Analysis:
Their Terrorists, Our Freedom
Fighters
By William Blum
The Consortium, 1997
Imagine that what happened in Peru were to take place in Cuba --
14 Cuban dissidents taking over a large social gathering and holding
a few hundred people hostage, including Castro's brother Raul and
other prominent officials, as well as foreign ambassadors and
businessmen. Imagine that the Cuban rebels made demands similar to
those of the MRTA [Tupac Amaru guerrillas] in Peru -- raising
the standard of living of the masses, bettering prison conditions,
freeing a number of political prisoners, and improving the state of
civil liberties.
Imagine the reaction of the American media. The MRTA "terrorists,"
through an arcane ideological alchemy, would be transformed into
anti-communist "freedom fighters." The Cubans' demands would be
reported fully, seriously, and regularly, not disappearing down the
great media black hole behind the printing press. What had been seen
before as an appalling, illegitimate way to achieve social change
would give way effortlessly to a sincere appreciation that under
intolerable conditions, desperate people can be reduced to reckless
measures.
We now know that in Lima, on April 22, Peruvian commandos, under
orders to take no prisoners, executed all the rebels who survived the
initial onslaught. Only President Alberto Fujimori still denies this.
Peruvian security forces told Reuters News Agency two days later that
two male rebels were captured alive in a room, told to stand against
a wall, and shot with separate bursts of gunfire, one after the
other. During the same dramatic moments, the news agency reported, an
intelligence operative, who was monitoring the raid through listening
devices, picked up the execution of two teen-age rebel girls, who
were shot despite one of them yelling "We surrender! We
surrender!"
Moreover, Agriculture Minister Rodolfo Munante, one of the hostages,
disclosed to the Spanish-language news channel, CBS/Telenoticias,
that "One rebel surrendered in the room where the judges were ... he
told the judges he surrendered, but then (a soldier) entered and
machine-gunned (the rebels) in the room."
Military sources later revealed that each rebel was given a final
"coup de grace" shot in the forehead to make sure he was dead.
Munante had a further story to tell. He said he could not sleep for
thinking about a young rebel who spared his life. "I've hardly slept.
I went to bed late and was thinking all the time ... I've remembered
and remembered the attitude of that youngster." Moments after the
Peruvian troops burst into the building to rescue the hostages, one
of the teen-age rebels came into the room where high-ranking captives
were held and pointed his rifle straight at the Agriculture
Minister.
"I don't know what happened," said Munante, "I don't know if he
doubted, but I saw sadness in his eyes, maybe because of the order to
kill us, or maybe because he saw his life slipping away. Then, in a
matter of seconds, he turned straight around and closed the
door."
The young man, who was shot dead within seconds, may have had second
thoughts due to the close ties that had formed between captors and
captives after 18 weeks inside the residence, said Munante. "After so
many days of talking and talking an emotional bond had been
established."
"I feel a lot for the youngsters, who were humble people from the
Peruvian jungle," Jorge Gumucio, the Bolivian ambassador, who was
also a hostage, told Reuters. "But we knew from the start that it was
either us or them."
Of course, it would have been a lot more of "us", but "them" released
more than 80 percent of the hostages within the first two weeks;
then, as time went by, released others who had become, or claimed to
be, ill. During the four-month siege, no hostage was harmed by the
rebels. In return, the rebels were rewarded by a complete refusal by
Fujimori to make even the slightest concession, all the while
planning their summary executions.
Imagine again that Cuba had been the stage for this tragedy. The
halls of the U.S. Congress would have been filled with operatic wails
and forehead smiting over the cold-blooded execution of the freedom
fighters, with Jesse Helms waving a sword and pleading to lead the
invasion of Cuba. Ol' Bill, at his heartfelt best, would have assured
the families of the slain rebels: "I feel your pain!". Flags would
have flown at half-mast in Miami, and any one there who dared to
question the prevailing wisdom or the prevailing emotion would risk
premature death.
The Media's Take
But inasmuch as these idealistic young people were not seeking to
overthrow a socialist government, their lives were accorded scant
value in the U.S. media. An editorial in The Washington Post
remarked upon the "successful rescue in which there were amazingly
small losses of life: One hostage and two attackers died." Then,
quite parenthetically: "The guerrillas, who had claimed a
revolutionary cause but found few takers among Peru's terrorism-weary
population, lost all 14 of their own." Period.
Obscured also in this statement is the idea that fear of a lifetime
of torture and imprisonment in one of Peru's infamous hellholes might
just be responsible for discouraging people from publicly expressing
support for the MRTA, let alone joining them. Not to mention social
indoctrination.
One sad sight in the TV coverage was the picture of the Peruvian
soldiers celebrating their victory. These indigena-looking young men,
finding in military service perhaps their only way to escape poverty,
hunger and unemployment, shouting for joy, back-slapping,
high-fiving, burning an MRTA flag, all because they had killed a
number of other poverty- stricken young indigenas who were struggling
to wrench a concession or two from the government to lighten the load
of the poor and the imprisoned.
A "terrorist" -- a loaded term that has been abused since the Nazis
used it to describe World War II resistance fighters -- fights for
what he believes in; a soldier in countries such as Peru fights for
what someone else believes in -- in this case the wealthy coercing
the poor to kill the poor to keep the wealthy in power.
It will come as no surprise that the commandos received training and
sophisticated technological help from the United States for their
operation, including overflights of the RU-38A airplane, which can
photograph a building and gauge the thickness of its walls, amongst a
host of other details crucial to planning the final raid. Supporting
the Peruvian government in such circumstances would be regarded by
Washington as the most natural thing in the world.
But no one would raise the alternative question: If the United States
felt compelled to intervene in Peru in a purely internal matter, why
didn't it take the side of the rebels, rather than abetting a
government that has often sunk into the practice of state terrorism?
[See related story in this issue]
But what is the nature of this Peruvian government that inspires the
dedicated support of the United States?
In April 1992, President Fujimori closed down his nation's Congress
and dismissed much of the judiciary, giving himself dictatorial
power. In protest, the United States immediately announced the
suspension of all foreign aid programs to Peru. It was not long
before this aid was resumed, if, in fact, it was ever actually cut
off. Washington was interested in drug interdiction in Peru, and even
more so in helping the Peruvian government combat leftist and
populist rebellion.
Counter-Insurgency
This is reminiscent of 1965, when a force of U. S. Green Berets
was sent to Peru and helped wipe out the guerrilla movements of that
period. Indeed, the anti-drug campaign in the Peruvian jungles in
recent years, just as in Colombia, appears to have been used as a
cover for the anti-guerrilla campaign.
Often, however, it has been the government -- more so than the
guerrillas -- which has had the cozy relationships with the drug
traffickers. For instance, Fujimori's chief aide and personal lawyer,
Vladimiro Montesinos, has had ties to drug cartels. Montesinos also
has been accused of setting up death squads and being a long-time CIA
asset. Last November, U.S. drug czar, Gen. Barry McCaffrey met with
Montesinos in Peru, which was interpreted in Peru as an endorsement
of the latter, so much so that the New York Times was moved
to criticize McCaffrey for the meeting. [Nov. 25, 1996,
editorial]
Though the Peruvian Congress has been reinstated, that development
has scarcely meant a reawakening of freedom and democracy in Peru.
One recent description of the Fujimori regime is as follows:
"Security forces were responsible for extrajudicial killings,
disappearances, torture, and beatings. Although individual prison
directors made some efforts to improve conditions in their own
prisons, overall prison conditions remain extremely harsh,
particularly in the case of prisoners jailed for terrorism offenses.
Arbitrary detention, accountability, lack of due process, lengthy
trial delays, and prolonged pretrial detention remain problems. The
authorities at times infringed upon citizens' privacy rights.
Violence against women and children and discrimination against the
disabled, indigenous people, and minorities are continuing problems.
Child labor is also a problem."
This is taken from the latest State Department human rights report on
Peru.
If the Soviet Union still existed, the rebel action in Peru would
have been branded as part of the International Communist Conspiracy.
But which conspiracy do the anti-communists blame now? Could it be
that the revolutionary and "terrorist" actions of the Cold War were
home grown all along, springing from indigenous roots?
(William Blum is the author of Killing Hope: U.S. Military
and CIA Interventions Since World War II. )
