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Chapter 3.
The Two Main Haredi Groups
A brief consideration of the historical background should provide
a basis for understanding the differences between the two major
Haredi groups: the Ashkenazi and the Oriental, formerly called Sephardi.
Throughout most of their history, Jews lived scattered in different
countries. Not surprisingly, separate Jewish communities emerged,
comprised of Jewish residents of a single country, of a cluster
of countries or sometimes of different parts of a single country.
Until about AD 1050 one particular community existed as a Jewish
center, recognized by other communities as the authority for dictating
rules and issuing instructions binding upon Jews throughout the
world. The last such center was the Jewish community of Iraq. After
the collapse of the last center in Iraq, the differences between
Jewish communities deepened considerably. Different communities,
for example, although keeping and using some of the ancient prayers
common to all Jews, composed new prayers, used only in their own
services. Even the chanting of prayers in different communities
changed and thus varied. Religious rules of conduct in almost every
conceivable area of life, to which pious Jews adhered, also changed
to some extent and varied from one community to another.
The Ashkenazi community that emerged in northern France and western
Germany between the tenth and twelfth centuries became more innovative
and began to deviate more from previously established patterns than
any other community with the possible exceptions of small communities
in remote countries, such as Georgia. The Ashkenazi divergences
became embedded and persisted. Until this day, for example, most
pious Ashkenazi Jews refuse to eat meat or any foods containing
meat that are prepared under supervision of non-Ashkenazi rabbis;
pious members of other Jewish communities are content with dietary
supervision of rabbis not belonging to their community. Thus, a
pious Sephardi Jew, visiting a pious Ashkenazi Jew will eat food
prepared by the latter, but a pious Ashkenazi Jew visiting a Sephardi
Jew will refuse to eat any foods containing meat or often any food
whatsoever. Ashkenazi exclusiveness is evident in many other aspects
of their religious conduct. Sephardi Jews, on the other hand, developed
as early as the twelfth century an exclusiveness of their own, based
upon the consideration that they were superior in some ways to other
Jews. The Spanish and Portuguese Jews, a part of Sephardi Jewry,
especially developed a pride in the supposed "purity of descent."
(In Hebrew Sephardi means Spanish.) Most of them not only refused
to marry but also often despised being together with Ashkenazi Jews.
Moses Maimonides, who lived until 1204 and was both a rabbi and
the greatest medieval Jewish philosopher, moralized in a testament
addressed to his son:
Guard your soul by not looking into books composed by Ashkenazi
rabbis, who believe in the blessed Lord only when they eat beef
seasoned with vinegar and garlic. They believe that the vapor
of vinegar and the smoke of garlic will ascend to their nostrils
and thus make them understand that the blessed Lord is near to
them ... You, my son, should stay only in the pleasant company
of our Sephardi brothers, who are called the men of Andalusia
[or southern Spain, then ruled by the Muslims ] because only they
have brains and are clever.
Similar statements, in which members of a Jewish community express
feelings of their superiority over other Jews, abound in Jewish
literature and are common. Even as late as the 1960s older Sephardi
rabbis and other Jewish men in Jerusalem, when signing their names,
would invariably add the Hebrew initials meaning "pure Spanish."
Ashkenazi exclusiveness, as it developed and deepened over centuries,
however, became more all-encompassing and extreme than Sephardi
exclusiveness.
The developing exclusiveness had geographical, social and political
causes. Prior to the formation of the Ashkenazi community, almost
all Jews lived in the Mediterranean basin or in countries, such
as Iraq, connected with the basin by trade routes. In the tenth
century most Mediterranean countries were under either Muslim or
Byzantine rule. The communications between this region and the emerging
feudal Europe were tenuous largely because of the language barriers:
Greek and Arabic, spoken on the one side, were largely unknown in
Western Christian areas, while Latin was largely unknown in the
Orient. Jews, who almost always spoke the language(s) of the people
among whom they lived, encountered the same communication obstacle
as did other people. The Ashkenazi community, therefore, framed
its own life style without knowledge about or guidance from the
older, Jewish communities. The Ashkenazi Jewish life style developed
within the context of the emerging feudalism in Europe, which differed
in many crucial respects from other regimes in other areas in that
time period. In spreading eastward into the emerging states in central
and eastern Europe, the Ashkenazi community solidified its cohesiveness
and its identity: these have persisted to date but in more pronounced
forms among religious rather than secular Ashkenazi Jews.
Expelled from Spain in 1492 and from Portugal in 1498, Sephardi
Jews not only settled in but also transformed other Jewish communities.
In these communities the new Sephardi immigrants tended to maintain
an exclusiveness and to remain aloof from other Jews. Having come
from the relatively developed society of the Spain of the Renaissance
and having settled in less developed countries, they soon became
the wealthiest, best educated and most politically connected Jews
in Mediterranean countries. The Sephardi Jews that settled in Saloniki
(now in Greece but then part of the Ottoman Empire) received privileges
from the Ottoman Sultan, because they manufactured the best cloth
and provided textiles for the uniforms worn by members of elite
units of the Ottoman army. The Saloniki Sephardi Jews kept this
monopoly for 130 years, losing it only when more modern textiles
were imported from England and the Netherlands. Spanish Jews mostly
and Italian Jews to a lesser extent actually did most of the creative
work in all areas of medieval Jewish culture. Largely because of
their wealth and education, Sephardi Jews imposed their customs,
language and name upon Jewish communities in all the countries to
which they emigrated. One good illustration of this occurred in
Jewish communities in the Balkans and what is now Turkey. The Jews
in these communities called themselves "Romaniole," taken from the
popular name of the Byzantine Empire "Romania." They spoke Greek
until about 1550 at which time, influenced by the effects of the
Sephardi immigration, began to call themselves "Sephardi" and to
speak Ladino, an ancient form of Spanish. The fact is that no Sephardi
communities existed other than those made up of the immigrants from
the Iberian Peninsula, their descendents or those who assimilated
themselves into Sephardi communities. European travelers and some
Ashkenazi Jews have referred, and still refer, mistakenly to all
non-Ashkenazi Jews as Sephardi. This is because the real Sephardi
Jews established a lasting hegemony over other Jewish communities.
Many other than Sephardi, non-Ashkenazi members of Jewish communities
have more correctly defined themselves not only as Jews but also
as Iraqis, Moroccans, Italians or another nationality.
Until the end of the seventeenth century, Ashkenazi Jews constituted
a small minority of world Jewry. Their cultural advancement trailed
far behind other Jewish communities, especially the Sephardi and
Italian. Since the eighteenth century, the populations of Mediterranean
countries, especially those in the Ottoman Empire, steadily declined
economically and demographically. This trend greatly affected Jewish
communities of those countries. Between 1700 and 1850, Jewish populations
in these countries steeply declined and became increasingly impoverished.
The modest increase in Jewish population between 1850 and 1914 did
not to a significant extent offset the decline. From the beginning
of the eighteenth century the political and technological advancements
in Europe affected the Ashkenazi community. From the mid-eighteenth
century the Ashkenazi population began to increase rapidly; by 1800
Ashkenazi Jews had become the majority of world Jewry; this increase
and the majority percentage accelerated in the nineteenth century.
Jews living in the European part of the Russian Empire, nearly all
of them Ashkenazi, proliferated sevenfold between 1795 and 1914.
Ashkenazi Jews developed a variety of innovations in Judaism, some
of them secularist. By the first half of the twentieth century,
Ashkenazi Jews had surpassed the relatively small, non-Ashkenazi
minority in every major respect, including Talmudic studies. The
current split between religious Ashkenazi Jews and non-Ashkenazi
Jews stems from the fact that during the past two centuries, in
contrast to what had previously been the case, almost all rabbis
of distinction have been Ashkenazi. In non-Ashkenazi communities
during this time period the quality of talmudic study, of books
published and even of older books being reprinted has disastrously
declined.
Until 1948, Zionism and the emigration of Jews to Palestine were
predominantly Ashkenazi inventions. Most religious Jews viewed Zionism
as being in opposition to Judaism; hence, only Jews emancipated
from their religious past could become Zionists. Even so, few Ashkenazi
Jews immigrated to Palestine because of Zionist convictions. The
great majority of those who immigrated did so only because their
lives were so difficult in their own countries of origin. The great
majority of Jews in Israel in 1948 were those who had immigrated
to Palestine after the increase in anti-Semitism in Europe after
1932 and especially after Hider came to power in Germany. The number
of non-Ashkenazi Jews in Israel at the time of the state's creation
was relatively small. For most Jews in non-Ashkenazi communities,
the religious influence, especially the messianic strain, was in
the 1950s and early 1960s still potent. Living standards in Israel
in the 1950s, although below those throughout Europe, were superior
to those in most of the Arab Middle East. The Israeli government,
therefore, could easily persuade Jews from many countries, for example,
Morocco, Yemen and Bulgaria, to immigrate to Israel. The
Israeli government induced Jewish immigration from Iraq by bribing
the government of Iraq to strip most Iraqi Jews of their citizenship
and to confiscate their property. By contrast, few Jews immigrated
to Israel from the more advanced countries of the eastern Mediterranean,
such as Greece or Egypt. The majority of the Israeli Jewish population
shifted to the non-Ashkenazi. During the period from 1949 to 1965,
Ashkenazi Jews in Israel declined to a minority that stabilized
at about 40 per cent of Israel's population. The substantial immigration
of Jews from the former Soviet Union thereafter increased the Ashkenazi
population to about 55 per cent. By virtue of their having come
from more advanced countries, the bulk of Ashkenazi Jews were relatively
modern in outlook and secular.
The non-Ashkenazi Jews, increasingly referred to as "Orientals"
instead of "Sephardis," remained predominantly religious. Upon their
arrival in Israel many Oriental Jews and their children were put
through a cultural socialization directed by veteran Ashkenazi residents
and advocated by members of the Zionist Labor Party then in power.
This socialization included a considerable amount of coercive modernization
and attempts to secularize the young. The results of this coercion
were mixed during most of the first two decades of Israel's existence.
The majority of Oriental Jews remained traditionalists, meaning
that these people ignored the more exacting commandments of Judaism,
such as the ban of Sabbath travel, but followed other commandments,
especially those dealing with synagogue attendance. Even more importantly,
it meant that they retained belief in the magical powers of rabbis
and "holy men." To date, only a few Oriental politicians dare criticize
a rabbi in public, even when the rabbi strongly opposes or curses
them. Ashkenazi Jews of all political views in contrast criticize
rabbis freely. Most Ashkenazi politicians despise any kowtowing
to rabbis. Almost all Oriental politicians, including the Black
Panthers of the early 1970s and the members of tiny Oriental peace
movements, commonly bow to and kiss the hands of rabbis in public.
The Ashkenazi religious minority, particularly its Haredi segment,
has resisted secularization of Oriental Jews. They have succeeded
to some extent, most particularly in persuading a minority to retain
the strict observance of Judaism's commandments. They have established
separate religious schools and yeshivot for the Orientals and have
admitted, although in strictly controlled numbers, some of the most
qualified Oriental youngsters to their own schools and yeshivas.
After the passage of time, an Oriental Haredi elite group of rabbis
and talmudic scholars emerged in Israel. Almost without exception,
Ashkenazi Haredi rabbis trained members of this elite group.
By the beginning of the 1990s, the confrontation between the unbending
Haredi version of Ashkenazi exclusiveness and Oriental traditionalism,
which previously was potentially explosive, erupted. The Ashkenazi
Haredi movement insisted upon completely freezing the situation
that existed in central and eastern Europe around 1860. The Oriental
Jews, trained by Ashkenazi Haredi Jews, were forced to discard their
traditional garb, wear the black Ashkenazi clothing and learn and
speak Yiddish. Yiddish was the language of oral instruction in the
Haredi yeshivot; Hebrew was reserved for writing. The Oriental traditionalists
were also forced to adopt the Ashkenazi manner of praying, which
differed in numerous ways from their former method. Revered rabbis,
who commanded authority and encountered almost no opposition, imposed
those radical changes. By contrast, the various attempts by the
Labor movement to impose modernizing constraints upon the Orientals
in the 1950s sparked furious opposition among the Oriental masses,
who would often criticize politicians but hardly ever criticize
rabbis.
The Oriental students in Ashkenazi Haredi yeshivot, after years
of docile submission to demands and after being ordained as rabbis,
were not granted status equal to that of their fellow students and
rabbis. They have continued to accept and even today seem to be
content with their inferior treatment. An excellent illustration
of this is the inequality in intermarriage with their Ashkenazi
peers. All Jewish communities share the time-honored custom that
the head of the yeshiva arranges all marriages of yeshiva students.
He carefully picks the daughters of rich and pious Jews as wives
for students. The better students are matched with the daughters
of the wealthiest parents. (The head of the yeshiva also matches
daughters of rabbis with sons of the wealthiest parents.) Yeshiva
students have selflessly complied with this matchmaking; resisting
has been--and still is--considered to be a grave sin. This practice
was instituted so that yeshiva students, who had no marketable skills,
and their families would be supported. Students could continue their
sacred studies, and the entire supporting family would supposedly
then be able to enter paradise. More recently, yeshiva heads, when
unable to find wealthy, prospective fathers-in-law for students,
find prospective wives that are previously trained in skilled professions
suitable for Haredi women and are willing to support husbands engaged
in "sacred studies." (Such support will supposedly bring the wives
to paradise.) By being matchmakers, yeshiva heads have most often
been able to control the livelihoods and thus the lives of yeshiva
students and their families.
Ashkenazi Haredi Jews have never formally prohibited marriages
with pious Jews from other communities. Such marriages, nevertheless,
often have been--and still are--considered disgraces. Because of
this, the heads of Ashkenazi Haredi yeshivot adopted the custom,
still followed, of matching Oriental students, however distinguished
in their studies, with either physically handicapped Ashkenazi brides
or ones from poor families.
Not surprisingly, an unwritten rule developed whereby Oriental
students, however distinguished, would not be appointed to any responsible
teaching positions even in lower-rank yeshivot, attended solely
by Oriental students. These teaching jobs were reserved for Ashkenazi
rabbis, the underlying assumption being that Oriental Jews were
not yet sufficiently mature to hold responsible religious positions.
When Rabbi Shach, one of the foremost Haredi leaders, explicitly
reiterated this assumption shortly before the 1992 elections, he
was denounced as being racist by many Ashkenazi secular Jews; neither
Oriental rabbis nor Oriental political activists uttered one word
of public criticism.
No Oriental initiative was responsible for the creation of the
Haredi political party, Shas. Rabbi Shach formed Shas before the
1988 elections, because he, in his rivalry with other prominent
Ashkenazi Haredi rabbis, needed to have Knesset members that would
be subservient only to him. He, therefore, ordered those rabbis
that were his students and retained personal allegiance to him to
form two new, separate, Haredi political parties: Degel Ha'Tora
(Banner of the Law) would be purely Ashkenazi; Shas (an acronym
for Sephardi List for Tradition) would be purely Oriental. After
the formation of both parties, the party leaders publicly regarded
Rabbi Shach as their highest spiritual authority and vowed to obey
him unconditionally. In order to make Shas also attractive to non-Haredi
Orientals, Shach handpicked a non-Haredi Oriental rabbi upon whom
he could rely--Rabbi Ovadia Yoseph, the former chief rabbi of Israel--to
act as the nominal party head. Shach, of course, retained authority.
For Shach, Yoseph's greatest virtue was that, after failing to win
re-election as chief rabbi due to the NRP's refusal to exert influence
on his behalf, Yoseph hated the NRP as fiercely as did Shach himself.
As is well known in Israel, hatred between secular Jews cannot match
in intensity the mutual hatred between diverse groups of religious
Jews, especially in the quarrels between rabbis representing those
diverse groups. Shach had good reason to expect that, because of
his wish to retaliate against NRP rabbis, Yoseph would remain loyal
to him and be content with his subordinate role.
For a while everything worked as Shach had planned. The two parties,
controlled by Shach, obtained eight Knesset seats altogether in
the 1988 elections; Degal Ha'Tora had two seats; Shas, six seats.
The Haredi party, Agudat Israel, against which Shach formed his
parties, obtained only five seats. Degel Ha'Tora and Shas preferred
a Likud government and after the 1988 elections supported Yitzhak
Shamir as the prime minister. Their support may have been decisive.
After 1990 Shamir would not have had a Knesset majority without
their support. The self-demeaning attempts by the Labor Party leader,
Shimon Peres, to reverse this situation failed. Peres spent months
attending lessons of Talmud, given in his home by Rabbi Yoseph.
Peres attempted unsuccessfully to be received by Rabbi Shach; Shach
received many petty secular politicians but not Peres. Peres made
repeated, public pronouncements about how deeply he respected Judaism
in general and the Haredi rabbis in particular. Everything Peres
attempted was in vain. Shach and his rival Haredi rabbis did not
bend in their support for Shamir. Yitzhak Rabin's victory over Peres
for the leadership position in the Labor Party primaries preceding
the 1992 elections was largely due to Labor's rank-and-file disillusionment
with Peres' attempts to ingratiate himself with Haredi Jews and
to win their support. In spite of this experience, Peres repeated
the same attempts that resulted in the same results in the 1996
elections.
The Haredi parties wielded political power after 1988, most especially
in the 1988-90 period. Peres, still in the government after 1988,
supported their demands; Shamir, while Prime Minister, was even
more resolute with support. Haredi political success can best be
measured by the amounts of money the two Haredi parties were able
to obtain from the state through so-called "special money" grants,
not subject to fiscal controls of the state. These special money
grants were made through a voluntary association, formed to remain
under the real control of a Haredi Knesset member or his friends.
The ministry of finance made grants from the state budget to such
associations, most often on the basis of flimsy purpose statements
and with no control exerted over expenditures. The resultant corruption
was enormous, reaching a scale unprecedented in the entire history
of the State of Israel and finally causing the withdrawal of such
special money grants.
The extensive corruption involved in the obtaining of this special
money did not necessarily mean that the money itself was used illicitly.
Shas spent most of this money to establish a network of institutions
designed to exert a lasting influence and to train cohorts of militants
that in the future could enable the party to maximize its control
over its public. This network consisted of a chain of educational
institutions designed to revive traditional Jewish education for
boys with only sacred and not secular subjects taught. (Shas largely
ignored the education of girls.) Adult males between the ages of
40 and 50 were encouraged to leave their professions or give up
their businesses in order to enroll in institutions and study sacred
subjects with guaranteed remuneration. The remuneration, that is,
salaries for studying, were admittedly low, but numerous individuals
considered the life of study preferable to their persisting to do
menial work or to maintain decaying businesses. The recruits did
more than study Talmud. They were required to do political work
for Shas. These recruits soon constituted Shas' political cadre,
which has been and remains instrumental in turning Haredi neighborhoods
into electoral constituencies under almost any conceivable circumstances.
Informed Israeli political commentators have recognized the public
and political impact of such Haredi political activity. In his June
26,1992 article in Al-Hamishmar, Professor Gideon Doron,
Rabin's major advisor on strategy during the 1992 elections, explained
after Rabin's victory why the Labor Party refrained from canvassing
votes in Shas-dominated neighborhoods:
This is a party that keeps its public under continuous influence
during election and other times ... Shas' method is to turn electoral
outcomes into sources of monetary revenues and spend the money
obtained during the four years [between one election and another].
The method succeeds. True, they also use magic spells, amulets
and vows that greatly influence their public, but their role is
secondary.
According to Doron, the best way to appeal to the Shas constituency
is to do so through those of the salaried elite whose role anyway
is to keep the constituency under control. Doron pointed out that,
with the exception of the previously mentioned elite, Shas' followers
are essentially the same as the "Oriental tradition-minded segment
of Likud supporters." By acquiring political power, Shas leaders,
particularly Rabbi Yoseph, gained self-confidence and began to seek
emancipation from the tutelage of Ashkenazi Haredi rabbis. In each
Shas-dominated neighborhood, Rabbi Yoseph rather than Rabbi Shach
was acclaimed to be the greatest rabbi in the world. After some
years of continual adulation by the masses, Rabbi Yoseph almost
certainly came to believe that he no longer needed to be subordinate
to Rabbi Shach.
The split between Shas and Rabbi Shach came after the 1992 elections
and was sparked by a triviality. The split in reality was over the
rival claims by Shach and Yoseph to be regarded as the spiritual
head of Shas. Rabin, when forming his coalition, approached and
accepted the demands of Shas. Before signing an agreement, Shas
asked Rabbi Shach for approval. Shach refused, because, as discussed
in another chapter, Shulamit Aloni was to be named Minister of Education.
Shach's newspaper, Yated Ne'eman, editorialized that
this appointment was worse than the killing of one million children
during the Holocaust. The reasoning employed here was that the Nazis
killed the children but did not prevent their souls from going to
paradise, whereas the appointment of Aloni could corrupt Jewish
souls and deprive them of paradise. Rabbi Yoseph and the Shas Party,
nevertheless, decided to risk the souls of Jewish children and joined
Rabin's government. Rabbi Shach and his followers reacted negatively
in a furious manner that persisted thereafter.
The confrontation between the two Haredi movements has been waged
in the magical area over the contest of spiritual authority. In
keeping with commonly held and magical Haredi beliefs, the Shas
leaders' sin of resisting Rabbi Shach's will could be punished by
a few curses resulting in either the deaths or sicknesses of those
leaders and/or their family members. The result would allegedly
restore heavenly equilibrium. In order to further this magical result,
Rabbi Shach's supporters resorted to conduct previously employed
in similar situations. They published fake announcements of deaths,
hospitalizations and/or traffic accidents of Shas leaders and then
either notified the families accordingly by telephone or sent ambulances
to their homes. As noted above, internecine hatred between religious
Jews, and especially between Haredi rabbis, is often virulent. The
existence of such hatred has continually resulted in disunity within
ranks that limits Haredi political power. The methods of internecine
infighting have been so customarily employed within Haredi culture
that, unfortunately for Rabbi Shach's followers, the impact is severely
limited. In the domain of magic, moreover, Shas has on its side
the great authority and renowned miracle worker, Rabbi Kaduri, who
announced that he would shield all Shas leaders by casting cabbalistic
spells. Rabbi Kaduri also claimed that God revealed to him that
harassment by other Haredi Jews would qualify Shas leaders for the
greatest Jewish virtue, sanctification of the Lord's name through
martyrdom.
In the contest of spiritual authorities, debate ensued over whether
Rabbi Yoseph 's spirituality was sufficiently great to validate
his challenge to Shach's rabbinical authority, especially in light
of Yoseph 's former allegiance to Shach. Following the debate all
the Shas rabbis decided to obey Rabbi Yoseph. Shas rabbis and followers
then began to extol Rabbi Yoseph as "the greatest rabbi of his generation,"
greater even than any Ashkenazi rabbi. This honor had previously
been awarded to Rabbi Shach. Shas had won its independence. The
Ashkenazi Haredi Jews thus could not defeat but did sever all connections
with Shas. No Ashkenazi rabbi distanced himself from Shach's pronouncements;
some added even more venom. The leader of the largest Hassidic sect,
the Gur Hassids, reiterated his previously expressed view that Israel
lost the Yom Kippur War (of October 1973) because a woman, Golda
Meir, was prime minister. He implied that Israel would lose its
next war because of Shulamit Aloni. Ashkenazi rabbis and their followers
used weapons more hurtful than their curses and pronouncements.
They desecrated Shas synagogues, usually just before the beginning
of the Sabbath, thus making it difficult to clean in time without
desecrating the Sabbath. Many Shas leaders, who had been educated
in Ashkenazi institutions and who continued to pray in Ashkenazi
synagogues, were harassed or beaten during the reciting of prayers.
One Shas leader, Rabbi Pinhassi, was spat upon and beaten in an
Ashkenazi synagogue in the Haredi town of Bnei Brak during a Sabbath
prayer session. Some children of Shas leaders were terribly abused.
The then Minister of the Interior, Yitzhak Der'i, had to remove
his sons from an Ashkenazi yeshiva after they were publicly humiliated.
Der'i was repeatedly harassed, often when attempting to pray in
synagogues, by Shach 's followers and by religious settlers. Shas
followers fought back. On several occasions they beat up those who
had harassed Der'i; they also desecrated Ashkenazi synagogues in
retaliation. Shas retaliations ultimately served their opponent's
cause by escalating the conflict.
The split and conflict within Haredi ranks illustrate the religious
transformation of Oriental Jews. For over two decades many secular
Oriental groups were founded; they all failed to obtain the support
of the populations they claimed to represent and, as a result, collapsed
ignominiously. Their failure can be attributed to their obstinate
refusal to recognize that the Oriental Jewish communities define
themselves primarily in religious terms. The Haredi Shas Party will
in the foreseeable future likely remain the sole Oriental political
party in Israel. This particular case study may help illustrate
the nature of religious transformation of a not fully modernized
population.
Web Editor's
Note:
This document has been edited slightly
to conform to American stylistic, punctuation and hypertext conventions.
Other than a slight reorganization of sections and the correction
of a few typographical errors, no further changes to the text have
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