Ribbentrop also denied Hitler ordered the Holocaust | Winston Smith Ministry of Truth Archive

Winston Smith Ministry of Truth Archive

[Note: As this article is reconstructed from a copy some content/layout may vary from the original posting.]

Ribbentrop also denied Hitler ordered the Holocaust

Herman Goering denied even knowing about the mass executions of Jews whilst he was on the stand at the main Nuremberg Trial, stating:

This I maintain, and the reason for this is that these things were kept secret from me. I might add that in my opinion not even the Führer knew the extent of what was going on. This is also explained by the fact that Himmler kept all these matters very secret. We were never given figures or any other details.

But Goering wasn't the only senior member of the NSDAP who was of the opinion that Hitler did not order the mass killing of Jews. I've recently obtained a copy of the memoirs of Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister. He too was

tried and sentenced to death by hanging at Nuremberg, but in the last few weeks of his life, he wrote his memoirs which were published in 1953 and English in 1954.

THE JEWISH PROBLEM

From the moment I joined the N.S.D.A.P. I tried to bring about a revision of its anti-Semitic principles, or, at least, to have the Jewish problem solved by way of evolution through a 'numerus clausus'. I also though there was a possibility that my hope for more tolerance would come true.

Germany undoubtedly had a Jewish problem even before 1933. Jews had gained considerable influence in many sectors of the life of the nation. They were almost predominant in German cultural life, the Press, the cinema, the stage and especially business and finance. A well-known Frankfurt Jew and family friend of ours of long standing frequently spoke to me about this at the time full of anxiety. He was worried lest the conduct of certain German and immigrant Jews should lead to serious conflict sooner or later.

After the promulgation of the Nuremberg Laws in September, 1935, I had a long detailed talk with the Führer about the Jewish question. It was soon after the conclusion of the Naval Agreement with Britain; the Führer had great confidence in me, and I therefore pointed out the repercussions these Laws would have abroad. His reply seemed to me to indicate that the new legislation was intended to be the concluding measure, and that the Jews, while very much restricted in their scope, would retain an altogether fair chance of Hitler and of Party headquarters up to 1936, when I left for London, appeared to be not unfavourable to the emergence of quite toleration.

When in 1938 I returned to Berlin as Foreign Minister I found an entirely new situation. The reaction of world Jewry, especially in the U.S.A., to the Nuremberg Laws had been strong, and the result had been the sharpest attacks on National Socialist Germany, especially in the foreign Press. This in turn had made the Führer much harder. The vicious circle had begun.

Following the murder by the Jew Grunspan of Legation Counsellor vom Rath in our Paris Embassy, the well-known excesses against Jews occurred in November, 1938. As soon as I heard of them I went to the Obersalzberg and told Hitler of the serious effect such illegal anti-Semitic measures were bound to have on our own German people, and the inevitable political consequences. Hitler replied in deadly earnest that it was not always possible to detirmine the course of events as one liked, and that everything would return to its normal course. I had the impression that Hitler himself was surprised by the extent of the reaction.

During the winter of 1938 to 1939 I repeatedly made vain representations to the Führer in favour of a complete return to the situation as it existed before the excesses. I submitted to him a plan which provided for the voluntary emigration of Jews with permission to take with them part of their property. In fact many Jews did emigrate at that time, although other countries, including the U.S.A., made the immigration of German Jews very difficult.

After the outbreak of hostilities the propaganda war between National Socialist Germany and international Jewry became increasingly bitter; this made Hitler even more inflexible and it became more and more difficult to talk to him about the Jewish question. In spite of this I indicated to him the great disadvantages from the point of view of foreign policy of the anti-Jewish policy on several occasions. American propaganda, and even that of some netural governments, made great play with the Jewish question and made things very difficult for us. Most of this propaganda originated in the Anglo-American world. I always told Hitler that the enmity of world Jewry appeared unnecessary, and that it was tantamount to having an additional great power as an enemy.

However, Hitler's conviction that world Jewry had systematically prepared the war against Germany and was in the end responsible for its outbreak became more and more deeply rooted. In his view, the desired comprehensive settlement with Britain had been foiled by the Jews alone, in that country and in America. Moreover, before and after the outbreak of the Russian war, Hitler believed that international Jewry was also responsible for the communist threat in the East, and that it had compelled Stalin to decide first to defeat Germany by an attack from East and West and then to bolshevize her.

I repeatedly advanced my contary opinion: I was convinced that the war had been caused by Britain's hostility to German aspirations. While Jewish influence may have contributed, it had not been the primary cause. On the contary this lay in the anxiety of British imperialists to preserve the balance of power in Europe. When discussing these questions with Hitler I recalled that in the era of Napoleon, when the Jews exerted no appreciable influence in England (the Rothschilds only rose to eminence after Waterloo), the English nevertheless fought an embittered war against the French Emperor; and later, Britain had proclaimed the Emperor Wilhelm II as her enemy, although he was a friend of the German Jews.

Hitler was immovable and always replied that I did not understand this issue. He remained convinced that the war had been brought about by the Jews of England and France, and especially of the U.S.A. American Jews, who exercised almost complete domination over the American Press, had systematically prepared for war and driven Roosevelt into his anti-German attitude. My proposal for a change in our Jewish policy were rejected.

After the victory over Poland and France Hitler gave Himmler jurisdiction over the Jews in occupied Europe. I was only informed late and incompletely about his actions for the resettlement in the East, first of German Jews, and then of the Jews in the occupied territories. As late as 1944, the Terezein (Theresienstadt) camp, for instance, was still open to inspection by representatives of the International Red Cross. Since the Foreign Office acted as the intermediary, I received a report which described conditions as satisfactory. I heard no details, and certainly not about other camps, because the Führer had given authority over these exclusively to the Reichsführer S.S. (Himmler.) The Foreign Office wastold that these matters of domestic administration, and it was thereby expressly excluded from concerning itself with Jewish questions.

When in 1943 I submitted to the Führer a memorandum with proposals for a change in our ecclesiastical and Jewish policies, Hitler replied that he thoroughly disagreed with me on all matters. Nor did a subsequent talk, which was conducted in a comparatively calm atmosphere, yield any positive result. Hitler said: 'You understand foreign policy; the Jewish question you do not understand. This question is best understood by Goebbels. The Foreign Office can do nothing; it is not its business.' I nevertheless advanced every possible argument to prove how our situation, which had become so much more difficult through the worsening of the war, could be eased by an ideological peace. Hitler replied: 'That is naïve. This is an ideological war between the Jewish-bolshevist world and the world of nations, and it cannot be won in the field of diplomacy; arms must decide.'

The Foreign Office could only try to oppose the adoption of extreme anti-Jewish measures, and it was often able to exert a claming influence. Hitler, personally, gave few instructions to the Foreign Office on the Jewish question, and those which he did send were generally concerned with representations to friendly governments, asking that more attention should be paid to the Jewish question, and that Jews should be removed form important posts. But this, too, always led to unpleasantness with out allies. Thus the Führer once sent me a message to the effect that a big Jewish espionage and sabotage organization had been discovered in Italian-occupied France, and instructed me to make serious representations to Mussolini. In our diplomatic work in neutral states it became increasingly apparent that the Jews were working against us there.

In 1944, Hitler spoke even more of his conflict with Jewry and he became fanatically obstinate. But never, down to 22nd April, 1945 when I last saw him in the Reich Chancellery, did he ever mention the killing of Jews. That is why even to-day I cannot believe that the Führer ordered these killings; I believe that Himmler presented him with accomplished facts.

click image to enlarge

------------------------------

Back to the Winston Smith Ministry of Truth Archive

Back to our section on W.W. II Revisionism