http://star.arabia.com/980625/OP1.html25 JUNE 1998
Summer of '54 a history of state-sponsored terrorism
By Samir Raafat
MS VICTORINE Marcelle Ninio (which she spelt Nigno) was a native of Cairo and a one-time Olympic contender who had played basketball at the Hakoah Club on Selehdar Street, Heliopolis. The combination of geopolitics, youth and personal ideals pushed her into the forefront of regional events in July 1954.
Although born and raised in Egypt, Ninio had thrown in her lot with the newly created State of Israel. If in 1948 she suspected her actions could be catalytic to the downfall of Egypt's thriving Jewish community, by the time she faced sentence in 1955 she had no lingering doubts.
Ninio and her associates had been indirectly responsible for the hastening of 50,000 Jews out of Egypt. On a more personal tragic note, Armando Carmona, a close companion of Nino's family, allegedly took his own life (or was encouraged to) upon discovering his Heliopolis flatmate had been indicted in a covert Israeli-led operation.
The physically challenged Carmona (walking disability) worked for the The Cairo Electric Railways & Heliopolis Oases Company, known to most simply as The Heliopolis Company. It was his habit after working hours to join his friends at the nearby Heliopolis Sporting Club for a round of cards. Failing to appear one day, his anxious partners advised the police. Upon entering his flat at 6 Rue Ibis, off Avenue des Pyramides, Armando was found hanging from the ceiling. To this day, Marcelle Carmona-Fisher, who lives outside Tel Aviv, failed to resolve the riddle of her father's death. Her attempts to obtain answers from the Israeli government have been persistently stonewalled.
As it transpired during the Cairo investigation, Armando's friend Marcelle Ninio was part of an espionage network run by the Israeli military. Their objective: To spread havoc in Cairo and Alexandria by planting bombs in crowded public areas such as cinema theaters, the main railway stations and central post office in both cities. And to discredit Egypt in the West, the American USIS libraries and British Councils in both cities were also added as an afterthought.
In other words, Marcelle Ninio and her colleagues were licensed to kill civilians using fire bombs.
It was Ninio's ultimate controllers, most of them senior Israeli officers who laid out the gameplan. Also in the know were privileged members of the political Israeli apparatus including cabinet members-to-be like Shimon Peres, Moshe Dayan and Ben-Gurion (then in retirement). The code name for this mission of death was Operation Shoshana (Susana) known in history books as the Lavon Affair or Esek Bish (the Mishap).
A latter day name for this deadly operation was Ha-Parashah (the case). Like the the multiple names associated with this operation its objectives went beyond destabilizing Egypt's new republican regime or causing dissension in Egypto-British/US relations.
Aside from forestalling the withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone, its success or failure notwithstanding, another equally important objective of this operation was to poison relations between mainstream Egyptians and the 50,000 Jews who had remained in Egypt after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.
Operations similar to Shoshana had been primed elsewhere in the Middle East where large Jewish communities existed, the most important being the 1949/50 Operation Ali Baba in the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq, when Israeli agents went after Jewish targets wounding and killing innocent bystanders near Baghdad's Shemt of Synagogue. Predictably, requests for exit visas started pouring in and within a year, Iraq's largest and most important non-Muslim minority numbering in the tens of thousands relocated in Israel.
Without resorting to such drastic measures in Egypt, had Israel's policy-makers waited, Egyptian Jews would have left anyway at their own free cognizance. Like Egypt's Italian, Greek, Armenian and Syro-Levantine minorities, all of whom found the new combination of nationalism and a state controlled economy distasteful, the Jews would have had no reason to remain.
Ever since the days of Viceroy Mohammed Ali Pasha, (r.1805-48), laissez faire and free enterprise had been the mainstay of the nation's enlightened minorities. Lacking the elements which had attracted foreigners to Egypt, why would these minorities remain? And with the arrival of socialism in 1961, it was the turn for Muslim and Coptic members of Egypt's business class to apply for immigrant visas, an unprecedented phenomena in a country that had accepted economic migrants throughout the ages.
Operation Shoshana-a.k.a. Susana, Lavon, the Mishap, the Affair-failed because Paul Frank (alias Avraham Siedenwerg or Avri El Ad), one of the 13 Israeli agents involved, had had second thoughts. An undecided Zionist, he snitched to an Egyptian undercover agent in Germany. Concommittant to sparing innocent Egyptian lives, Frank's action eventually brought down the government of Moshe Sharett in Israel, starting with the February 1955 resignation of Defense Minister Pinchas Lavon.
Like many other disturbing facts in Israel's first 50 years, Operation Shoshana was buried and forgotten by the official propagandists. When its perpetrators were rounded up in Cairo no one from Israel stepped forward to take responsibility of their operation. If ever mentioned, Ninio and her accomplices were referred to as saboteurs (never as terrorists) by the western press.
Diverse court verdicts were delivered on January 27, 1955, ranging from two death sentences to several years in prison, some of them in absentia. Predicatbly, the Cairo rulings sent Israel into an unofficial state of mourning. There were emotional promises to dedicate a street in Ramat Gan and Beersheeba each in honor of the fallen "victims", an action which would have its equivalent today in renaming one of Gaza's streets in commemoration of a Tel Aviv suicide bus bomber.
Marcelle Ninio and three of her colleagues were released during the 1967 June War prisoner exchanges. No one knew she had returned to Israel, for in her country of adoption like in her country of birth, Ninio was a source of political embarrassment. The situation changed only after Prime Minister Golda Meir personally announced in 1974 she would attend Ninio's wedding. That year, what had been deliberately ignored for so long came out on Israel's national TV. Operation Shoshana was no longer a carefully guarded state secret.
Throughout the polemic, the word "terrorism" was never brought up. With the help of propagandists abroad and with the assistance of an immensely powerful Jewish lobby in the United Sates, the terms "agents" or "saboteurs" were used instead.
Equally remarkable in this whole affair is how one of the first prototype of organized state sponsored terrorism in the region, was shrouded under tons of secrecy acts and waves of disinformation campaigns. How the usually merciless and overzealous media never insisted. The Israeli state apparatus did not realize then that one day the chicken would come home to roost, this time against civilians in Tel-Aviv buses.