Manbar wasn't alone
The Jerusalem Post,
07/17/1998
Background by STEVE RODAN
(July 17) - Nahum Manbar may be slippery and mendacious, as the
three-judge panel that sentenced him to 16 years yesterday determined. But
one thing is clear: He wasn't the only one selling military equipment to Iran.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a host of Israeli defense contractors sold
their goods to Iran. Israeli court records show Elbit tried to interest Iran in
purchasing equipment that would detect chemical weapons in a $50 million
deal via Poland. Defense sources say such companies as Rabintex sold
Teheran fire-protection garments. In most cases, the equipment was sold via
European countries, but with the knowledge and permission of the Defense
Ministry's Sibat arms export agency.
So, why was Manbar arrested and convicted? Manbar and his supporters say
he is a scapegoat and his prosecution was meant to assuage US authorities,
who had declared him persona non grata in 1994.
Intelligence sources familiar with the case say Manbar simply went too far.
In July 1994, Manbar's two companies, Europol Holding and Mana Investment
International, both based in Western Europe, were placed on a State
Department list of companies that sold chemical weapons parts to rogue states
in defiance of the US embargo.
US Assistant Secretary of State Thomas McNamara said in his report that US
companies are banned from doing business with the companies of Manbar and
others that appear on the list. Their goods also would be kept out of the US.
At the same time, US officials were pressing Israel for Manbar's prosecution.
They argued that Manbar's activities could not be overlooked if the US
embargo on Iran was to be taken seriously.
For several years, intelligence sources say, Israeli officials hesitated. Part of the
problem was the contradicting views of Manbar in Israel's intelligence
community. The General Security Service had been receiving information on
Iran volunteered by Manbar since 1991. The GSS assured Manbar that he
would not be prosecuted for dealing with Iran.
During the Manbar trial, a GSS agent, identified as A, testified that he and his
colleagues had promised to protect Manbar.
"It was clear to the establishment that Nahum had information on interesting
subjects, such as the heart of [Iran's] biological and chemical establishment,"
A testified. "It wasn't clear what his part was in this array."
The sources said Manbar's relations with the GSS were so cozy that he was
seen at least once dining with then-GSS chief Ya'acov Perry.
But Manbar's dealings with Iran were opposed by the Mossad and its
then-chief Shabtai Shavit. Shavit argued that Manbar was hurting the US's
dual containment policy and Israeli efforts to try to stop Iran's military
programs. He said Manbar's offer of chemical weapons equipment to Iran was
not worth the intelligence he might be receiving from Teheran.
"Shavit's message was that this was not the way to get intelligence," an
intelligence source said.
By early 1993, then-prime minister Yitzhak Rabin was convinced that the
Israeli weapons dalliance with Iran had to stop. What persuaded him were
reports from the IDF that Hizbullah was firing mortars, supplied to Iran over the
previous few years from the Yokne'am-based contractor Soltam, at Israeli
troops in Lebanon. Rabin ordered an immediate halt to defense sales to Iran.
Civilian exports, however, continued to arrive in Iran and industry sources say
current trade, largely done through European companies, is estimated at close
to $100 million annually.
Manbar was warned to stop selling equipment to Iran. But, as his associates
said, he still had unfinished business to complete. It took until 1994 for Manbar
to end his relationship with Teheran.
As Manbar's older brother, Zvi, recalls, Nahum told him: "If I don't keep my
agreement with these people I could get kill
