the old statal edifice to its deepest foundations,
but only because the normal equilibrium within the social
structure of the nation had already been destroyed by the
war.
Every
national body is made up of three main classes. At one extreme
we have the best of the people, taking the word 'best' here to
indicate those who are highly endowed with the civic virtues
and are noted for their courage and their readiness to
sacrifice their private interests. At the other extreme are the
worst dregs of humanity, in whom vice and egotistic interests
prevail. Between these two extremes stands the third class,
which is made up of the broad middle stratum, who do not
represent radiant heroism or vulgar vice.
The stages of
a nation's rise are accomplished exclusively under the
leadership of the best extreme.
Times of
normal and symmetrical development, or of stable conditions,
owe their existence and outwardly visible characteristics to
the preponderating influence of the middle stratum. In this
stage the two extreme classes are balanced against one another;
in other words, they are relatively cancelled out.
Times of
national collapse are determined by the preponderating
influence of the worst elements.
It must be
noted here, however, that the broad masses, which constitute
what I have called the middle section, come forward and make
their influence felt only when the two extreme sections are
engaged in mutual strife. In case one of the extreme sections
comes out victorious the middle section will readily submit to
its domination. If the best dominate, the broad masses will
follow it. Should the worst extreme turn out triumphant, then
the middle section will at least offer no opposition to it; for
the masses that constitute the middle class never fight their
own battles.
The
outpouring of blood for four-and-a-half years during the war
destroyed the inner equilibrium between these three sections in
so far as it can be said – though admitting the sacrifices
made by the middle section – that the class which
consisted of the best human elements almost completely
disappeared through the loss of so much of its blood in the
war, because it was impossible to replace the truly enormous
quantity of heroic German blood which had been shed during
those four-and-a-half years. In hundreds of thousands of cases
it was always a matter of 'volunteers to the front', volunteers
for patrol and duty, volunteer dispatch carriers, volunteers
for establishing and working telephonic communications,
volunteers for bridge-building, volunteers for the submarines,
volunteers for the air service, volunteers for the storm
battalions, and so on, and so on. During four-and-a-half years,
and on thousands of occasions, there was always the call for
volunteers and again for volunteers. And the result was always
the same. Beardless young fellows or fully developed men, all
filled with an ardent love for their country, urged on by their
own courageous spirit or by a lofty sense of their duty –
it was always such men who answered the call for volunteers.
Tens of thousands, indeed hundreds of thousands, of such men
came forward, so that that kind of human material steadily grew
scarcer and scarcer. What did not actually fall was maimed in
the fight or gradually had to join the ranks of the crippled
because of the wounds they were constantly receiving, and thus
they had to carry on interminably owing to the steady decrease
in the supply of such men. In 1914 whole armies were composed
of volunteers who, owing to a criminal lack of conscience on
the part of our feckless parliamentarians, had not received any
proper training in times of peace, and so were thrown as
defenceless cannon-fodder to the enemy. The four hundred
thousand who thus fell or were permanently maimed on the
battlefields of Flanders could not be replaced any more. Their
loss was something far more than merely numerical. With their
death the scales, which were already too lightly weighed at
that end of the social structure which represented our best
human quality, now moved upwards rapidly, becoming heavier on
the other end with those vulgar elements of infamy and
cowardice – in short, there was an increase in the
elements that constituted the worst extreme of our
population.
And there was
something more: While for four-and-a-half years our best human
material was being thinned to an exceptional degree on the
battlefields, our worst people wonderfully succeeded in saving
themselves. For each hero who made the supreme sacrifice and
ascended the steps of Valhalla, there was a shirker who
cunningly dodged death on the plea of being engaged in business
that was more or less useful at home.
And so the
picture which presented itself at the end of the war was this:
The great middle stratum of the nation had fulfilled its duty
and paid its toll of blood. One extreme of the population,
which was constituted of the best elements, had given a typical
example of its heroism and had sacrificed itself almost to a
man. The other extreme, which was constituted of the worst
elements of the population, had preserved itself almost intact,
through taking advantage of absurd laws and also because the
authorities failed to enforce certain articles of the military
code.
This
carefully preserved scum of our nation then made the
Revolution. And the reason why it could do so was that the
extreme section composed of the best elements was no longer
there to oppose it. It no longer existed.
Hence the
German Revolution, from the very beginning, depended on only
one section of the population. This act of Cain was not
committed by the German people as such, but by an obscure
canaille of deserters, hooligans, etc.
The man at
the front gladly welcomed the end of the strife in which so
much blood had been shed. He was happy to be able to return
home and see his wife and children once again. But he had no
moral connection with the Revolution. He did not like it, nor
did he like those who had provoked and organized it. During the
four-and-a-half years of that bitter struggle at the front he
had come to forget the party hyenas at home and all their
wrangling had become foreign to him.
The
Revolution was really popular only with a small section of the
German people: namely, that class and their accomplices who had
selected the rucksack as the hall-mark of all honourable
citizens in this new State. They did not like the Revolution
for its own sake, though many people still erroneously believe
the contrary, but for the consequences which followed in its
train.
But it was
very difficult to establish any abiding authority on the
popular support given to these Marxist freebooters. And yet the
young Republic stood in need of authority at any cost, unless
it was ready to agree to be overthrown after a short period of
chaos by an elementary force assembled from those last elements
that still remained among the best extreme of the
population.
The danger
which those who were responsible for the Revolution feared most
at that time was that, in the turmoil of the confusion which
they themselves had created, the ground would suddenly be taken
from under their feet, that they might be suddenly seized and
transported to another terrain by an iron grip, such as has
often appeared at these junctures in the history of nations.
The Republic must be consolidated at all costs.
Hence it was
forced almost immediately after its foundation to erect another
pillar beside that wavering pillar of popularity. They found
that power must be organized once again in order to procure a
firmer foundation for their authority.
When those
who had been the matadors of the Revolution in December 1918,
and January and February 1919, felt the ground trembling
beneath their feet they looked around them for men who would be
ready to reinforce them with military support; for their feeble
position was dependent only on whatever popular favour they
enjoyed. The 'anti-militarist' Republic had need of soldiers.
But the first and only pillar on which the authority of the
State rested, namely, its popularity, was grounded only on a
conglomeration of rowdies and thieves, burglars, deserters,
shirkers, etc. Therefore in that section of the nation which we
have called the evil extreme it was useless to look for men who
would be willing to sacrifice their lives on behalf of a new
ideal. The section which had nourished the revolutionary idea
and carried out the Revolution was neither able nor willing to
call on the soldiers to protect it. For that section had no
wish whatsoever to organize a republican State, but to
disorganize what already existed and thus satisfy its own
instincts all the better. Their password was not the
organization and construction of the German Republic, but
rather the plundering of it.
Hence the cry
for help sent out by the public representatives, who were beset
by a thousand anxieties, did not find any response among this
class of people, but rather provoked a feeling of bitterness
and repudiation. For they looked upon this step as the
beginning of a breach of faith and trust, and in the building
up of an authority which was no longer based on popular support
but also on force they saw the beginning of a hostile move
against what the Revolution meant essentially for those
elements. They feared that measures might be taken against the
right to robbery and absolute domination on the part of a horde
of thieves and plunderers – in short, the worst rabble
– who had broken out of the convict prisons and left their
chains behind.
The
representatives of the people might cry out as much as they
liked, but they could get no help from that rabble. The cries
for help were met with the counter-cry 'traitors' by those very
people on whose support the popularity of the regime was
founded.
Then for the
first time large numbers of young Germans were found who were
ready to button on the military uniform once again in the
service of 'Peace and Order', as they believed, shouldering the
carbine and rifle and donning the steel helmet to defend the
wreckers of the Fatherland. Volunteer corps were assembled and,
although hating the Revolution, they began to defend it. The
practical effect of their action was to render the Revolution
firm and stable. In doing this they acted in perfect good
faith.
The real
organizer of the Revolution and the actual wire-puller behind
it, the international Jew, had sized up the situation
correctly. The German people were not yet ripe to be drawn into
the blood swamp of Bolshevism, as the Russian people had been
drawn. And that was because there was a closer racial union
between the intellectual classes in Germany and the manual
workers, and also because broad social strata were permeated
with cultured people, such as was the case also in the other
States of Western Europe; but this state of affairs was
completely lacking in Russia. In that country the intellectual
classes were mostly not of Russian nationality, or at least
they did not have the racial characteristics of the Slav. The
thin upper layer of intellectuals which then existed in Russia
might be abolished at any time, because there was no
intermediate stratum connecting it organically with the great
mass of the people. There the mental and moral level of the
great mass of the people was frightfully low.
In Russia the
moment the agitators were successful in inciting broad masses
of the people, who could not read or write, against the upper
layer of intellectuals who were not in contact with the masses
or permanently linked with them in any way – at that
moment the destiny of Russia was decided, the success of the
Revolution was assured. Thereupon the analphabetic Russian
became the slave of his Jewish dictators who, on their side,
were shrewd enough to name their dictatorship 'The Dictatorship
of the People'.
In the case
of Germany an additional factor must be taken into account.
Here the Revolution could be carried into effect only if the
Army could first be gradually dismembered. But the real author
of the Revolution and of the process of disintegration in the
Army was not the soldier who had fought at the front but the
canaille which more or less shunned the light and which were
either quartered in the home garrisons or were officiating as
'indispensables' somewhere in the business world at home. This
army was reinforced by ten thousand deserters who, without
running any particular risk, could turn their backs on the
Front. At all times the real poltroon fears nothing so much as
death. But at the Front he had death before his eyes every day
in a thousand different shapes. There has always been one
possible way, and one only, of making weak or wavering men, or
even downright poltroons, face their duty steadfastly. This
means that the deserter must be given to understand that his
desertion will bring upon him just the very thing he is flying
from. At the Front a man may die, but the deserter must die.
Only this draconian threat against every attempt to desert the
flag can have a terrifying effect, not merely on the individual
but also on the mass. Therein lay the meaning and purpose of
the military penal code.
It was a fine
belief to think that the great struggle for the life of a
nation could be carried through if it were based solely on
voluntary fidelity arising from and sustained by the knowledge
that such a struggle was necessary. The voluntary fulfilment of
one's duty is a motive that determines the actions of only the
best men, but not of the average type of men. Hence special
laws are necessary; just as, for instance, the law against
stealing, which was not made for men who are honest on
principle but for the weak and unstable elements. Such laws are
meant to hinder the evil-doer through their deterrent effect
and thus prevent a state of affairs from arising in which the
honest man is considered the more stupid, and which would end
in the belief that it is better to have a share in the robbery
than to stand by with empty hands or allow oneself to be
robbed.
It was a
mistake to believe that in a struggle which, according to all
human foresight, might last for several years it would be
possible to dispense with those expedients which the experience
of hundreds and even of thousands of years had proved to be
effective in making weak and unstable men face and fulfil their
duty in difficult times and at moments of great nervous
stress.
For the
voluntary war hero it is, of course, not necessary to have the
death penalty in the military code, but it is necessary for the
cowardly egoists who value their own lives more than the
existence of the community in the hour of national need. Such
weak and characterless people can be held back from
surrendering to their cowardice only by the application of the
heaviest penalties. When men have to struggle with death every
day and remain for weeks in trenches of mire, often very badly
supplied with food, the man who is unsure of himself and begins
to waver cannot be made to stick to his post by threats of
imprisonment or even penal servitude. Only by a ruthless
enforcement of the death penalty can this be effected. For
experience shows that at such a time the recruit considers
prison a thousand times more preferable than the battlefield.
In prison at least his precious life is not in danger. The
practical abolition of the death penalty during the war was a
mistake for which we had to pay dearly. Such omission really
meant that the military penal code was no longer recognized as
valid. An army of deserters poured into the stations at the
rear or returned home, especially in 1918, and there began to
form that huge criminal organization with which we were
suddenly faced, after November 7th, 1918, and which perpetrated
the Revolution.
The Front had
nothing to do with all this. Naturally, the soldiers at the
Front were yearning for peace. But it was precisely that fact
which represented a special danger for the Revolution. For when
the German soldiers began to draw near home, after the
Armistice, the revolutionaries were in trepidation and asked
the same question again and again: What will the troops from
the Front do? Will the field-greys stand for it?
During those
weeks the Revolution was forced to give itself at least an
external appearance of moderation, if it were not to run the
risk of being wrecked in a moment by a few German divisions.
For at that time, even if the commander of one division alone
had made up his mind to rally the soldiers of his division, who
had always remained faithful to him, in an onslaught to tear
down the red flag and put the 'councils' up against the wall,
or, if there was any resistance, to break it with
trench-mortars and hand grenades, that division would have
grown into an army of sixty divisions in less than four weeks.
The Jew wire-pullers were terrified by this prospect more than
by anything else; and to forestall this particular danger they
found it necessary to give the Revolution a certain aspect of
moderation. They dared not allow it to degenerate into
Bolshevism, so they had to face the existing conditions by
putting up the hypocritical picture of 'order and
tranquillity'. Hence many important concessions, the appeal to
the old civil service and to the heads of the old Army. They
would be needed at least for a certain time, and only when they
had served the purpose of Turks' Heads could the deserved
kick-out be administered with impunity. Then the Republic would
be taken entirely out of the hands of the old servants of the
State and delivered into the claws of the revolutionaries.
They thought
that this was the only plan which would succeed in duping the
old generals and civil servants and disarm any eventual
opposition beforehand through the apparently harmless and mild
character of the new regime.
Practical
experience has shown to what extent the plan succeeded.
The
Revolution, however, was not made by the peaceful and orderly
elements of the nation but rather by rioters, thieves and
robbers. And the way in which the Revolution was developing did
not accord with the intentions of these latter elements; still,
on tactical grounds, it was not possible to explain to them the
reasons for the course things were taking and make that course
acceptable.
As Social
Democracy gradually gained power it lost more and more the
character of a crude revolutionary party. Of course in their
inner hearts the Social Democrats wanted a revolution; and
their leaders had no other end in view. Certainly not. But what
finally resulted was only a revolutionary programme; but not a
body of men who would be able to carry it out. A revolution
cannot be carried through by a party of ten million members. If
such a movement were attempted the leaders would find that it
was not an extreme section of the population on which they had
to depend butrather the broad masses of the middle stratum;
hence the inert masses.
Recognizing
all this, already during the war, the Jews caused the famous
split in the Social Democratic Party. While the Social
Democratic Party, conforming to the inertia of its mass
following, clung like a leaden weight on the neck of the
national defence, the actively radical elements were extracted
from it and formed into new aggressive columns for purposes of
attack. The Independent Socialist Party and the Spartacist
League were the storm battalions of revolutionary Marxism. The
objective assigned to them was to create a fait accompli, on
the grounds of which the masses of the Social Democratic Party
could take their stand, having been prepared for this event
long beforehand. The feckless bourgeoisie had been estimated at
its just value by the Marxists and treated en canaille. Nobody
bothered about it, knowing well that in their canine servility
the representatives of an old and worn-out generation would not
be able to offer any serious resistance.
When the
Revolution had succeeded and its artificers believed that the
main pillars of the old State had been broken down, the Army
returning from the Front began to appear in the light of a
sinister sphinx and thus made it necessary to slow down the
national course of the Revolution. The main body of the Social
Democratic horde occupied the conquered positions, and the
Independent Socialist and Spartacist storm battalions were
side-tracked.
But that did
not happen without a struggle.
The activist
assault formations that had started the Revolution were
dissatisfied and felt that they had been betrayed. They now
wanted to continue the fight on their own account. But their
illimitable racketeering became odious even to the wire-pullers
of the Revolution. For the Revolution itself had scarcely been
accomplished when two camps appeared. In the one camp were the
elements of peace and order; in the other were those of blood
and terror. Was it not perfectly natural that our bourgeoisie
should rush with flying colours to the camp of peace and order?
For once in their lives their piteous political organizations
found it possible to act, inasmuch as the ground had been
prepared for them on which they were glad to get a new footing;
and thus to a certain extent they found themselves in coalition
with that power which they hated but feared. The German
political bourgeoisie achieved the high honour of being able to
associate itself with the accursed Marxist leaders for the
purpose of combating Bolshevism.
Thus the
following state of affairs took shape as early as December 1918
and January 1919:
A minority
constituted of the worst elements had made the Revolution. And
behind this minority all the Marxist parties immediately fell
into step. The Revolution itself had an outward appearance of
moderation, which aroused against it the enmity of the
fanatical extremists. These began to launch hand-grenades and
fire machine-guns, occupying public buildings, thus threatening
to destroy the moderate appearance of the Revolution. To
prevent this terror from developing further a truce was
concluded between the representatives of the new regime and the
adherents of the old order, so as to be able to wage a common
fight against the extremists. The result was that the enemies
of the Republic ceased to oppose the Republic as such and
helped to subjugate those who were also enemies of the
Republic, though for quite different reasons. But a further
result was that all danger of the adherents of the old State
putting up a fight against the new was now definitely
averted.
This fact
must always be clearly kept in mind. Only by remembering it can
we understand how it was possible that a nation in which
nine-tenths of the people had not joined in a revolution, where
seven-tenths repudiated it and six-tenths detested it –
how this nation allowed the Revolution to be imposed upon it by
the remaining one-tenth of the population.
Gradually the
barricade heroes in the Spartacist camp petered out, and so did
the nationalist patriots and idealists on the other side. As
these two groups steadily dwindled, the masses of the middle
stratum, as always happens, triumphed. The Bourgeoisie and the
Marxists met together on the grounds of accomplished facts, and
the Republic began to be consolidated. At first, however, that
did not prevent the bourgeois parties from propounding their
monarchist ideas for some time further, especially at the
elections, whereby they endeavoured to conjure up the spirits
of the dead past to encourage their own feeble-hearted
followers. It was not an honest proceeding. In their hearts
they had broken with the monarchy long ago; but the foulness of
the new regime had begun to extend its corruptive action and
make itself felt in the camp of the bourgeois parties. The
common bourgeois politician now felt better in the slime of
republican corruption than in the severe decency of the defunct
State, which still lived in his memory.
As I have
already pointed out, after the destruction of the old Army the
revolutionary leaders were forced to strengthen statal
authority by creating a new factor of power. In the conditions
that existed they could do this only by winning over to their
side the adherents of an outlook which was a direct
contradiction of their own. From those elements alone it was
possible slowly to create a new army which, limited numerically
by the peace treaties, had to be subsequently transformed in
spirit so as to become an instrument of the new regime.
Setting aside
the defects of the old State, which really became the cause of
the Revolution, if we ask how it was possible to carry the
Revolution to a successful issue as a political act, we arrive
at the following conclusions:
1. It was due
to a process of dry rot in our conceptions of duty and
obedience.
2. It was due
also to the passive timidity of the Parties who were supposed
to uphold the State.
To this the
following must be added: The dry rot which attacked our
concepts of duty and obedience was fundamentally due to our
wholly non-national and purely State education. From this came
the habit of confusing means and ends. Consciousness of duty,
fulfilment of duty, and obedience, are not ends in themselves
no more than the State is an end in itself; but they all ought
to be employed as means to facilitate and assure the existence
of a community of people who are kindred both physically and
spiritually. At a moment when a nation is manifestly collapsing
and when all outward signs show that it is on the point of
becoming the victim of ruthless oppression, thanks to the
conduct of a few miscreants, to obey these people and fulfil
one's duty towards them is merely doctrinaire formalism, and
indeed pure folly; whereas, on the other hand, the refusal of
obedience and fulfilment of duty in such a case might save the
nation from collapse. According to our current bourgeois idea
of the State, if a divisional general received from above the
order not to shoot he fulfilled his duty and therefore acted
rightly in not shooting, because to the bourgeois mind blind
formal obedience is a more valuable thing than the life of a
nation. But according to the National Socialist concept it is
not obedience to weak superiors that should prevail at such
moments, in such an hour the duty of assuming personal
responsibility towards the whole nation makes its
appearance.
The
Revolution succeeded because that concept had ceased to be a
vital force with our people, or rather with our governments,
and died down to something that was merely formal and
doctrinaire.
As regards
the second point, it may be said that the more profound cause
of the fecklessness of the bourgeois parties must be attributed
to the fact that the most active and upright section of our
people had lost their lives in the war. Apart from that, the
bourgeois parties, which may be considered as the only
political formations that stood by the old State, were
convinced that they ought to defend their principles only by
intellectual ways and means, since the use of physical force
was permitted only to the State. That outlook was a sign of the
weakness and decadence which had been gradually developing. And
it was also senseless at a period when there was a political
adversary who had long ago abandoned that standpoint and,
instead of this, had openly declared that he meant to attain
his political ends by force whenever that became possible. When
Marxism emerged in the world of bourgeois democracy, as a
consequence of that democracy itself, the appeal sent out by
the bourgeois democracy to fight Marxism with intellectual
weapons was a piece of folly for which a terrible expiation had
to be made later on. For Marxism always professed the doctrine
that the use of arms was a matter which had to be judged from
the standpoint of expediency and that success justified the use
of arms.
This idea was
proved correct during the days from November 7 to 10, 1918. The
Marxists did not then bother themselves in the least about
parliament or democracy, but they gave the death blow to both
by turning loose their horde of criminals to shoot and raise
hell.
When the
Revolution was over the bourgeois parties changed the title of
their firm and suddenly reappeared, the heroic leaders emerging
from dark cellars or more lightsome storehouses where they had
sought refuge. But, just as happens in the case of all
representatives of antiquated institutions, they had not
forgotten their errors or learned anything new. Their political
programme was grounded in the past, even though they themselves
had become reconciled to the new regime. Their aim was to
secure a share in the new establishment, and so they continued
the use of words as their sole weapon.
Therefore
after the Revolution the bourgeois parties also capitulated to
the street in a miserable fashion.
When the law
for the Protection of the Republic was introduced the majority
was not at first in favour of it. But, confronted with two
hundred thousand Marxists demonstrating in the streets, the
bourgeois 'statesmen' were so terror-stricken that they voted
for the Law against their wills, for the edifying reason that
otherwise they feared they might get their heads smashed by the
enraged masses on leaving the Reichstag.
And so the
new State developed along its own course, as if there had been
no national opposition at all.
The only
organizations which at that time had the strength and courage
to face Marxism and its enraged masses were first of all the
volunteer corps, and subsequently the organizations for
self-defence, the civic guards and finally the associations
formed by the demobilized soldiers of the old Army.
But the
existence of these bodies did not appreciably change the course
of German history; and that for the following causes:
As the
so-called national parties were without influence, because they
had no force which could effectively demonstrate in the street,
the Leagues of Defence could not exercise any influence because
they had no political idea and especially because they had no
definite political aim in view.
The success
which Marxism once attained was due to perfect co-operation
between political purposes and ruthless force. What deprived
nationalist Germany of all practical hopes of shaping German
development was the lack of a determined co-operation between
brute force and political aims wisely chosen.
Whatever may
have been the aspirations of the 'national' parties, they had
no force whatsoever to fight for these aspirations, least of
all in the streets.
The Defense
Leagues had force at their disposal. They were masters of the
street and of the State, but they lacked political ideas and
aims on behalf of which their forces might have been or could
have been employed in the interests of the German nation. The
cunning Jew was able in both cases, by his astute powers of
persuasion, in reinforcing an already existing tendency to make
this unfortunate state of affairs permanent and at the same
time to drive the roots of it still deeper.
The Jew
succeeded brilliantly in using his Press for the purpose of
spreading abroad the idea that the defence associations were of
a 'non-political' character just as in politics he was always
astute enough to praise the purely intellectual character of
the struggle and demand that it must always be kept on that
plane
Millions of
German imbeciles then repeated this folly without having the
slightest suspicion that by so doing they were, for all
practical purposes, disarming themselves and delivering
themselves defenceless into the hands of the Jew.
But there is
a natural explanation of this also. The lack of a great idea
which would re-shape things anew has always meant a limitation
in fighting power. The conviction of the right to employ even
the most brutal weapons is always associated with an ardent
faith in the necessity for a new and revolutionary
transformation of the world.
A movement
which does not fight for such high aims and ideals will never
have recourse to extreme means.
The
appearance of a new and great idea was the secret of success in
the French Revolution. The Russian Revolution owes its triumph
to an idea. And it was only the idea that enabled Fascism
triumphantly to subject a whole nation to a process of complete
renovation.
Bourgeois
parties are not capable of such an achievement. And it was not
the bourgeois parties alone that fixed their aim in a
restoration of the past. The defence associations also did so,
in so far as they concerned themselves with political aims at
all. The spirit of the old war legions and Kyffauser tendencies
lived in them and therewith helped politically to blunt the
sharpest weapons which the German nation then possessed and
allow them to rust in the hands of republican serfs. The fact
that these associations were inspired by the best of intentions
in so doing, and certainly acted in good faith, does not alter
in the slightest degree the foolishness of the course they
adopted.
In the
consolidated Reichswehr Marxism gradually acquired the support
of force, which it needed for its authority. As a logical
consequence it proceeded to abolish those defence associations
which it considered dangerous, declaring that they were now no
longer necessary. Some rash leaders who defied the Marxist
orders were summoned to court and sent to prison. But they all
got what they had deserved.
The founding
of the National Socialist German Labour Party incited a
movement which was the first to fix its aim, not in a
mechanical restoration of the past - as the bourgeois parties
did - but in the substitution of an organic People's State for
the present absurd statal mechanism.
From the
first day of its foundation the new movement took its stand on
the principle that its ideas had to be propagated by
intellectual means but that, wherever necessary, muscular force
must be employed to support this propaganda. In accordance with
their conviction of the paramount importance of the new
doctrine, the leaders of the new movement naturally believe
that no sacrifice can be considered too great when it is a
question of carrying through the purpose of the movement.
I have
emphasized that in certain circumstances a movement which is
meant to win over the hearts of the people must be ready to
defend itself with its own forces against terrorist attempts on
the part of its adversaries. It has invariably happened in the
history of the world that formal State authority has failed to
break a reign of terror which was inspired by a philosophy of
life. It can only be conquered by a new and different
philosophy of life whose representatives are quite as audacious
and determined. The acknowledgment of this fact has always been
very unpleasant for the bureaucrats who are the protectors of
the State, but the fact remains nevertheless. The rulers of the
State can guarantee tranquillity and order only in case the
State embodies a philosophy which is shared in by the people as
a whole; so that elements of disturbance can be treated as
isolated criminals, instead of being considered as the
champions of an idea which is diametrically opposed to official
opinions. If such should be the case the State may employ the
most violent measures for centuries long against the terror
that threatens it; but in the end all these measures will prove
futile, and the State will have to succumb.
The German
State is intensely overrun by Marxism. In a struggle that went
on for seventy years the State was not able to prevent the
triumph of the Marxist idea. Even though the sentences to penal
servitude and imprisonment amounted in all to thousands of
years, and even though the most sanguinary methods of
repression were in innumerable instances threatened against the
champions of the Marxist philosophy, in the end the State was
forced to capitulate almost completely. The ordinary bourgeois
political leaders will deny all this, but their protests are
futile.
Seeing that
the State capitulated unconditionally to Marxism on November
9th, 1918, it will not suddenly rise up tomorrow as the
conqueror of Marxism. On the contrary. Bourgeois simpletons
sitting on office stools in the various ministries babble about
the necessity of not governing against the wishes of the
workers, and by the word 'workers' they mean the Marxists. By
identifying the German worker with Marxism not only are they
guilty of a vile falsification of the truth, but they thus try
to hide their own collapse before the Marxist idea and the
Marxist organization.
In view of
the complete subordination of the present State to Marxism, the
National Socialist Movement feels all the more bound not only
to prepare the way for the triumph of its idea by appealing to
the reason and understanding of the public but also to take
upon itself the responsibility of organizing its own defence
against the terror of the International, which is intoxicated
with its own victory.
I have
already described how practical experience in our young
movement led us slowly to organize a system of defence for our
meetings. This gradually assumed the character of a military
body specially trained for the maintenance of order, and tended
to develop into a service which would have its properly
organized cadres.
This new
formation might resemble the defence associations externally,
but in reality there were no grounds of comparison between the
one and the other.
As I have
already said, the German defence organizations did not have any
definite political ideas of their own. They really were only
associations for mutual protection, and they were trained and
organized accordingly, so that they were an illegal complement
or auxiliary to the legal forces of the State. Their character
as free corps arose only from the way in which they were
constructed and the situation in which the State found itself
at that time. But they certainly could not claim to be free
corps on the grounds that they were associations formed freely
and privately for the purpose of fighting for their own freely
formed political convictions. Such they were not, despite the
fact that some of their leaders and some associations as such
were definitely opposed to the Republic. For before we can
speak of political convictions in the higher sense we must be
something more than merely convinced that the existing regime
is defective. Political convictions in the higher sense mean
that one has the picture of a new regime clearly before one's
mind, feels that the establishment of this regime is an
absolute necessity and sets himself to carry out that purpose
as the highest task to which his life can be devoted.
The troops
for the preservation of order, which were then formed under the
National Socialist Movement, were fundamentally different from
all the other defence associations by reason of the fact that
our formations were not meant in any way to defend the state of
things created by the Revolution, but rather that they were
meant exclusively to support our struggle for the creation of a
new Germany.
In the
beginning this body was merely a guard to maintain order at our
meetings. Its first task was limited to making it possible for
us to hold our meetings, which otherwise would have been
completely prevented by our opponents. These men were at that
time trained merely for purposes of attack, but they were not
taught to adore the big stick exclusively, as was then
pretended in stupid German patriotic circles. They used the
cudgel because they knew that it can be made impossible for
high ideals to be put forward if the man who endeavours to
propagate them can be struck down with the cudgel. As a matter
of fact, it has happened in history not infrequently that some
of the greatest minds have perished under the blows of the most
insignificant helots. Our bodyguards did not look upon violence
as an end in itself, but they protected the expositors of ideal
aims and purposes against hostile coercion by violence. They
also understood that there was no obligation to undertake the
defence of a State which did not guarantee the defence of the
nation, but that, on the contrary, they had to defend the
nation against those who were threatening to destroy nation and
State.
After the
fight which took place at the meeting in the Munich
Hofbräuhaus, where the small number of our guards who were
present won everlasting fame for themselves by the heroic
manner in which they stormed the adversaries; these guards were
called The Storm Detachment. As the name itself indicates, they
represent only a detachment of the Movement. They are one
constituent element of it, just as is the Press, the
propaganda, educational institutes, and other sections of the
Party.
We learned
how necessary was the formation of such a body, not only from
our experience on the occasion of that memorable meeting but
also when we sought gradually to carry the Movement beyond
Munich and extend it to the other parts of Germany. Once we had
begun to appear as a danger to Marxism the Marxists lost no
opportunity of trying to crush beforehand all preparations for
the holding of National Socialist meetings. When they did not
succeed in this they tried to break up the meeting itself. It
goes without saying that all the Marxist organizations, no
matter of what grade or view, blindly supported the policy and
activities of their representations in every case. But what is
to be said of the bourgeois parties who, when they were reduced
to silence by these same Marxists and in many places did not
dare to send their speakers to appear before the public, yet
showed themselves pleased, in a stupid and incomprehensible
manner, every time we received any kind of set-back in our
fight against Marxism. The bourgeois parties were happy to
think that those whom they themselves could not stand up
against, but had to knuckle down to, could not be broken by us.
What must be said of those State officials, chiefs of police,
and even cabinet ministers, who showed a scandalous lack of
principle in presenting themselves externally to the public as
'national' and yet shamelessly acted as the henchmen of the
Marxists in the disputes which we, National Socialists, had
with the latter. What can be said of persons who debased
themselves so far, for the sake of a little abject praise in
the Jewish Press, that they persecuted those men to whose
heroic courage and intervention, regardless of risk, they were
partly indebted for not having been torn to pieces by the Red
mob a few years previously and strung up to the lamp-posts?
One day these
lamentable phenomena fired the late but unforgotten Prefect
Pöhner – a man whose unbending straightforwardness
forced him to hate all twisters and to hate them as only a man
with an honest heart can hate – to say: "In all my life I
wished to be first a German and then an official, and I never
wanted to mix up with these creatures who, as if they were kept
officials, prostituted themselves before anybody who could play
lord and master for the time being."
It was a
specially sad thing that gradually tens of thousands of honest
and loyal servants of the State did not only come under the
power of such people but were also slowly contaminated by their
unprincipled morals. Moreover, these kind of men pursued honest
officials with a furious hatred, degrading them and driving
them from their positions, and yet passed themselves off as
'national' by the aid of their lying hypocrisy.
From
officials of that kind we could expect no support, and only in
very rare instances was it given. Only by building up its own
defence could our movement become secure and attract that
amount of public attention and general respect which is given
to those who can defend themselves when attacked.
As an
underlying principle in the internal development of the Storm
Detachment, we came to the decision that not only should it be
perfectly trained in bodily efficiency but that the men should
be so instructed as to make them indomitably convinced
champions of the National Socialist ideas and, finally, that
they should be schooled to observe the strictest discipline.
This body was to have nothing to do with the defence
organizations of the bourgeois type and especially not with any
secret organization.
My reasons at
that time for guarding strictly against letting the Storm
Detachment of the German National Socialist Labour Party appear
as a defence association were as follows:
On purely
practical grounds it is impossible to build up a national
defence organization by means of private associations, unless
the State makes an enormous contribution to it. Whoever thinks
otherwise overestimates his own powers. Now it is entirely out
of the question to form organizations of any military value for
a definite purpose on the principle of so-called 'voluntary
discipline'. Here the chief support for enforcing orders,
namely, the power of inflicting punishment, is lacking. In the
autumn, or rather in the spring, of 1919 it was still possible
to raise 'volunteer corps', not only because most of the men
who came forward at that time had been through the school of
the old Army, but also because the kind of duty imposed there
constrained the individual to absolute obedience at least for a
definite period of time.
That spirit
is entirely lacking in the volunteer defence organizations of
today. The more the defence association grows, the weaker its
discipline becomes and so much the less can one demand from the
individual members. Thus the whole organization will more and
more assume the character of the old non-political associations
of war comrades and veterans.
It is
impossible to carry through a voluntary training in military
service for larger masses unless one is assured absolute power
of command. There will always be few men who will voluntarily
and spontaneously submit to that kind of obedience which is
considered natural and necessary in the Army.
Moreover, a
proper system of military training cannot be developed where
there are such ridiculously scanty means as those at the
disposal of the defence associations. The principal task of
such an institution must be to impart the best and most
reliable kind of instruction. Eight years have passed since the
end of the War, and during that time none of our German youth,
at an age when formerly they would have had to do military
service, have received any systematic training at all. The aim
of a defence association cannot be to enlist here and now all
those who have already received a military training; for in
that case it could be reckoned with mathematical accuracy when
the last member would leave the association. Even the younger
soldier from 1918 will no longer be fit for front-line service
twenty years later, and we are approaching that state of things
with a rapidity that gives cause for anxiety. Thus the defence
associations must assume more and more the aspect of the old
ex-service men's societies. But that cannot be the meaning and
purpose of an institution which calls itself, not an
association of ex-service men but a defence association,
indicating by this title that it considers its task to be, not
only to preserve the tradition of the old soldiers and hold
them together but also to propagate the idea of national
defence and be able to carry this idea into practical effect,
which means the creation of a body of men who are fit and
trained for military defence.
But this
implies that those elements will receive a military training
which up to now have received none. This is something that in
practice is impossible for the defence associations. Real
soldiers cannot be made by a training of one or two hours per
week. In view of the enormously increasing demands which modern
warfare imposes on each individual soldier today, a military
service of two years is barely sufficient to transform a raw
recruit into a trained soldier. At the Front during the War we
all saw the fearful consequences which our young recruits had
to suffer from their lack of a thorough military training.
Volunteer formations which had been drilled for fifteen or
twenty weeks under an iron discipline and shown unlimited
self-denial proved nevertheless to be no better than cannon
fodder at the Front. Only when distributed among the ranks of
the old and experienced soldiers could the young recruits, who
had been trained for four or six months, become useful members
of a regiment. Guided by the 'old men', they adapted themselves
gradually to their task.
In the light
of all this, how hopeless must the attempt be to create a body
of fighting troops by a so-called training of one or two hours
in the week, without any definite power of command and without
any considerable means. In that way perhaps one could refresh
military training in old soldiers, but raw recruits cannot thus
be transformed into expert soldiers.
How such a
proceeding produces utterly worthless results may also be
demonstrated by the fact that at the same time as these
so-called volunteer defence associations, with great effort and
outcry and under difficulties and lack of necessities, try to
educate and train a few thousand men of goodwill (the others
need not be taken into account) for purposes of national
defence, the State teaches our young men democratic and
pacifist ideas and thus deprives millions and millions of their
national instincts, poisons their logical sense of patriotism
and gradually turns them into a herd of sheep who will
patiently follow any arbitrary command. Thus they render
ridiculous all those attempts made by the defence associations
to inculcate their ideas in the minds of the German youth.
Almost more
important is the following consideration, which has always made
me take up a stand against all attempts at a so-called military
training on the basis of the volunteer associations.
Assuming
that, in spite of all the difficulties just mentioned, a
defence association were successful in training a certain
number of Germans every year to be efficient soldiers, not only
as regards their mental outlook but also as regards bodily
efficiency and the expert handling of arms, the result must
necessarily be null and void in a State whose whole tendency
makes it not only look upon such a defensive formation as
undesirable but even positively hate it, because such an
association would completely contradict the intimate aims of
the political leaders, who are the corrupters of this
State.
But anyhow,
such a result would be worthless under governments which have
demonstrated by their own acts that they do not lay the
slightest importance on the military power of the nation and
are not disposed to permit an appeal to that power only in case
that it were necessary for the protection of their own
malignant existence.
And that is
the state of affairs today. It is not ridiculous to think of
training some ten thousand men in the use of arms, and carry on
that training surreptitiously, when a few years previously the
State, having shamefully sacrificed eight-and-a-half million
highly trained soldiers, not merely did not require their
services any more, but, as a mark of gratitude for their
sacrifices, held them up to public contumely. Shall we train
soldiers for a regime which besmirched and spat upon our most
glorious soldiers, tore the medals and badges from their
breasts, trampled on their flags and derided their
achievements? Has the present regime taken one step towards
restoring the honour of the old army and bringing those who
destroyed and outraged it to answer for their deeds? Not in the
least. On the contrary, the people I have just referred to may
be seen enthroned in the highest positions under the State
today. And yet it was said at Leipzig: "Right goes with might."
Since, however, in our Republic today might is in the hands of
the very men who arranged for the Revolution, and since that
Revolution represents a most despicable act of high treason
against the nation – yea, the vilest act in German history
– there can surely be no grounds for saying that might of
this character should be enhanced by the formation of a new
young army. It is against all sound reason.
The
importance which this State attached, after the Revolution of
1918, to the reinforcement of its position from the military
point of view is clearly and unmistakably demonstrated by its
attitude towards the large self-defence organizations which
existed in that period. They were not unwelcome as long as they
were of use for the personal protection of the miserable
creatures cast up by the Revolution.
But the
danger to these creatures seemed to disappear as the debasement
of our people gradually increased. As the existence of the
defence associations no longer implied a reinforcement of the
national policy they became superfluous. Hence every effort was
made to disarm them and suppress them wherever that was
possible.
History
records only a few examples of gratitude on the part of
princes. But there is not one patriot among the new bourgeoisie
who can count on the gratitude of revolutionary incendiaries
and assassins, persons who have enriched themselves from the
public spoil and betrayed the nation. In examining the problem
as to the wisdom of forming these defence associations I have
never ceased to ask: 'For whom shall I train these young men?
For what purpose will they be employed when they will have to
be called out?' The answer to these questions lays down at the
same time the best rule for us to follow.
If the
present State should one day have to call upon trained troops
of this kind it would never be for the purpose of defending the
interests of the nation vis-à-vis those of the stranger
but rather to protect the oppressors of the nation inside the
country against the danger of a general outbreak of wrath on
the part of a nation which has been deceived and betrayed and
whose interests have been bartered away.
For this
reason it was decided that the Storm Detachment of the German
National Socialist Labour Party ought not to be in the nature
of a military organization. It had to be an instrument of
protection and education for the National Socialist Movement
and its duties should be in quite a different sphere from that
of the military defence association.
And, of
course, the Storm Detachment should not be in the nature of a
secret organization. Secret organizations are established only
for purposes that are against the law. Therewith the purpose of
such an organization is limited by its very nature. Considering
the loquacious propensities of the German people, it is not
possible to build up any vast organization, keeping it secret
at the same time and cloaking its purpose. Every attempt of
that kind is destined to turn out absolutely futile. It is not
merely that our police officials today have at their disposal a
staff of eavesdroppers and other such rabble who are ready to
play traitor, like Judas, for thirty pieces of silver and will
betray whatever secrets they can discover and will invent what
they would like to reveal. In order to forestall such
eventualities, it is never possible to bind one's own followers
to the silence that is necessary. Only small groups can become
really secret societies, and that only after long years of
filtration. But the very smallness of such groups would deprive
them of all value for the National Socialist Movement. What we
needed then and need now is not one or two hundred dare-devil
conspirators but a hundred thousand devoted champions of our
philosophy of life. The work must not be done through secret
conventicles but through formidable mass demonstrations in
public. Dagger and pistol and poison-vial cannot clear the way
for the progress of the movement. That can be done only by
winning over the man in the street. We must overthrow Marxism,
so that for the future National Socialism will be master of the
street, just as it will one day become master of the State.
There is
another danger connected with secret societies. It lies in the
fact that their members often completely misunderstand the
greatness of the task in hand and are apt to believe that a
favourable destiny can be assured for the nation all at once by
means of a single murder. Such a belief may find historical
justification by appealing to cases where a nation had been
suffering under the tyranny of some oppressor who at the same
time was a man of genius and whose extraordinary personality
guaranteed the internal solidity of his position and enabled
him to maintain his fearful oppression. In such cases a man may
suddenly arise from the ranks of the people who is ready to
sacrifice himself and plunge the deadly steel into the heart of
the hated individual. In order to look upon such a deed as
abhorrent one must have the republican mentality of that petty
canaille who are conscious of their own crime. But the greatest
champion of liberty that the German people have ever had has
glorified such a deed in William Tell.
During 1919
and 1920 there was danger that the members of secret
organizations, under the influence of great historical examples
and overcome by the immensity of the nation's misfortunes,
might attempt to wreak vengeance on the destroyers of their
country, under the belief that this would end the miseries of
the people. All such attempts were sheer folly, for the reason
that the Marxist triumph was not due to the superior genius of
one remarkable person but rather to immeasurable incompetence
and cowardly shirking on the part of the bourgeoisie. The
hardest criticism that can be uttered against our bourgeoisie
is simply to state the fact that it submitted to the
Revolution, even though the Revolution did not produce one
single man of eminent worth. One can always understand how it
was possible to capitulate before a Robespierre, a Danton, or a
Marat; but it was utterly scandalous to go down on all fours
before the withered Scheidemann, the obese Herr Erzberger,
Frederick Ebert, and the innumerable other political pigmies of
the Revolution. There was not a single man of parts in whom one
could see the revolutionary man of genius. Therein lay the
country's misfortune; for they were only revolutionary bugs,
Spartacists wholesale and retail. To suppress one of them would
be an act of no consequence. The only result would be that
another pair of bloodsuckers, equally fat and thirsty, would be
ready to take his place.
During those
years we had to take up a determined stand against an idea
which owed its origin and foundation to historical episodes
that were really great, but to which our own despicable epoch
did not bear the slightest similarity.
The same
reply may be given when there is question of putting somebody
'on the spot' who has acted as a traitor to his country. It
would be ridiculous and illogical to shoot a poor wretch who
had betrayed the position of a howitzer to the enemy while the
highest positions of the government are occupied by a rabble
who bartered away a whole empire, who have on their consciences
the deaths of two million men who were sacrificed in vain,
fellows who were responsible for the millions maimed in the war
and who make a thriving business out of the republican regime
without allowing their souls to be disturbed in any way. It
would be absurd to do away with small traitors in a State whose
government has absolved the great traitors from all punishment.
For it might easily happen that one day an honest idealist,
who, out of love for his country, had removed from circulation
some miserable informer that had given information about secret
stores of arms might now be called to answer for his act before
the chief traitors of the country. And there is still an
important question: Shall some small traitorous creature be
suppressed by another small traitor, or by an idealist? In the
former case the result would be doubtful and the deed would
almost surely be revealed later on. In the second case a petty
rascal is put out of the way and the life of an idealist who
may be irreplaceable is in jeopardy.
For myself, I
believe that small thieves should not be hanged while big
thieves are allowed to go free. One day a national tribunal
will have to judge and sentence some tens of thousands of
organizers who were responsible for the criminal November
betrayal and all the consequences that followed on it. Such an
example will teach the necessary lesson, once and for ever, to
those paltry traitors who revealed to the enemy the places
where arms were hidden.
On the
grounds of these considerations I steadfastly forbade all
participation in secret societies, and I took care that the
Storm Detachment should not assume such a character. During
those years I kept the National Socialist Movement away from
those experiments which were being undertaken by young Germans
who for the most part were inspired with a sublime idealism but
who became the victims of their own deeds, because they could
not ameliorate the lot of their fatherland to the slightest
degree.
