After the winter bombs
By Eqbal Ahmad, December 1998
AS deadly missiles rain down on Baghdad, six verities ought to be
re-stated.
First, the target of the Anglo-American bombing campaign is not Iraq's
arsenal of mass destruction. Chemical and biological weapons are nearly
impossible to destroy from the air. The job UNSCOM inspectors could not do
bombs will not finish. The intent behind the bombing is murder - of Saddam
Hussein, his family and staff-- and the destruction of his security
services.
Among the targets hit on day one of the missile strikes were his
daughter's home, the presidential palace, the Directorate of Military
Intelligence Services, and the headquarters of the Republican Guards, an
elite force that serves as Saddam Hussein's personal security force.
Second, the Vatican of which the sentiment is normally pro-American, has
told the truth in plain words. "This is aggression", said a statement
issued from the Holy See. The American president and British prime
minister invoked UN resolutions on Iraq to justify their violation of
international laws and the UN Charter. The big lie nearly always
accompanies aggression. The UN secretary general spoke thus: "It's a sad
day for the United Nations and for the world. It is also a very very sad
day for me personally."
In a rebuke rare from any secretary general, Kofi Anan said "My thoughts
tonight are with the people of Iraq and with the 370 UN humanitarian
workers who remain in Iraq." In February 1991, Saddam Hussein committed
aggression when he invaded Kuwait. For that crime, the Iraqi people were
severely punished. Clinton and Blair have now equalled the score. No
retributions await them except of history.
Third, denials notwithstanding the bombings are linked with Bill Clinton's
personal predicament. The surprise aggression occurred days before the
House of Representatives was to vote on his impeachment. The bombs on
Baghdad deflected attention from it, brought a reprieve of sorts by a few
days, and possibly raised the already high public rating of the president.
Whether he likes it or not, in the eyes of the world Saddam Hussein and
Monica Lewinsky hold hands with Bill Clinton. It is not a linkage the
chief executive of the superpower should relish.
Fourth, the American proclivity to excessive violence is again on display.
The phenomenon finds bipartisan expressions. Two administrations - one
Democratic and the other Republican - dropped more bombs in Indo-China
than was used in World War II killing an estimated four million peasants.
In 1991, under Republican president George Bush 2,600 American warplanes
dropped 88,500 tons of bomb on Iraq. In 1998, a Democrat is emulating him
without hopefully matching the earlier levels of mass destruction.
Five, at the end of 1998 it is clear that even without the legitimizing
framework of the cold war American interventionism is alive and thriving.
With the exception of Britain's symbolic participation, the United States
has committed this aggression alone, as it did when Clinton ordered the
missiles attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan. Therein lies a great danger to
world peace and sovereignty of nations. Moral rhetoric cannot hide the
fact that caprice and self-interest, rather than concern for international
law or justice informs American policy and interventions.
Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and South Lebanon, violate UN
resolutions, its annexation of Jerusalem and the Golan violate the UN
charter, and its colonization activities in the occupied territories
violate the Geneva Conventions. Far from intervening to prevent its client
from committing these unlawful acts, Washington aids and abets Israel. It
is known also that Israel has stockpiled weapons of mass murder, including
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Yet, not a word from Washington.
What will the US and Britain gain from this assault? Britain's gain is
obvious and already made. It has earned American goodwill; the
'cousinship' is affirmed yet again. On the American balance sheet there
appear to be many losses and no gain. The primary US objective in the
Middle East is to maintain its hegemony there. That requires a measure of
legitimacy for American power in the region, and an environment relatively
free of instability and popular discontent. The missiles of December will
surely add to anti-American sentiments and political instability in the
Middle East.
In the unlikely event that Saddam Hussein is killed, an American obsession
will have been satisfied. Captain Ahab will get the great White Whale. But
fulfilling an obsession is not a viable policy objective. In fact,
President Hussein is the likely winner, live or die. If he survives, he
will be a hero to the Arab masses. Dead, he will be a martyr. Not that
people are pathologically inclined. Rather, American double standards
anger them. Moreover, they sense the great danger of living in the shadow
of Israel's nuclear weapons. In a PR initiative just before the assault on
Baghdad, Bill Clinton turned up in Gaza and spoke sympathetically of the
Palestinians. Later his war statement mentioned the holy month of Ramadan
and his concern with Muslim sensibilities as a justification for hitting
Baghdad now. Such palliatives cannot work while Jerusalem continues to be
'Judaized' (an Israeli term), Jewish settlements expand onto Arab lands,
and Israeli weapons of mass destruction hang over the Arabs.
Dictators rarely leave behind them an alternative leadership or a viable
mechanism for succession. Saddam Hussein is not an exception. Disarray and
confusion shall certainly ensue if Saddam Hussein is eliminated. Iraq is a
greatly divided country with the rebellious Kurds dominant in the north
and Shi'as in the South. With the one linked to the Kurds in Turkey and
the other to Shiite Iran, their ambitions in post-Saddam Iraq can cause
upheavals in the entire region. It is not clear that the United States has
either the will or the resources to undertake the remaking of Iraq. If it
does not, the scramble over Iraq may ignite protracted warfare involving
Turkey, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Kurd, Arab, Shia, Sunni and, in
one form or another, the United States.
The fundamentalist brand of Islamism may thrive in such an environment.
Islamism will find at least two major sponsors in the struggle for Iraq.
Iran borders on southern Iraq which is home to the most sacred shrines of
Shia' Islam and is populated largely by Shia Muslims. Iran's influence may
easily fill the post-Saddam vacuum, a development Saudi Arabia, the
Sheikhdoms of the Gulf, and the US shall find intolerable. Since none of
America's conservative Arab allies like Arab nationalism (it favours
secular government and Arab unity) they may counter Iran by promoting
Sunni fundamentalism. Sectarian groups thrive in this brand of Islamism.
Like Afghanistan today, Iraq may turn into a battle ground of war parties
backed by several states.
During and after the Gulf War 1, I had argued that Islamic movements are
likely to find fresh opportunities in the post-war Middle Eastern
environment. The argument was that the political culture of the Middle
East is message oriented. In the region where three great religions were
born, the success and failure of dynasties, leaders and movements have
been defined often by their links to a legitimizing ideology. For many
centuries, the struggles for power revolved around differing
interpretations of Islam. In the 19th and 20th centuries, secular
nationalism gained hegemony. Secular nationalist movements led the
founding of most nation states and until the Iranian revolution in 1979
dominated every state except Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms.
In the 1950s, the United States was alarmed by the assumption of power by
nationalists like Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, Abdul Nasser in Egypt, and
the Baath Socialist parties in Syria and Iraq. Their rhetoric of
non-alignment and anti-imperialism, and nationalization of such
multi-national enterprises as Iranian oil and the Suez Canal were viewed
as harmful to American and western interests. Thence began the effort to
undermine them. With the overthrow of Mossadegh in 1953, and defeat of
Abdul Nasser in 1967, the influence of nationalism began to wane first in
Iran and then in the Arab world. As the pro-western alternative, like the
Shah's dictatorship, was unattractive to much of the populace, Islamism
began its gradual rise.
One high point of the Islamic movement came when Iran's popular
revolution, led by Ayatollah Khomeini's clerical followers, founded the
Islamic Republic. Another historic watershed occurred when the United
States and Saudi Arabia sponsored from Pakistan an international jihad
against the evil empire. A third moment of opportunity may occur when the
Iraqi dictator departs, the secular Baath regime collapses, and the
struggle for Iraq begins.
Copyright Notice
This article is copyright 1998 Dawn, and may be redistributed provided
that the article remains intact, with this copyright message clearly
visible. This article may not under any circumstances be resold or
redistributed for compensation of any kind without prior written
permission from Dawn. If you have any questions about these terms, or
would like information about licensing materials from Dawn, please contact
us via telephone: +92 (21) 111-444-777, +92 (21)567-0001 or email:
webmaster@dawn.com .
Dawn is located on the World Wide Web at http://dawn.com This entire
Website including all its contents, graphical images and other elements
are the intellectual property of the Pakistan Herald Publications Ltd.
(P.H.P.L.)-publishers of the DAWN newspaper.
This site is for use by individuals and may not be used for any commercial
purposes. No part of this site may be redistributed or otherwise published
without written consent of P.H.P.L.
(c) The DAWN Group of Newspapers, 1998
