In an ultimately
unsuccessful attempt at historical revisionism which morally echoes,
though is dwarfed by, that of the Holocaust deniers, the Zionist
Organization of America has produced a report entitled "Deir Yassin:
A History of a Lie" [hereinafter "ZOA report"] which attempts
to deny 50 years of conventional history, Israeli and Arab, Zionist
and non-Zionist, Western and "Third World." Like Holocaust
"revisionism," its aim is to exculpate the guilty and its effect is
to cheat the victims of their moral right to the tragic dignity of
his personal suffering. More specifically, the ZOA report's aim is to
establish that the forces of the dissident Zionist organizations
Irgun Z'vai Leumi ("IZL", "Irgun," National Military Organization)
and the Lochamei Herut Israel ("Lehi", also known as "Stern Gang" or
"Stern Group," Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) did not massacre
scores of men, women, and children captives after their capture and
occupation of the Palestinian Arab village of Deir Yassin, beginning
on April 9, 1948. In short, it is a whitewash, but fortunately, a bad
and self-defeating one.
Surprisingly, or perhaps not so, the ZOA report by itself, though it
relies extensively on a single secondary source, confirms most of the
assertions generally held regarding the Deir Yassin incident to the
point where it is difficult for a reasonable person to even doubt the
massacre. *** In fact, the ZOA report in addition to its implicit
endorsement of the high credibility of survivor testimony, may
constitute one of the first, and certainly better publicized, studies
of the subject that provides objective figures on the casualties,
figures which render practically conclusive the proposition that the
dead of Deir Yassin were slaughtered with deliberate intent. [See
discussion # 13 for detail] *** At the same time the claim or
implication that massacre reports are the result of Arab,
anti-Israel, anti-Zionist or anti-Semitic propaganda or fabrications
are shown to be clearly false. The ZOA report is useful, however, in
its collection of different sources, though the reliance on Dr. Uri
Milstein's work for over 44 of the 156 footnotes makes it not as
diverse as it could be.
The ZOA report also debunks or at least contradicts many old Zionist
claims regarding the general causes of mass Palestinian flight from
what became Israel. Additionally, on close examination the ZOA report
seems to concede that the testimony of survivors and Palestinian
factual investigation about the events of Deir Yassin are more
credible that those of the organizations and participants that
captured the village. Finally, it is shown that the ZOA report does
complain about, and legitimately document, a real problem within
modern intellectual circles on the Middle East in the
English-language, namely, an insufficiently critical acceptance of
Labor Zionist contentions, the failure to note or properly represent
dissent to those contentions, and the inability of Arabs to penetrate
that uncritical consensus even when their contentions are
demonstrably more correct.
Approach
This paper critically examines the evidence offered and argued in the
ZOA report. Its purpose is to show that when examined for credible
material evidence, the ZOA report fails to meet its burden of
overcoming decades of a broad consensus of a terrible massacre
committed in the small village of Deir Yassin, west of Jerusalem (the
reports of which, it must be conceded, are often flawed in rigor and
detail, as well as used for political and rhetorical purposes). More
particularly, however, this paper will also show that the ZOA report
actually supports most, if not all, of the key conventional facts and
arguments which tend to demonstrate or "prove" that a
massacre-–a deliberate killing of civilian captives-–took
place at the hands of the Irgun and Lehi.
This paper does readily concede that the ZOA has met its burden of
proof on the issue of correcting the conventional figure of 254 dead
with a more realistic primary source-derived casualty count of 107
dead and 12 wounded. This paper also does not address charges of
additional atrocities (e.g. rape, looting) except briefly to note
that they do not appear to be refuted or confirmed.
One reason for the approach of generally not going behind the ZOA
sources is that an opportunity to review the ZOA sources prior to the
50th anniversary of the massacre is limited. (Certain outside sources
mostly unrelated to Deir Yassin are used for comparative purposes.)
Since the ZOA report appears timed with that, this relatively rapid
response is created. Thus, this paper basically limits itself to
addressing whether they have met their burden of proof in engaging in
massacre theory refutation. And in fact, not only do they not, but
they confirm most of the evidence of those who claim a massacre did
take place at Deir Yassin, and advance conclusive—particularly
in terms of casualty figures—new evidence and arguments in
favor.
Burden of
Proof
The burden of proof in this debate is on "massacre deniers" like ZOA
and its report. The reason for this is simple. Conventional history,
at least in English, has generally accepted that a massacre took
place at Deir Yassin. The ZOA report agrees with that assessment. By
its own figures only 8 out of 170 English language books on the
subject (about 5%) question that a massacre took place. Many of the
"pro-massacre" books, it notes, are required academic reading, others
like the bestseller
O Jerusalem! and
Genesis:1948 are popular works by major publishers,
and one is the only-–and therefore standard—English source
on Zionist anti-British resistance in Palestine (Bell, J. Bowyer.
Terror out of Zion).
What this means is that the ZOA is put to the burden of producing
evidence corroborating the long-rejected Irgun-Lehi theory that the
victims died in house-to-house combat rather than through the
deliberate slaughter of captives. (By "captive" here is meant anyone
either in custody or non-resisting parties, civilian or military,
under direct control of an armed party.) This could be forensic,
eyewitness, or some documentary or photographic revelation
attributable to someone on the scene. (In this respect, simply more
Irgun or Lehi members saying self-servingly or long after the fact
"we did not do it" is not especially significant; nor is anything
that is simply conclusory that says "they did not do it", if it is
not attributable to some underlying independent contemporary observer
or physical evidence.) Discrediting of hostile witnesses is
significant if the hostile witness's information is competent,
relevant, and material. But in order to meet a burden of proof, all
hostile witnesses on a point must be discredited.
In essence, the ZOA, in order to establish the massacre allegation as
a lie, must show us something that convincingly contradicts the
conventional wisdom. Overcoming conventional wisdom can be done. It
has been done. On the very issue of Middle East refugees, Erskine
Childers, then an Irish journalist, in 1961 challenged the
conventional wisdom that Palestinian refugees fled their homes in
1948 due to radio broadcasts by the Arab states and political forces
urging them to leave. He did so by examining the actual records of
the broadcasts in the British Museum. He found no such orders to
leave, in fact he found orders to remain, and published the results
of his examination in the London Spectator ("The Other Exodus,"
London Spectator, 12 May 1961). Nowadays, conventional wisdom has
turned around such that a historian such as Dr. Aryeh Yitzhaki, who
in 1992 was military historian for the Israel Defense Forces,
described the alleged calls by Arab governments for the Palestinians
to leave "fabrications" (Ha'ir, May 6, 1992).
This paper presents a coherent, compelling, and rather conventional
theory of the incident as resulting in a massacre. It then looks to
see if the material in the ZOA report confirms, supports, or refutes
that theory. It does find that the ZOA report's evidence at minimum
fails to credibly challenge the theory of a massacre and it tends to
support, even confirm, the traditional view of a massacre.
Additionally, the report confirms that the dissemination of the
massacre theory of the events of Deir Yassin was not in origin Arab,
anti-Zionist, anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, although it has been used
for such purposes. The ZOA report also tends to confirm certain more
modern general theories about Palestinian flight in the 1948 war.
Finally, the ZOA report points up a major problem in English-language
Middle East study-–the uncritical acceptance and dissemination
of Labor Zionist contentions.
Structure:
Citation
References to the ZOA report are not by page as many readers may have
"downloaded" the text electronically and pagination may vary.
Therefore, citation is either to a named subsection or to the
footnote number which follows the portion referred to. This will
appear as the full word "note" as in (note 33). If the reference is
to the actual footnote content at the end of the document, the
reference appears as the letter "n." and number, as in (note 33).
References to outside works will be by author and title. References
to the numbered discussions in this paper are as follows (see #
[number]).
Structure: Theory
and Discussion
Below is a theory of a massacre at Deir Yassin. Each proposition in
the developed theory is preceded by a number. A detailed discussion
of each proposition and how the ZOA report confirms it, or fails to
contradict it, follows in sections numbered correspondingly.
Theory of a Massacre: Deir Yassin, Palestine Mandate,
beginning April 9, 1948.
Perpetrators: Combined Units-–Irgun Z'vai Leumi &
Lochamei Herut Israel underground paramilitary
Victims: Civilian Villagers
Massacre Casualties: (best estimate) 107 dead, 12 wounded
On April 9, 1948, combined forces of the independent Zionist
organizations Irgun and Lehi, attacked the Arab village of Deir
Yassin, and with the aid of the Haganah, the main pre-State Israeli
army in Palestine, they captured it. Some 100 or so civilian men,
women, and children lay dead in the aftermath.
MASSACRE THEORY PROPOSITIONS
The Massacre Theory: A massacre (perhaps with other atrocities like
rape, looting, or mutilation) was perpetrated on those captive
villagers in Deir Yassin. They were deliberately slaughtered by the
forces of the Irgun and Lehi.
Evidence of Massacre SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE ZOA REPORT
"Deir Yassin: History of A Lie":
Credibility of
Attackers:
1) The attackers at Deir Yassin have originated lies (official and
unofficial) for the public record on their actions there, they have
ample motive for doing so, and their credibility when offering
statements supporting a denial of a massacre is limited and damaged.
2) There exists the "hard" evidence of photographs (and a subjective
contemporary report) in the Israeli archives which (at least the
photos) would obviously help support the claims of the massacre
deniers, if such are true, but there appears no effort by
them—either attackers or apologists like ZOA—to get them
released for inspection. [Note: groups like
Deir
Yassin Remembered are eager to see these released for
historical value and forensic analysis.]
Nature of The
Attackers:
3) Regarding the events themselves, the main organization which is
accused of the massacre at Deir Yassin had a record of terrorism in
the form of murderous and humiliating displays of violence against
captives and an indifference to civilian life when a political goal
could be accomplished. 4) In fact, members of the attacking groups
had such an operational ethic that they required special consultation
and instructions NOT to harm civilians or prisoners. 5) One group
accused in the massacre has been shown to have welcomed the idea of
sowing general panic among the Arabs by a large death toll.
Pre-Attack Planning:
6) A fearsome showing, specifically a massacre (including women and
children victims), was actually proposed and contemplated by attacker
group members prior to the attack as part of their introduction of
themselves as a regular fighting force.
Course of
Events:
7) There appears to be no evidence that Deir Yassin was selected for
Igun-Lehi capture (with Haganah coordination and support) because it
had a hostile population or was feared as a base of hostile
operations or of foreign hostile forces. 8) And there is no
independent corroboration of the claim that the village was an armed
base for hostile foreign forces. 9) In any event, the initial attack
by Irgun-Lehi on the morning of April 9, 1948 failed in certain
respects, namely the warning loudspeaker was ineffective and the
Irgun-Lehi attackers failed to actually take the town. 10) The
attackers eventually had to let the rival Haganah come and subdue the
town. 11) These terror organizations, who had just been frustrated,
frightened, humiliated, killed and injured by the village defense,
now were now entrusted with the fate of the villagers.
The Lethal Outcome
of April 9 and Thereafter:
12) As late as two days later and as early as that afternoon, the
attacker-controlled village is observed as a scene of terrible
carnage—about 100 dead bodies (or more), apparently civilian,
including large numbers of women and children apparently still in
houses. It is not disputed that the Stern-Lehi weapons physically
caused their deaths. 13) Casualty and post-battle figures are
inconsistent and missing, and while the attackers claim the deaths
resulted unintentionally from a hard-fought battle, and not a
systematic massacre, the best casualty figures available indicate
that almost 90% of civilians "unintentionally" hit by or because of
Irgun-Lehi firepower ended up dead (three times the lethal accuracy
of such massacres as Jonesboro and the Texas Tower; only 9% less than
Lidice, about equal to Hadassah Hospital, and 5% deadlier than fire
at Wounded Knee), while "intense firepower" directed at the attackers
out in the open scored only 10% lethal hits; that about 50 prisoners
are unaccounted for, and that a most deferential estimate of the
alleged Arab fighters killed yields a 33% civilian to fighter death
ratio, still twice the overestimated civilian to fighter casualty
rate first falsely reported at My Lai and which set off suspicious
inquiries about causes of civilian deaths. Additionally, casualty and
prisoner figures are in general inconsistent or absent.
Massacre
Reports:
14) There is no independent corroboration for the attacker's
explanation of the large numbers of deaths being caused by rough
house-to-house fighting in the April 9, 1948 morning battle. 15) And
there is no non-Irgun non-Lehi person on the immediate scene who
corroborates their massacre denial. 16) On the other hand there are
many who have reported on the record seeing a massacre of innocent
civilians at Deir Yassin by the Irgun and Lehi. 17) In fact, some
evidence exists indicating that some Irgun-Lehi members may have
privately admitted they "cold bloodedly shot every Arab they
found-–man, woman, or child" at Deir Yassin. 18) Further, it is
uncontroverted that after the capture of the village several of the
attackers were observed contemplating a massacre of prisoners.
Additional Issues of Atrocity and Cruelty:
15) There are additional allegations of atrocities, including rape,
mutilation, and looting that are unconfirmed and unrefuted. 20) A
truck carrying captives from Deir Yassin was driven through West
Jerusalem where crowds around it displayed hostility and one
contemporary witness with basis for knowledge reported this was done
to boost public morale. 21) Since all these events, there appears
little observed remorse or recrimination from the attackers who
supposedly killed women and children only by accident.
The above theory and evidence clearly argue overwhelmingly that a
massacre occurred at Deir Yassin. The theory and its components are
validated almost exclusively by the evidence in the ZOA report itself
(with some outside data for illustration and comparison purposes).
Despite its attempted argumentation, the ZOA report fails to conceal
the reality of a terrible massacre (which possibly included other
atrocities) that occurred to the residents of Deir Yassin in early
April 1948. Below, it will be shown how each point is demonstrated by
the ZOA report.
Propositions
Supported By ZOA Report
1) The ZOA report reveals that the attackers at Deir Yassin have
originated lies (official and unofficial) for the public record on
their actions there, and have ample motive for doing so, and their
credibility when offering statements supporting a denial of a
massacre is limited and damaged.
The participants in the attack at Deir Yassin were led by an
organization that has had an admitted record of lying for public
consumption about their actions in Deir Yassin. Statements from the
attackers themselves, especially years after the massacre, are of
limited use in terms of evidence as they have host of motives (and as
time goes by greater opportunity) to lie about a massacre and support
the excuse of accidental civilian mass death from a combat with
regular Arab soldiers or organized fighters. Many such motives are
obvious, like shame and embarrassment. And there is a less obvious
financial and comradely motive for doing so revealed by the ZOA The
government of Israel once questioned the military nature of the
attack in order to deny wounded veteran's benefits to attackers who
were wounded in the initial fighting at Deir Yassin (note 74). To
support their comrades and their own benefit status and not to impugn
testimony in a hearing on the subject, there is a motive to maintain
a coherent line on the subject.
The ZOA report also recalls one attacker Reuven Greenberg. He is
admitted to have tried to lie on the record about Deir Yassin and
falsely attribute a civilian death to false causes (Haganah
detonator). He is described as a shady character, "a man who knew how
to tell tales." (note 73)
But the attackers in a collective way lied about Deir Yassin for the
public record. The Irgun leader Mordechai Ra'naan is reported by the
ZOA to have knowingly exaggerated the Arab casualty figures at Deir
Yassin (note 83). He raised them to 254 to provoke fear (note 83),
and this excessive figure has gone around the historical record
(notes 92-112, generally) until, according to the ZOA report,
Palestinian Arab survivors of Deir Yassin and a Palestinian
University offered for the record far straighter casualty figures
based on new primary source inquiry (see generally notes 88-91).
The ZOA report clearly argues that the attackers are of limited
credibility. Referring to those who have passed along the false 254
figure, it argues (section: "The latest and the worst"):
"If those who claimed there was a massacre . . . have been proven
to be so completely unreliable concerning the crucial question of the
casualty total, what does that say about the reliability of their
other claims? If the accusers were willing to knowingly assert that
the number of victims was nearly 150% larger than it really was, how
can we trust their other claims-–of rape, mutilation, and of the
massacre itself? . . . Whether through mendacity or carelessness,
they mangled the truth, and such behavior would have discredited all
of their testimony in a court of law."
But as just noted above, the ZOA report concedes that the original
"knowing asserter" of casualty falsehood was the Irgun itself! And it
also reports that there were other attackers who counted the bodies
or were aware at the time of a body count and knew the public record
figure was wrong (note 82). So cannot the following slightly altered
question therefore be asked about attacker credibility?
"If those who claimed there was NO massacre . . . have been proven
to be so completely unreliable concerning the crucial question of the
casualty total, what does that say about the reliability of their
other claims? If the ACCUSED were willing to knowingly assert that
the number of victims was nearly 150% larger than it really was, how
can we trust their other claims – [DENIAL] of rape,
mutilation, and [DENIAL]of the massacre itself? . . . Whether
through mendacity or carelessness, they mangled the truth, and such
behavior would have discredited all of their testimony in a court of
law."
The ZOA report's own standard of credibility speaks for itself. In
addition to the self-serving nature of attacker denials, and accounts
supporting the heavy combat excuse, the attackers are not to be
trusted as they are the dishonest source of the very figures whose
falsehood dooms the speaker to permanent inadmissibility under the
ZOA's rules of evidence.
2) The ZOA report confirms there is "hard" contemporary evidence
about the Deir Yassin incident in the form of photographs (and a
subjective contemporary report) in the Israeli archives which (the
photos) would obviously help support the claims of the massacre
deniers, if they are as true as they claim, yet there appears no
effort by them-–either attackers or apologists—to release
them for inspection. [Note:
Deir Yassin
Remembered is eager to see these released for
historical value and forensic analysis.]
It is not denied that the photos in the Israeli archives alleged to
be of Deir Yassin on the day of the battle are those of the place
(note 56). While the archives have only admitted they show bodies
(note 56), still dead people do tell tales. Positions of bodies,
their clothing and conditions can go a long way to helping the
attackers vindicate their case if true. Yet, there is no call by the
ZOA report, or reported of any attacker, calling for their release,
either to the public or for private inspection should adverse
publicity be feared or out of respect for surviving relatives. The
old chief of the Irgun (note 28), Menachem Begin, was Prime Minister
for many years, yet he obviously never released them. If the physical
evidence is present and the massacre denial is true, why not release
them? Or is there something in the photos that it is not desired that
we see. Not only is this a general question of credibility in
massacre denial but in each of the detailed propositions in this
paper where corroboration would be possible from the photos, e.g.
Iraqi soldiers, nature of battle, condition of bodies etc, the lack
of call for these photos is additional evidence of lack of
corroboration.
3) The ZOA report confirms that the main organization accused of the
massacre at Deir Yassin had a record of terrorism in the form of
murderous and humiliating displays of violence against captives and
an indifference to civilian life when a political goal could be
accomplished.
Some conventional history labels the Irgun and Lehi organizations as
terrorist. For example, it is recorded that the Irgun retaliated
against an Arab village by shooting at civilian Arab crowds in a town
when they thought townspeople spied on Jewish convoys, and threw
bombs at civilian Arab shoppers and bus stop in Jerusalem. (See
Collins/Lapierre, O Jerusalem p.117, 135). Conventional accounts also
record that the Irgun already had a mode of operation of cold-blooded
premeditated violence in which deaths of innocent (and even friendly)
civilians were considered acceptable if a political goal was
accomplished. This extended to humiliating and retaliating against
enemies by publicly displaying violent abuse, and killing of,
prisoners. (see Collins/Lapierre p. 117.)
This assessment confirmed by the ZOA report. The report notes the
bombing of the King David Hotel by the Irgun (which, although not
mentioned, is generally known to have caused 90 deaths, including
Jewish and Arab civilians) (note 79). The military target, as the ZOA
report indicates, was the British Mandatory Government's office in
the hotel (note 79). But they clearly did not scruple to kill
civilians cold-bloodedly. [Whether or not there was a warning in
advance is irrelevant, the point is they were willing to go ahead
with it.] The report also mentions Irgun "retaliatory hangings"
and "public whippings" indicating a penchant for harming prisoners as
acts of retaliation (note 79). The report even shows them attempting
to blow up a police headquarters while their own members are
prisoners inside (note 79).
Without going beyond the ZOA report, it is clear that Deir Yassin was
about to be descended upon by people with a cold-blooded disregard
for human life and a penchant for deadly and even sadistic violence
against people they hold captive. These are the people who deny
committing a massacre after they took the Arab village.
4) The ZOA report reveals that members of the attacking groups were
terrorist in that that they required special orders NOT to harm
civilians or prisoners.
In a section entitled "Begin vetoed mistreatment of civilians", the
ZOA report advises that prior to attacking Deir Yassin, the attackers
had to appeal all the way to their commander in Tel Aviv for specific
instructions not to harm civilians. One is forced to wonder by this
alone what the normal fighting ethic of the group was. One does not
"veto" an idea that is not urged up from below. Clearly, the general
operating ethic is one easily described as terrorist. (The ZOA report
labels some people "terrorist" because they are alleged to be willing
to put civilian "hostages," i.e. captives, in harm's way (note 40).
[This terrorist designation is corroborated by a conventional
source, the New York Times' Dana Adams Schmidt, who in his book
Armageddon In The Middle East, recalls travelling to Tel Aviv after
Deir Yassin to meet "the Irgun spokesman" (unnamed, possibly Begin)
who tells him that it is necessary to use "terror, bombs, and
assassination." (pp. 3-5)]
5) The ZOA report confirms the group accused of massacre welcomed the
idea of general panic being spread among the Arabs by a high death
toll.
After the capture of Deir Yassin, the ZOA report records that the
Irgun commander told the press an exaggerated death figure in order
that "the Arabs would panic not only in Jerusalem but across the
country" (note 84). Menachem Begin is cited by the ZOA report as
finding to be beneficial general Arab flight (described by ZOA as
"voluntary Arab emigration"!) resulting from the fear created by
reports of Deir Yassin's carnage (note 131). [Again, this
confirms the same conventional source cited above (#4), Dana Adams
Schmidt, who also reports that the "Irgun spokesman" told him that
terror was necessary in order to "frighten the Arabs."]
6) The ZOA report confirms that members of the organizations planning
the attack on Deir Yassin wanted to make an exhibition at Deir Yassin
of their fearsomeness as a new combined regular fighting force and
specifically that a massacre (including women and children victims)
was proposed and discussed by the Irgun-Lehi group members prior to
the attack.
In a rare favorable citing of Haganah intelligence officer Meir Pa'il
who had contacts inside the attacking groups, the ZOA report reveals
that there was a discussion that "if we, the IZL (Irgun) and Lehi are
finally going to do a joint operation, the Arabs should know it.'"
(note 10) Although Pa'il's credibility about his claimed observations
of Deir Yassin on April 9, 1998 is questioned in the report, this
reference is not. [This supports a reference from a conventional
source, David K. Shipler's "Arab and Jew: Wounded Spirits in a
Promised Land" who speaks of a woman and her son in Jerusalem who
served tea to the attackers before their assault on Deir Yassin and
recalled them speaking excitedly of sending a message to the Arabs
all over the land.] In the same Pa'il reference, the ZOA report
confirms "during their planning [of the Deir Yassin attack]
someone tried to suggested a massacre. . . " Pa'il describes this as
a suggestion of more than one member, "some hooligans" but then he
notes that the "commanders opposed it." (note 10) The ZOA report does
not record Pa'il recollecting that there was any opposition from the
rank and file to the "hooligan" suggestion. The ZOA report admits in
fact that Lehi representatives told the Irgun commanders they wanted
to "kill anyone that opposed us" regardless of "age or gender".
Shortly thereafter these groups would occupy Deir Yassin and leave
over 100 dead civilians. Almost 50 years later, the Zionist
Organization of America will reject with indignation the suggestion
that these groups could possibly have massacred them (see ZOA:
Introduction, generally).
7) The ZOA report confirms that there appears to be no evidence that
Deir Yassin was selected for Igun-Lehi capture with Haganah
coordination and support because it had a hostile population or was
feared as a base of hostile operations or of foreign hostile
forces.
Deir Yassin was not considered as a center of hostile attacks or a
base of foreign Arab troops when it was selected as the testing for
the Irgun and Lehi by their leadership and that of the Haganah. Both
Irgun-Lehi and Haganah sources are consulted by the ZOA report and in
all the planning discussions that they undertook, there is discussion
of a long-range desire to set up an airfield near Deir Yassin, a
reference to a general unspecified strategic value (presumably
another reference to the airfield and the village's location near the
road and lower Motza), and finally timing to assist a convoy on the
road and an attack on Kastel (notes 6-16). The ZOA report indicates
no reference in the discussions to activities of the population of
the village itself or to hostile foreign forces being present. In
fact, a letter by Haganah commander Shaltiel advises that maintaining
the presence of the population is desirable to help PREVENT the
village from BECOMING a center for foreign forces (note 7). In fact,
the ZOA report confirms that there was a non-belligerency arrangement
among Deir Yassin and neighboring Jewish areas, and in Deir Yassin
the mukhtar was a Haganah informant (note 19). Had the town
demonstrated prior belligerency, a violation of the agreement would
likely have been discussed either in the planning stage or in
post-attack reports.
In fact, there is only one explicit reference to any possible hostile
action from Deir Yassin villagers or the village itself but as it
occurs after the selection of Deir Yassin as a target, it was not
part of the process of selecting it as a target. [There are other
reports in late March and early April of armed people entering or
leaving Deir Yassin—probably passing through as the same reports
indicate Jewish forces moved through Jewish villages—or
gathering there at various times, and that the Haganah-recruited Arab
village maintained contacts with Arab military forces-–who are
alleged to be based elsewhere—and that fighting or gunfire
occurred in the Deir Yassin area or on the roadway near Deir Yassin
but no such reports treat these as evidence of either a base or a
hostile population. Also seizure Deir Yassin is reported to have been
assessed as an advantage for highway protection but again no
reference to the village or villagers as a source of trouble (notes
19-26).] A few hours before the assault, the ZOA report
indicates, a message from Haganah Jerusalem commander Shaltiel was
sent to "a colleague" advising that the "Arabs of Deir Yassin" had
trained a mortar on the road to shell the convoy (note 27). An odd
report, certainly.
First, nowhere in the report does it say people in the village had
ever done that before and it contains no information on the identity
or reliability of the source of the report, or its purpose. More
importantly, the ZOA report offers no word of a mortar in use at Deir
Yassin during the attack, no claim of its capture despite a detailed
discussion of materiel found in the village (a discussion of bullets
but somehow they overlooked small artillery!) (notes 34-35), nor any
concern about it on the part of Haganah or the attackers or the
survivors on the ground. Since no mortar appears used by the Arabs in
Deir Yassin or found among them, no post-battle concerns about it
from the attackers or the Haganah on the ground, it remains a strange
inconsistency with no corroboration. It is thus not even credible and
it could represent anything from absentminded substitution (concern
about the impending Deir Yassin attack), to an out-of-context
speculation, to a false bureaucratic justification for authorizing an
Irgun-Lehi operation on Deir Yassin, to a forgery. The fact that the
only explicit reference to hostile action originating from the
village is demonstrably incredible probably argues even more
aggressively against the reputation or fact of the village as hostile
in that something possibly had to have been made up just to justify
an attack.
The ZOA report gives a final confirmation of the belief that the
village was expected to pose little danger and therefore was not
selected as a vital target. It claims that the attackers' expectation
was that the villagers would put up "perhaps . . . token resistance"
(note 31). That is hardly something to be expected from a place that
was expected to be a hostile encampment.
8) The ZOA report produces no independent contemporary observer
corroboration to claims that Deir Yassin was a base for, or had,
hostile foreign soldiers (e.g. Iraqis) at the time of the attack.
The claim that foreign regular soldiers or other foreign troops
fighting on the Arab side of the conflict were present and fighting
in Deir Yassin supports the contention by the attackers that they did
not engage in a massacre but that deaths resulted from tough
house-to-house combat. Obviously this is self-serving and
corroboration would be vital. (This is especially true in light of
the low credibility of the Irgun-Lehi evidence of foreign troops, to
be discussed below, and the additional consideration that it has been
in the financial self-interest of the participants or their comrades
for the receipt of benefits (see #1, above). Deir Yassin has been
subject to difficult litigation to establish it was a military action
in order for Deir Yassin veterans to receive benefits.)
Missing Figures, As
If They Were Never There
An additional point of note is that the ZOA report in the section
"How many Arabs died at Deir Yassin?" and sections thereafter goes on
and on about the history of the 254 number but settles on the low
survivor-based estimate of 107 dead and a conclusive high of 120
(note 91 ). ***At no point in calculating "Arab deaths," however,
does it spare a thought wondering how many outside fighter/soldiers
there may have been in order to determine the body count of Arabs.***
Now that we have a hard and acceptable civilian figure, independently
verified, why do they not proceed to determine the presence of
foreign fighters, most of whom would presumably be Arab, to round out
the body count? Why not turn to the Irgun figures on fighter
casualties? Or the Lehi ones? Or maybe a Haganah post-battle report,
as they were more institutionalized? But there appear no clear
figures, because none were made or because there were no such
casualties?
It's almost as if the ZOA authors forgot the cover story of the
foreign soldiers and reverted to the truth that only villagers died
at Deir Yassin. The "How many Arabs died. . . ?" section in the
report (and its following) seem quite happy to end the question of
Arab deaths triumphantly on corroborated survivor calculations made
from villager memories of villager losses. The missing Arab soldiers
or irregulars seemed to have disappeared from calculation. [There
isn't even a minus-one for the alleged Yugoslav Muslim one attacker
years later reported finding (note 32).] As if they were never
there. . .
Nobody Else Saw Them
In any event, the ZOA report otherwise indicates there is no
independent contemporary corroboration of foreign forces in the
village at the time of attack. An Israeli Labor government pamphlet
or two a generation later say there were some present but it is not
attributed to a non-Lehi non-Irgun primary source observer (an Arab
survivor statement therein – presuming its reliability —
only refers to hostile fire from the "population") (notes 110-115).
Government pamphlets tell stories for any number of reasons, so it
hardly counts as evidence any more than a Syrian government pamphlet
asserting rapes and mutilations at Deir Yassin. ***The most important
thing to note is that of the non-Irgun-Lehi people on the scene at
some point, or reported on the scene, there is not a single person
who reports the presence of foreign forces either as fighters,
prisoners, or bodies.*** No Arab survivors are quoted to state this,
no Haganah observer of the battle and its aftermath, like Mordechai
Gihon who provided cover fire and watched for foreign troop movements
(note 43), and even counted bodies that afternoon (note 82), recalls
them, nor Meir Pa'il or his reported mystery photographer, no
post-battle assessment by Haganah is cited to say this, no reports
come from Yona Ben-Sasson in Givat Shaul who interacted with
prisoners (note 58), nor Yeshurun Schiff, nor Shlomo Havilov, nor
Yehoshua Arieli or any other reported there (note 52). The Haganah
troops who finally captured the village (note 44, 46) are not quoted
reporting foreign forces in what is alleged to have been an hour-long
confrontation. All this is especially strange when one considers how
important movements of foreign troops are to the main Jewish army.
The ZOA report confirms this importance as it cites regular Haganah
observations of troop movements in the area (notes 19-27).
Troop Movements: Passing Through
The ZOA report does quote an observation "shortly before" the Deir
Yassin attack (a day? a week? hours?) stating that numerous armed men
were passing from Ein Kerem to Deir Yassin and only a few returned.
Some appeared to be soldiers in Iraqi uniform. (note 26) Since we are
mysteriously not told when this occurred and it is based on a recent
recollection of Mordechai Gihon rather than a contemporary report
(note 26), it does not appear to have been of much contemporary
significance. The ZOA report reveals though not directly is that Deir
Yassin was a path THROUGH which people moved to the major road and
the larger battles. [Deir Yassin was between Ein Kerem and the
critical highway. The report makes note of a pass or road from Ein
Kerem to Deir Yassin on which people could travel (note 43)].
Further, the ZOA report reveals there was battle in Motza (which was
nearby (note 18) going on at the same time as Deir Yassin (note 44,
45). In fact the Haganah who assisted at Deir Yassin would come from
there (note 44). So there remains no independent contemporary
evidence that there were fighters other than armed villagers in the
town at the time of attack on April 9. All we have are armed people
whose presence in Deir Yassin seems to not evoke much contemporary
concern.
Useful Gathering
Place
One report indicates that apparently foreign Arab soldiers had come
through Deir Yassin a few days earlier on the way to Motza and were
harassing the highway (note 22 ). The information, the ZOA tells us,
came originally from Haganah intelligence, not scouts, and described
what had been happening IN Deir Yassin (note 22), a "gathering". Now
one could suppose that since the mukhtar was a Haganah informant, and
a Haganah agent could travel into Deir Yassin (note 20), that perhaps
Deir Yassin was the source of the information and the passage of
troops through there was preferable to other places. Finally, a
"gathering" suggests something that is "ad hoc" where people meet
from elsewhere and not where they are based. The descriptions of a
gathering is followed by people LEAVING (note 22).
No Evidence of Contemporary Concern
In any event, the ZOA report cites no evidence that such movements
was of concern for the battle of Deir Yassin (e.g. last minute
reports to Irgun-Lehi). Without more all we have is just another
troop movement through one of many villages near the highway at
unclear times in a battle area. So these movements appear part of
larger activity while no contemporary concern is revealed about the
presence of foreign troops in Deir Yassin.
Foreign Troop Report
Would Have Existed
In fact, given Haganah accessibility, would there not have been a
contemporary report or recollection of someone saying as the attack
was planned: "This town is a base crawling with armed bands and
foreign soldiers in fighting positions. . ."? There is only a report
of large numbers of foreign soldiers in the previous month but no
indication that they remained or indication of concern about it at
the time the attack was planned (note 19). In any event, if the
Haganah had access, it is likely to have been because an armed
foreign presence was only transient.
No Physical Evidence
of Foreign Troops
The ZOA report also reveals no corroborating physical evidence of
foreign soldiers. No bodies of foreign troops are reported by the Red
Cross observer (note 65), nor by Dr. Engel who is cited favorably
(note 66). Yehoshua Arieli and Yair Tsaban who buried bodies (note
68) are not quoted as saying, "Well, we found a few Iraqis [or
other soldiers]." One Iraqi alleged by an attacker to have been
present is reported dressed in similar khaki to the attackers (note
31). Yet there are no reported naked bodies from the attackers
helping themselves to a useful or tradable war item. Unless we are to
believe they dressed them in other clothes for burial. Further, the
Irgun and Lehi were underground forces and if there were dead Iraqis
of officer rank with uniforms and, as noted in the report they have
an Arabic speaking Iraqi as a member (note 8), the advantages of
keeping the clothes for infiltration purposes are obvious. Yet there
are not even recollections, much less outside corroboration, of the
fate of the bodies, uniforms, or any other physical evidence. And
while the report attempts to show how well armed the village was,
there is only a discussion of ammunition found in the village (note
34, 35). There is curiously no reference to finding or trading
regular issue military firearms (even by the attackers).
Once again, there is the problem of the photographs (see #2). The
photos of the incident in the Israeli archives might clear all this
up. Where is the call for release?
The extensive lack of corroboration and the self-servingness of the
claim as justification for the alleged combat that resulted in the
civilian deaths, or to support veteran's benefits (see #1) is
sufficient to conclude the that the claim of outside forces remains
wholly unconfirmed. Yet another reason found in the ZOA report argues
this. The witness claims are of incredibly low credibility, even
aside from their self-servingness. The reports are from interviews
decades after the incident and massacre charge and not nearly
contemporary (notes 31-35). One dramatic attacker account has a
trained Arab soldier waiting until he is over a wall before he fires
at shot even though he had just been face to face with his intended
victim (note 33). Then it takes a sniper on a rooftop to identify the
man as an Iraqi officer even though the narrator was face to face
(note 33 ).
Another self-serving account tells of a Yugoslavian Muslim soldier
among the dead. He supposedly has on him an identification showing
him to be a former member of the Bosnian Nazi S.S. (note 32). It
seems odd that a former Nazi collaborator would carry written proof
of this with him across the Eastern Mediterranean after World War II
and into a British jurisdiction. And then bring it to a place where
he might be captured by armed Jews many of whom are refugees and
survivors from Nazi Europe.
Still another self-serving account has an Arab soldier dressed in
khaki who is almost indistinguishable from the attackers. Suddenly
the soldier turns around and shoots him in the leg. The attacker then
sees the man was an Iraqi soldier (note 31). How he is able to
identify the man's precise nationality while taking a bullet in the
leg is not explained.
Additionally, we do not learn even from attacker recollection of any
Iraqi or foreign soldier casualties or prisoners ever separately
counted or recorded, something that probably would have been easy (it
is reported that they wore military clothes) and important to do and
it is clear that attacker and Haganah personnel made some kind of
body count (notes 81-83). This absence is surprising as one alleged
soldier body is reported carefully inspected-–the alleged
Yugoslav Muslim with the Nazi identification. But no separate
casualty counts or contemporary records to this day.
Curious Lack of
Recrimination
Interestingly, ZOA presents us with telling testimony of the
Jerusalem Irgun commander at a benefits hearing for a comrade's
military pension. This testimony raises some questions regarding the
alleged Arab soldier fortress that ZOA says Deir Yassin was. In the
hearing, the claimant needed to help establish that Deir Yassin was a
military action in order for a veteran of the battle to qualify for
veteran's benefits. We are then presented with commander Rana'an's
1952 recollection of his own pique at apparent ridicule by the
Haganah commander for poor performance in taking Deir Yassin. But his
pique is only expressed by a sarcastic comment to the effect of "is
that why you called me here?" At no point do we hear him angrily
reply, "My God, there's a nest of Iraqis and Bosnians! We've had to
go through civilians to get to them" (note 45). Further we note that
the ZOA has the protocols of that hearing (Introduction) and it has
not chosen to offer in its report any statement from that formal
military proceeding regarding fighting foreign troops. Such a
statement would have been more credible sworn (one assumes) testimony
subject to cross-examination and closer in time to the attack. But
the only Irgun-Lehi direct statements are the much later dramatic
anecdotes, e.g., Milstein or Jabotinsky Archives or later sources
(nns. 31-40).
The claim of Iraqi and other troops present in Deir Yassin remains
uncorroborated and unestablished.
9) The ZOA confirms that the initial attack by Irgun-Lehi failed in
certain respects, viz. to effectively give loudspeaker warning to
villagers, and to subdue the village.
The loudspeaker warning the residents to flee got stuck and may not
have been heard. All morning fighting went on [though perhaps not
in the way ZOA claims, see #14, below] and but the Irgun-Lehi
forces were not able to subdue the village (notes 44, 46). The
village resistance proved quite difficult for them (note 42). [A
conventional source—not cited for this purpose by the ZOA
report—Collins and Lapierre, O Jerusalem, p. 274, sarcastically
notes that "no one seemed to have imagined that it might be
considerably more difficult to conquer a village than it was to toss
a bomb into an unarmed crowd waiting for a bus."] For a period,
refugees from the village were fired upon by a Haganah unit blocking
their escape during the latter's early morning attempt to block armed
men from neighboring villages to come to the assistance of Deir
Yassin (note 43).
10) The ZOA report confirms that the attackers had to let the Haganah
come and capture the town.
The attackers eventually turned to the Haganah at about late morning
for help. Haganah fighters entered with small artillery, extricated
wounded attackers, and quickly and efficiently conquered the
remainder of the village (note 44).
11) The ZOA report reveals the village was now turned over to
terrorists who had been frustrated, frightened, humiliated in front
of their rivals, killed and injured by the village defense.
The village was then left to the hands of terrorists to "mop up"
(note 45) who, as discussed above, even prior to the long deadly
fight had contemplations of massacre (see #1). And, as the ZOA notes,
they had suffered fatal and other casualties at the hands of the
village defense. Further, the attackers were left open to ridicule.
In fact, the ZOA reports the recollection of the Irgun commander that
Haganah commander Shaltiel did ridicule him saying the Irgun-Lehi
forces had taken on a job too big for them (note 45). Although this
happened elsewhere than the battlefield and there is no report of
ridicule from the Haganah on the scene, nonetheless, it is
uncontradicted by the ZOA that the attackers were in a position to be
subject to Haganah ridicule, in that this was the attackers first
regular operation, and their performance was shown up by their
rivals. "They achieved in one hour," a Lehi member recalled, "what we
could not accomplish in several hours. They had good weapons and they
had battle experience." (note 46). As the ZOA report notes in its
Introduction, although they were on the same side of the war, the
Haganah and the Irgun-Lehi were political and military competitors in
the same community.
The village of Deir Yassin had caused these physical and
psychological injuries to the terrorists, people as noted
above—and by the ZOA report—with a record of premeditated
civilian slaughter and retaliating lethally against prisoners (see #s
3-6, above). These people then obtain full control of the village
under the circumstances described above. Thereafter, scores of its
residents are seen dead in terrible carnage. The ZOA report attempts
to argue that the villagers were not deliberately killed and implies
only a dishonest, foolish, or careless historian could conclude there
was a massacre.
12) The ZOA confirms that as early as the afternoon of the battle,
and as late as two days later, the attacker-controlled village is a
scene of terrible carnage—a mass of at least 100 dead bodies,
including large numbers of women and children, and a small number of
untended wounded. It is not questioned that the attackers actions
were the primary cause of their deaths.
As the ZOA report notes about two days after these groups took over
fully, a Jewish doctor from Magen David Adom working with the Red
Cross representative came to Deir Yassin, still in the hands of the
Irgun-Lehi. Villagers of Deir Yassin were still all around, he sees
approximately 100 of them still inside houses—dead men, women,
and children, a sight he calls "terrible." Burial of other bodies is
underway. (note 66) There is a report of some still untreated
wounded, undenied by the ZOA report (note 65).
Haganah observer Mordechai Gihon sees large numbers of bodies (he
counted 150) on the afternoon of the battle (note 83). The ZOA report
makes and cites no claim that the casualties were primarily or
especially the result of Arab firing; there is no denial that the
attackers caused the deaths of the bodies. (The Haganah had used
mortars and threw hand grenades in some houses—it does not say
that the houses were occupied—but no casualties are reported
(note 46). There is reference to "crossfire" but it is not detailed
and is speculative (note 69). In fact, the ZOA report details a
morning battle during which they claim the civilians were killed
(instead of a post-takeover massacre) in order to describe how
Irgun-Lehi unintentional or necessary actions caused civilians to die
in the houses and how civilians and fighters could be confused
resulting in civilian deaths generally (notes 37-42).
13) Casualty figures are inconsistent and in some areas absent in the
ZOA report which nonetheless confirms that while the attackers claim
the deaths resulted unintentionally from a hard-fought battle, and
not a systematic massacre, the best casualty figures indicate that
almost 90% of civilians "unintentionally" hit by or because of
Irgun-Lehi firepower ended up dead (three times the lethal accuracy
of fire at such massacres as Jonesboro and the Texas Tower; only 9%
less than Lidice, about equal to Hadassah Hospital, and 5% deadlier
than fire at Wounded Knee), meanwhile "intense firepower" directed at
the attackers advancing closer scored only 10% lethal hits. About 50
prisoners are unaccounted for, and a deferentially high estimate of
the alleged Arab fighters killed yields a 33% civilian to fighter
death ratio, still twice the false civilian to fighter casualty rate
that set off suspicious inquiries about causes of civilian deaths at
My Lai.
Vague and Evasive
Figures
The ZOA report's casualty and post-battle figures are vague and,
frankly, evasive and inconsistent. It gives no estimate of wounded,
generally, and no tabulation of military versus civilian prisoners,
wounded, or dead, despite the alleged presence of foreign forces.
Then, it quotes favorably the 12 wounded in the Bir Zeit University
survivor study (91). Then, in one set of reports based upon
Irgun-Lehi sources, the ZOA reveals there were 40 "prisoners" after
the morning battle who were sent to a Lehi camp and given food and
water until late afternoon (note 47). And there is no report of any
medical care needed or given. And as this is argued by the ZOA in
support of decent treatment of prisoners, one would assume that there
were no seriously injured. Then a "small number" of survivors turn up
in the houses and are ultimately sent "towards" Arab Jerusalem for
professedly "humanitarian" reasons to bring the survivors to an Arab
area [no hospital is mentioned, or Red Cross or Magen David (note
47)]. Again, apparently, no urgent medical attention was needed
or sought. So from this account that the ZOA presents
sympathetically, there are no seriously wounded reported by
Irgun-Lehi or anyone else.
But then there they are in the credible Bir Zeit report. Then three
turn up in the village two days after the attack with the Red Cross
representative in an uncontradicted portion of his report (note 65).
And the prisoner figures as discussed below leave about 50 prisoners
who disappear from the account. Meanwhile, actual body counts
recalled from the scene vary as much as 70 (notes 81-83).
These absences and inconsistencies suggest real evasiveness on the
issue of how Arabs suffered and died in Deir Yassin. The surviving
villagers and precisely what happened to them, the alleged Arab
fighters who caused the whole difficulty and their ultimate
disposition, and the disposition of wounded, probably the most
pressing post-battle "humanitarian" (note 47) concern, are
unquantified. Just what happened after the battle? Why are captives
called "prisoners" and counted in the morning as they are taken in
the battle allegedly but suddenly "survivors of the battle" in a
"small number" in the afternoon (note 47)? And aren't these survivors
wounded, or very likely to be? Why are there no contemporary records
of casualties by the attackers offered? And, if they were they not
made, why not? And again, why are helpful photos still secreted away
by a government run by Menachem Begin's party (see #2, above)?.
Mysteriously Low
Number of Wounded: Likely A Massacre
The reasons for this evasiveness about wounded even after 50 years of
combined recollection is probably because there were only a few. The
ZOA report gives its best credence (correctly, almost certainly) to
the Bir Zeit study which cites 12 wounded villagers. But why this
evasiveness and why this low figure?
The reason so few wounded existed in proportion to killed is
simple-–when you commit a massacre the goal is to make the
victims dead not leave them wounded. They can be shot point blank and
repeatedly. There is often time to go back and shoot the wounded. The
massacre stops when someone intervenes (as in My Lai), or the killers
run out of energy (Wounded Knee); meanwhile a small number of wounded
might hide leaving some alive (Wounded Knee, My Lai), or an
intervention or distraction might save them (Hadassah Hospital). In a
true chaotic battle, wounded are left everywhere. The only battle
situation where few wounded are left (proportionate to dead) are
take-no-prisoners battles like the Alamo which are massacres of a
sort. Entering Deir Yassin and shooting every living thing is a
massacre. But the ZOA tells us that prisoners were taken during
morning fighting. This suggests that the deaths of those civilians
who died really came sometime between late morning after a much less
bloody battle won readily by the Haganah and the afternoon when
Mordechai Gihon sees the bodies (note 83). Interestingly, Irgun
commander Ra'naan makes a point in later official testimony to place
himself outside Deir Yassin while early afternoon "mopping up" is
underway (note 45).
Extremely Lethal
Fire For Unintentional
And if we rely on the count accepted by the most authoritative by the
ZOA, the Bir Zeit University there is a figure of 107 dead and 12
wounded, a ratio of almost nine killed to one wounded. This is a
damning proportion. According to the ZOA's argument, they were killed
unintentionally by an inexperienced fighting force armed with bad
weapons, who set off explosives in doorways while under heavy fire
from trained soldiers, who inflicted varying degrees of collapse of
stone houses leaving "killed or wounded" who saw women are running
around the battle picking weapons off fighters who are reported
"wounded," and who fought with sufficient restraint to accept
surrenders (note 41). The attackers would throw hand grenades
fearfully into houses, while a great part of a population of 750
(note 2) tries to escape with no clear announcement of where to go or
what was happening, the refugees partly blocked for part of the
morning.
And yet, in this chaos of blind grenade throwing, door explosions on
stone houses withering fire from leonine Arabs, we are to believe
that armed with bad weapons, a "green" fighting force that needs to
call in help just to finish the job manages to score direct fatal
hits 9 times as often as they score an indirect hit. On people they
did not intend to hit! Meanwhile, the attackers themselves are being
directly shot at by professional soldiers or just plain villagers
"who excelled at accurate sniping" (note 36). The sniping defenders
are shooting from stone houses with iron doors (note 39) at forces
approaching and undoubtedly the village defenders intend to make the
most effective hits possible. [The ZOA report makes reference to
the Arab fighters' "massive, nearly overwhelming, firepower." (note
103)]. But, strangely, these professional firepower-laden
supersnipers of Fortress Deir Yassin only manage to kill 4
battle-inexperienced surprise-abandoning house-storming
advancing-into-fire attackers while wounding "several dozen more"
according to the ZOA. If we assume several means three (a
conservative estimate of "several") then we have a ratio of 1 killed
to 9 wounded (4 to 36 using ZOA figures only), the very inverse of
the Deir Yassin civilian casualties-–a mere 10% deadly accuracy.
Now if that 10% alone is called "intense firepower" (note 36) (even
"murderous fire"–-note 110) and "accurate [obviously
deliberate] sniping", what could we possibly call the kind of
fire that slaughtered the villagers with 90% efficiency? Hand
grenades with explosive power so accurate that its shrapnel went
right for vital organs 9 times out of 10 [but left limbs intact
(note 78)]? Entering a house shooting, perhaps under fire with
bad weapons and low ammunition (notes 31-42), yet kills civilians in
a house with far greater efficiency than the allegedly well armed
skilled snipers one is advancing against. And their attacks of
mini-mass destruction leave the dead bodies still inside recognizable
houses (note 66) and bodies with "limbs intact" (note 78) and in
sufficient condition that they can be examined for rape or mutilation
(note 75-78).
This is beyond belief. The truth is again apparent: the villagers
were slaughtered by murderous and deliberate fire in which the
attackers had time to carefully aim, and if necessary, double check
to make sure most of their victims did not survive.
Other Massacres
Let us look at different casualty
ratios to test this. In the intentional no-return-fire massacres at
Jonesboro Arkansas and the Texas Tower killer Charles Whitman the
ratios of killed to wounded is only about 33%. At Amritsar in 1919,
where British troops fired unopposed intentionally directly into a
huge crowd, the rate of killed to wounded was about 25%, less than
one-third of Deir Yassin. On the other hand, the Arab massacre of a
Jewish medical and military going to Hadassah Hospital on Mt. Scopus
shortly after Deir Yassin reveals the same lethal accuracy figure of
about 90% of casualties dead—75 dead, 6 wounded. That was
clearly an attempt to massacre all prisoners in an ambush.
Lidice is cited by ZOA as a massacre. The ratio of killed is to
wounded there appears to be 100%, only 10 percentage points more
lethally effective than Deir Yassin. There are reports of wounded
survivors at My Lai (CBS, "60 Minutes" March 29, 1998) and hard
figures appear hard to come by but 500 are reported dead, so My Lai
appears to be 99%. Wounded Knee appears to have had an 85% killed to
wounded ratio. Deir Yassin is thus closer to Lidice, My Lai, and
Hadassah Hospital than even to Amritsar, Jonesboro, or the "Bloody
Sunday" massacre of 1920 Dublin, when British troops fired into a
crowd at a Gaelic Football match (figures of casualties 12 dead about
60 injured or a killed to injured percentage of 17%).
The reason this ratio is, as noted, important is that intentional
killers by definition eliminate the wounded until they stop or are
stopped. (The existence of prisoners does not conflict with this, a
massacre may stop or as in Lidice, only some are selected for
slaughter, or only some fighters in some areas commit the slaughter.)
It thus appears from the ZOA report information that the villager
dead were mostly systematically slaughtered and that the combat story
is an excuse after the fact. More likely, the ZOA report gives rise
to the conclusion that morning fighting was ineffective (the
attackers taking some casualties) and after the Haganah secured the
village the Irgun-Lehi fighters decided—out of pique, ideology,
temperament, fear, or bravado, or some combination of these (emotions
all arguable from evidence in the ZOA report, see # 11,
above)—to slaughter many captive civilians. The numbers say it
all.
The Vanishing
Prisoners
On one page it is asserted baldly that 100 prisoners were taken by
the end of the day (note 42). Then a page or so later it says that 40
were held by late morning (note 47). Then it says "a small number of
survivors" were found later and sent through Jerusalem (note 47).
Assuming a small number is about the number of reported
wounded-–12—then there are 48 or so prisoners who simply
disappear. At least that's what the ZOA report indicates. What
happened to them? We are not told. [We do hear of only three
surviving wounded being turned over to the Red Cross two days later
(note 65)]. Again, the ZOA report is maddeningly inconsistent and
evasive about the fate of captives. Why?
Fighters to
Civilians: One Suggestive Ratio
The figure-shy ZOA report does not tell us how many of its alleged
outside fighters existed. But let us assume half the dead villagers
were fighters-–say about 50 and let's add to that the largest
body count-–150 by Mordechai Gihon (note 83). De Reynier does
not appear to give a body count of his own calculation (note
65)—and assume that the excess over civilian dead are all
outside fighters. For ease of numbers let us assume therefore that 50
dead civilians and twice as many alleged fighters were killed. That
vastly overgenerous estimate-–and almost certainly false as such
a high rate of fighter death, with captured weapons, etc., would have
been noted—means 33% of the reported dead would be civilians. Or
one dead civilian for two dead fighters.
This may not strike the reader as odd. But to illustrate the military
significance, a comparison is in order. In village fighting in
Vietnam, on one occasion. American soldiers in the field reported 20
civilians dead in an engagement in which they reported about 120
enemy fighters dead (about 15%). That ratio of only about HALF the
Deir Yassin civilian casualty rate in this fighter-exaggerated ratio
calculation caused the unit's headquarters to get suspicious of
evasiveness and nervous about the high number and demand an
explanation of civilian casualties; it later resulted in a special
order for safeguarding non-combatants. The soldiers then explained
that the civilians got caught up in heavy fighting ("Enemy units had
broken all contact with friendly forces by infiltrating with
civilians leaving the area . . . "). Later it turned out that this
disturbing ratio of civilians to fighters was indeed false (as in our
example), the infiltrating with civilians was a ruse, and that there
was reason for suspicion. The soldiers had overreported fighter
casualties and underreported civilian casualties. Eventually, the
whole situation was investigated and several were court-martialed for
their action in that village, My Lai 4. (Hersh, pp. 131-167)
If we take ACTUAL reported figures by those trying to deny a massacre
at Deir Yassin, Menachem Begin's body count—130-–and assume
107 dead villagers, and let's make 50 or so of the villagers fighters
again in order to grant the benefit of the doubt, giving us about 75
fighter dead and 55 civilians dead. Then the civilian to fighter
percentage is a little over 40%, almost three times the ratio that
caused red flags about false figures, false reports, and civilian
slaughter at My Lai. The difference is that at My Lai figures were
concocted. At Deir Yassin, the attackers and even their apologists
are noticeably evasive instead. The battle field accounts in ZOA
avoid wounded figures and alleged fighter figures, while giving
precise captured bullet counts (notes 31-42); however in a later
discussion of deaths based on credible survivor reports, the villager
wounded figure emerges as a related finding supported by the same
credible evidence in the ZOA report (note 91). The author(s) of that
separate section probably did not realize he/she was giving a
blessing to the most damning and well-corroborated single piece of
evidence demonstrating a deliberate massacre at Deir Yassin possibly
ever published in English. And a piece of information the authors of
the battlefield account in the ZOA report seem at pains to evade.
The killed-wounded casualty figures and fighter-civilian figures
reveal rates of slaughter consistent with those seen in major
massacres. The numbers tell more than mere testimony does. And that
explains the evasiveness and inconsistencies in battlefield casualty
information. The numbers do not add up to anything but a systematic
deliberate slaughter of captive men, women, and children. And that is
indeed something to be evasive about. Enough to keep photos of the
scene out of the public eye for 50 years and to silently accept that
while claiming to want to prove innocence (see #2).
[Sources for massacres mentioned in this section include Seymour
Hersh's CBS "60 Minutes" broadcast of March 29, 1998, (re: My Lai);
Encyclopedia Britannica "Amritsar Massacre"; Coogan, Tim Pat, Michael
Collins: The Man Who Made Ireland (re: Bloody Sunday, Dublin 1920);
(re: Wounded Knee); Collins/Lapierre, O Jerusalem (re: Hadassah
Hospital-Mt. Scopus); (re: Lidice); Lavergne, (re: Texas Tower); CNN
News, April 1, 1998 (re: Jonesboro).]
14) The ZOA report fails to find any independent corroboration for
the attacker's explanation of the deaths as caused by rough and
chaotic close-in house-to-house fighting on the morning of the
battle.
Irgun and Lehi claims that the large number of civilian dead resulted
from the April 9, 1997 morning's heavy house-to-house fighting
involving mixed-together and sometimes dressed-alike fighters and
civilians which required fast and aggressive firepower are
substantiated only by self-serving assertion members of those groups.
There is no testimony from surviving Arab eyewitnesses to this. There
are no reports by Haganah people on the scene that confirm this,
including those who came in to finish the job. Mordechai Gihon of
Haganah observed the battle until 8:30 a.m. (note 43) In all the ZOA
report, several Haganah people are reported as being on the scene at
various times in the day. ***Not a single person on the scene other
than those of the attacking groups trying to deny a massacre is cited
as evidence of casualties to Arabs inflicted in deadly house-to-house
fighting.*** After fifty years, would not one Haganah soldier who
witnessed the scene-–or had been part of the battle—have
said at some point: "I was there and while I don't like those
s.o.b.'s personally or politically I could see they were beginners
faced with one hell of a fight, they didn't slaughter innocent people
deliberately" or "I saw the blown up houses, the enemy forces lying
dead everywhere, the dead bodies were clearly bad luck"? Isn't this
especially likely when the Deir Yassin incident has been used to
"blacken" the name of the State both groups fought to build (ZOA
Introduction)? Would not some report from the time reflect this, or
quote the Haganah troops who finished the battle as saying they
noticed the bodies from the morning battle? But the ZOA has offered
none of this. After fifty years?
The ZOA report quotes an alleged survivor report translated from
Arabic and cited second-hand without context in an Israeli government
pamphlet a generation later. He is alleged to have told a Jordanian
newspaper on the 5th anniversary of the incident: "The Jews never
intended to harm the population of the village, but were forced to do
so after they encountered fire from the population, which killed the
Irgun commander." This does not describe house-to-house fighting and
it seems also to indicate no outside forces were present. Without
context, and lacking in linguistic precision it tells only that the
observer saw the population "harmed" and concluded that the "Jews"
had not originally intended to do so but in some way felt "forced to
do so" because of fire from the population that killed someone he
presumed to be the "Irgun commander." (Notice again this says fire
came from the "population," not "soldiers" or other "fighters.") In
context the statement might read: "The Jews came in the morning
hoping that the population would all run away from its gunfire and
loudspeaker so they would not be forced to fight. The Jews never
intended to harm the population but were forced to do so when they
encountered fire from the population, which killed the Irgun
commander. Then, their anger [or commanders] forced them to
shoot everybody they found after we surrendered." This is speculation
but it is not inconsistent and the original quote gives us no
description of what actually happened. So it is not a denial of a
massacre, nor is it particularly reliable, nor is it confirmation of
rough house-to-house fighting (note 110).
Haganah sources from their intervention do not say how easy or
difficult it was or the nature and tenacity of the resistance. They
do say they had to eliminate sources of gunfire to retrieve wounded,
the central problem of every battle including police standoffs with a
drunken ex-husbands. They also say they threw grenades in some
houses, we are not told how many or whether this was a precautionary
measure after civilians were removed or the brief overcoming of
resistance in houses from which civilians had been evacuated by the
fighters or Haganah. (note 44, 46) Again, no confirmation of a
grueling morning-long slow conquest of most of the village.
The casualty numbers are also inconsistent with fighting described as
consisting of exploding doors, partially collapsed roofs, wild
shooting, wounded fighters on the ground, killed and wounded in the
houses, hand grenades in windows, friendly fire hitting Irgun men,
indistinguishable figures running around, "murderous" Arab fire, and
finally a mortar assault. (notes 31-46, 110) In a village of 700 or
more, with escape routes unclear because of loudspeaker failure and
attackers coming from two direction, is it really credible that there
are only 12 villagers wounded-–two percent of the
population?
That is the figure cited as most credible by the ZOA report (see # 13
above). And if we were to count the larger enumeration of two
inconsistent numbers of "prisoners" in the ZOA report as all
"wounded," that would be 100 (see #13 above for a fuller treatment of
the evasive and confusing casualty and prisoner numbers), a more
reasonable possibility for house-to-house fighting but the ZOA report
does not claim that, in fact it makes little mention of calculation
or treatment of wounded. But since prisoners are alleged to have been
not mistreated and no reports of prisoner medical assistance is
reported (a perfect example of proper prisoner treatment), we can
proceed as in #13 on that figure. "A small number" of survivors are
reported who are allegedly given "humanitarian consideration."
That-–and a report of three wounded two days later—is the
closest we get to a count of wounded.
Can we accept from that almost certainly accurate or near accurate
figure of only 12 wounded that morning long chaotic bloody
house-to-house advances against soldiers or even villagers took
place? Is this credible when the attackers who were out in the open
undergoing direct "murderous" fire from Arabs fighting like "lions"
received (according to ZOA) "several dozen" (let's say 36) wounded
(note 36)? The answer that 107 civilians are dead only enhances the
question, if they are alleged to have been killed unintentionally. If
fighting was that prolonged and severe, would it not have left more
wounded? (There are no reported air strikes, heavy artillery
bombardment pummelling the villagers to death). Would not bodies of
parents shield children from bullets such that they might take a
weakened bullet in an extremity? Ricochets would be flying around a
village where over 700 confused and frightened people are mainly
trying to flee, as women pick up ammunition from "wounded fighters,"
and "killed or wounded" result from partial house collapses (notes
31-42).
Amidst such severe explosions and firefights, with force and
firepower to cause dozens and dozens lay dead, only ***two percent***
of the village, ***twelve***, emerges as surviving significantly
hurt, according to ZOA figures. Further, as the ZOA report claims,
this was not a "take-no prisoners" action (prisoners were reported
taken and the general claim is unintentional death of civilian
villagers), yet there is no large number of wounded from where
attackers may have withheld part of their fire, or shot recklessly,
or half blew up a house. The low numbers of combat injuries of
civilians while the attackers themselves suffered at least 36
wounded, according to ZOA, under directly targeted hostile fire
strongly indicates that combat was not the way it was claimed. In
fact, the low number indicates that few civilians were harmed by
combat. Something else left them slaughtered in their homes.
There is also a strange absence of contemporary or near contemporary
evidence from the attackers. One revealing example of this absence
occurs during Haganah commander Shaltiel's ridicule around midday on
April 9, 1948, reported by ZOA from the testimony of the Haganah
commander. Surely, the Irgun commander would have reported responding
furiously to such ridicule in light of the heavy fighting he
encountered. And would Shaltiel have ridiculed poor performance of
fellow Jews who had gone through a village clearing out foreign
soldiers in frontal house assaults under hostile fire, especially
when he is described as being in earnest about offering help? (note
45) This more strongly indicates that the fighting may have been less
dramatic-–and less successful—than ZOA claims.
Finally, we should note that the testimonies of Arabs fighting like
lions and excelling at sniping, and civilian women being involved in
the battle are from Reuven Greenberg and Yehoshua Gorodenchik (notes
36-37). Both are described in the same report as less than credible!
(notes 73, 42) It appears that Greenberg, said to be involved in
"criminal" activities and a teller of tales, is trying to cover-up a
massacre and Gorodenchik, who is called "confused," is trying to
rationalize one.
15) The ZOA report finds that there is no non-Irgun non-Lehi
eyewitness or person on the immediate scene who corroborates a
massacre denial.
***No independent observer on the scene is quoted with expressing any
skepticism that a massacre occurred (there is only evidence of
conditions of those bodies the observers were able to see as
indicating no further atrocities like rape or mutilation (notes
75-78). None of the Haganah men on the scene-–including Yeshurun
Schiff, Yehoshua Arieli, Yair Tsaban, Shlomo Havilov, Mordechai
Gihon-–no Arab survivor, none of the doctors (notes 75-78), not
the Red Cross (note 65).*** One observer, Yona Ben-Sasson is quoted
without context of time or place that [as far as he knew] he
believed he talked some "hotheads" [ZOA words-–not described
as a direct quote] out of slaughtering prisoners but this only
reveals that some massacre or part thereof was contemplated
presumably by Irgun-Lehi members and they told the Haganah man they
changed their mind, and Ben-Sasson did not see it happen (note
58).
16) The ZOA report indicates on the other hand that there are many
persons who claim to have been present and declared that a massacre
has taken place, while some statements from attackers on the scene
have been refuted as false.
There are persons who claim to have seen a massacre take place exist,
these include Arab survivors and at least one Jewish Haganah member.
Arab survivor statements and recollection appear little challenged
for factual inconsistency or even addressed. Of their alleged
testimony, one affirms that the population was harmed as some kind of
response to fire from the population into the Irgun which killed
their commander (note 110). Another male survivor expresses merely
his personal opinion that members of the village were not raped and
that the issue had not been discussed among the survivors that he has
heard but the quote does not discuss the question of massacre (note
77). Yet another is cited-–and challenged (to be addressed
below)—as surviving the execution of his family and a group of
adults. Other survivors are cited generally.
British Officer's
Credibility
In one place, second and third hand survivor reports and rumors of
allegations of extra atrocities (rapes and mutilations) are dismissed
simply by merely characterizing them argumentatively-–without
evidence-–as "wild allegations" (note 148). Another such third
party report is that of the British investigator, Richard Catling,
made after interviewing survivors a few days after the incident (note
80). He is alleged by the ZOA to be lacking in credibility because he
was a victim of the Irgun's violent anti-British actions and a
British imperial agent who had been opposed and politically defeated
by them (note 79). The claim to bias has some clear validity.
Still, a look at what the ZOA reveals about him reveals his
credibility is far from totally shattered. First, the British
administration was expiring (note 79) and so the political war could
be said to be over. Second, he is revealed to be quite candid a
character, he freely admits-–when he apparently does not have
to-–beating up an Irgun prisoner that he believed killed a
friend and colleague (note 79). Even more so, the text of his report
reveals that he is professionally circumspect in his assessment.
Although he makes conclusory statements, he states openly his methods
of investigation, including the "great coaxing" he used on shy Arab
village women 50 years ago to get them to open up on issues like
sexual assault, traumatic to discuss for even the most modern
feminist (note 80).
The ZOA report authors appear to find something sinister in a male
British police officer needing to use great coaxing in interviews of
possible female Arab villager rape or violence victims (notes 80-81).
[In the published source to which we are referred by the ZOA
report, Catling indicates that the women broke into hysteria when
they would relate their experiences (Collins/Lapierre p. 273).]
Additionally, Catling is quite cautious yet candid. Although he
writes conclusions, he relates one account as "one story is current
concerning a case where a young girl was literally torn in two" (note
80). Now, had he been interested in fabrication, he would have
entirely avoided questionable stories like this or asserted them more
conclusively rather than as a rumor offered with detached skepticism.
[Also, the ZOA report leaves out his personal observation of an
old woman, "who gave her age as 106," whom he observed as having been
severely beaten with rifle butts. (Collins/Lapierre p. 273.) Had he
just wanted to give credibility to any brutality claim he could have
left out the credibility-damaging claim of age instead of reporting
it and doing so with noticeable skepticism.] Catling does not
appear to have acted in a way that shows his likely biases have
rendered him a flawed investigator.
Survivor
Statements
In any event, much of Catling's report available to us is his
conclusion and summary of what he heard or even what the survivors'
themselves considered rumors. One of the few direct Arab survivor
quotes the ZOA uses and challenges is from a surviving child via
Catling's report through Collins and Lapierre (note 148). In the
quote the child reports that his family was lined up against a wall
and shot but that most of the children survived because they hid
behind their parents. The ZOA report questions the credibility of
that statement by asking why it would be that the killers would have
refrained from killing the children after the first volley of
bullets. Apparently the ZOA authors do not know the meaning of the
word "hid" which is the past tense of "hide". Further, any general
knowledge of massacres and application of common sense reveals
survivors who are hidden or protected via a pile of bodies (example,
survivors of My Lai, CBS "60 Minutes", March 27, 1998). Finally, we
note that the child CONCLUDES why he and others survived, not
OBSERVES. For all we know, the killers were distracted by another
event or someone had an attack of conscience.
Of the apparent 700 or so Arabs (figures are inconsistent) who were
in the village throughout much or all of the attack day, there is no
serious attempt by the ZOA to individually analyze statements from
them to refute them. Clearly when one is trying to "debunk" a charge,
one has to discredit all the claimed eyewitnesses. The ZOA report
admits it has reviewed a Palestinian University [Bir Zeit]
study which contains a report of the Deir Yassin incident and that
the study derives its information about Deir Yassin and other
villages from people who lived there (notes 88-91). One is hard
pressed to know why this study is not dissected – or even
quoted—for the massacre claims of survivors who are the ultimate
chief witnesses for the allegation of massacre. Is being Arab enough
to make them not credible? (A good illustration of the Holocaust
revisionist style of the ZOA report: witnesses and victims are
discredited simply for being who they are ethnically.) In fact, the
ZOA report cites independently corroborated consistency among
survivors in recollections of actual casualties even across two
generations (notes 87-91). This suggests that the ZOA actually seems
to regard the survivors as more credible than the official Irgun on
the subject of Deir Yassin because the latter's spokesman knowing he
was lying concocted the incorrect death figure of 254 the use of
which in subsequent literature gives the ZOA apoplexy (see #1 and
note 153). Yet their testimony, available to ZOA in the Bir Zeit
report, is not offered for refutation. Even worse, there is not even
an explanation for why survivor accounts are not systematically
examined or why they are categorically rejected. Could it because the
accounts are disturbingly consistent and consistently disturbing?
General survivor credibility is briefly questioned in ZOA by noting
that authors Collins and Lapierre refused to use Arab survivors out
of their "fear that perhaps over the years survivors' accounts . . .
might have been altered" to match subsequent propaganda excesses
(note 150). The ZOA report then concludes astonishingly by saying
that "in other words, even Collins and Lapierre found the survivors'
accounts to be less than reliable." Actually Collins and Lapierre
said nothing of the sort. The statement expresses their own
subjective "fear" that "perhaps" there might be exaggerations.
[Translation: they don't want to be accused of being Arab
propagandists when other sources will do.] The allegation that
the authors actually found the statements unreliable is a patent
distortion of what they wrote. [Going behind the ZOA report
actually clears this instantly. "In any event, " Collins and Lapierre
continue, "[the survivors'] accounts related in 1969 amply
confirmed the details in the British report." (Collins/Lapierre p.
584).]
Meir Pa'il –
Haganah Eyewitness
Meir Pa'il, a Haganah man who claims to be an eyewitness along with
an unnamed photographer is challenged for political bias, personal
self-interest, and the credibility of details of his accounts. It is
claimed he may not even have been there and many people who claim to
have known him did not see him there (note 52).
Pa'il's claim is wrongly alleged or implied to have been refuted.
First, political bias and personal self-interest are just as easily,
in fact, more easily said of the participants who deny the massacre.
Pa'il is also said to be the only person who has claimed that
prisoners were massacred after the battle (note 57). (This vagueness
about "prisoners" remains frustrating – do they mean the
villagers, the mysteriously uncounted outside fighters, the village
fighters, etc?) In any case, the supposed refutation of that
ill-defined claim comes from another man of the Haganah who reports
talking some participants (called "hotheads" by ZOA) out of
massacring prisoners. As will be noted again elsewhere (see #18,
below), this tells us little about what was actually OBSERVED by
Ben-Sasson. All we know is that at some point, he spoke to some
participants who were planning a massacre of prisoners in a quarry
and he believed they did not carry it through. This does not directly
contradict Pa'il despite the words of the ZOA report claiming Pa'il's
claim was denied by Ben-Sasson (note 58).
One statement of Pa'il's does seem odd. He is reported to have
claimed at some point that he witnessed the Irgun-Lehi shooting
people in their homes as they lay "sleeping" (note 51). The ZOA
report notes the obvious strangeness of people sleeping during a
battle. A look at the source, however, indicates that it comes from a
secondary Hebrew language article whose title "There was No Massacre"
indicates it may have been written to discredit eyewitnesses like
Meir Pa'il (note 51 ). Further, it appears it could be a simple
misstatement-–"sleeping" for "lying" or a misrendering across
languages, or a misspeaking based on an image that he saw
mentally-–people in their bedclothes (the attack was early
morning and they may not have changed) lying dead perhaps some on
their beds, or it conceivably may refer to some incidents at the
beginning of the battle around dawn. There is no further explanation
of context and with many possible interpretations, it does not amount
to serious evidence of falsification.
Other claims of Pa'il do not appear incredible. He is questioned
because he says he saw people slaughtered in houses when he does not
say he was in the houses (note 51 ). Surely, it is possible to
conclude that if you saw soldiers enter a house, see movement inside,
perhaps hear screams, gunfire, then watch the soldier leave and find
everyone dead, then you saw people massacred in houses. While Pa'il
is not quoted as saying this exactly, it is a logical extrapolation
of going around a village and seeing killings in houses. (Another
good illustration of the Holocaust revisionist style of the ZOA
report: would the ZOA dismiss testimonies of killings in gas chambers
in Nazi camps because the witnesses were not inside the gas chamber
at the time?)
Pa'il is chided for not identifying the photographer who he said was
with him. Pa'il has asserted in the past that the photographer is
afraid (note 53 ). It does not seem inconsistent to believe that one
might be harmed or harassed (by the press alone) for being an
eyewitness to a controversial mass murder.
Pa'il's presence at the battle is questioned. This is because many
who claimed to have known him do not recall seeing him there (note
52). Yet, Pa'il is not shown anywhere to claim that he encountered
any of those named, nor do we see any claim that he was there at the
times some of the others listed were there (e.g. Havilov was there
overnight (note 52); no claim is reported by Pa'il about staying
overnight). All who claim he was not there and could not have been
without their knowledge are members of the attacking groups (note 52
). There is another disagreement about Pa'il's recollections but the
contradiction of them comes from another self-serving Irgun-Lehi
sources (note 49). There is, again, no direct contradiction of
Pa'il's personal observations from non-attacker sources. One claim
that testimony from certain Haganah officials (Shaltiel, Meret,
Eldad, and Schiff) fails to mention Pa'il tells us nothing as the
nature and scope of the testimony but appears to be from the
Jabotinsky Archives and not any official proceeding (note 52). For
all we know, it was about their haircuts that day, or more seriously,
operational plans, pre-planning, strategic assessments or
communications in which Pa'il was not involved.
The ZOA report questions Pa'il's credibility because he is alleged to
have cited the exaggerated 254 figure of deaths that has become the
incorrect conventional wisdom. His source, however, is reported to be
the Irgun itself ("the horse's mouth"). (note 86) The ZOA report
confirms that the standard falsehood on numbers was originated
knowingly by the Irgun commander. (see # 1). ***Apparently, the ZOA
report is arguing that Pa'il is not credible because he trusted the
Irgun, the people who are denying the massacre.*** It is true that it
appears he did not count the bodies himself and that that failure is
raised as a question of his being on the scene (note 87). But since
Pa'il was a spy of sorts (note 48), there is no reason to assume he
would want to be so conspicuous as to go around counting bodies as a
hostile witness to a mass murder. In any event, we are not told why
he claimed he did not count them so we cannot dismiss his credibility
on that basis.
Pa'il is challenged for allegedly saying in 1981 that Deir Yassin was
not located on any important route and its strategic value was "zero"
(note 50). Assuming the accuracy of the quote in context, it may have
been a comment on the timeliness of the attack, meaning he felt that
its value was zero at the time of the attack. It is not clear also
that Deir Yassin itself was ON an important route-–it was NEAR
one (ZOA: "on a HILL that overlooked" (Introduction)-–not a
"village which overlooked"—the main Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway).
It thus may have been part of an unimportant route from Ein Kerem to
the main road. In other words, there may be a context that explains
this. On the other hand, assuming Pa'il's opinion to be a poor
military evaluation, there is no prerequisite to be a keen military
strategist in order to be a spy-–or a credible eyewitness to
mass murder.
Further, the ZOA report does not seem to dispute that Pa'il produced
Deir Yassin photos for official Haganah scrutiny (see #2, above).
These photos are in the official archives of the government of Israel
and are not denied. If Pa'il was not there, what is he doing with
authentic photos? And if he got the photos and story from someone
else and concocted his own version of the massacre, why admit the
existence of a person who could dispute his story? Why not just claim
he took his own pictures while there? And after 50 years, there is no
report by ZOA that anyone else has taken responsibility for the
pictures or that anyone unconnected with Meir Pa'il has been alleged
to have taken or provided them.
As noted earlier, the government of Israel has not released these,
despite their obvious advantage to whomever's telling the truth. The
photos would tend to discredit Pa'il if he is lying and Pa'il was
known to be talking publicly in 1981 (see above) when Begin was Prime
Minister. But neither he nor the Irgun-Lehi descended political
leaders of Israel do not seem to want to confront him with the photos
directly. Further, if Meir Pa'il's credibility is in question, his
written report could also be released to the public and subject to
scrutiny for inconsistent statements and other evidence indicating
Pa'il has not been straightforward about what he has witnessed.
Again, this has not happened nor has it been called for by the ZOA.
What is there to hide?
Finally, it is briefly noted again that the ZOA report reveals that
some among the attackers have been shown: to have made deliberate
false statements about the scene (e.g. the Irgun Jerusalem commander)
(see #1 above), to have been inconsistent in body count (note 82), to
have given "confused" testimony (note 42), or to have apparently lied
about a cause of Arab death at Deir Yassin and been a teller of false
tales (see #1 above, R. Greenberg or note 43).
17) The ZOA report confirms that there is some evidence that some
Irgun-Lehi members have privately confessed their participation in
cold-bloodedly shooting to death Arab women and children.
Although the ZOA report disdains them, they note two cases of
published secondary sources reporting that admissions of deliberate
massacre of Arabs at Deir Yassin by veterans of the Irgun and Lehi
have been made. In at least one case, even the ZOA report cannot
dismiss it out of hand. Journalist Dan Kurzman's book Genesis:1948 is
cited as stating that some of the attackers admit that "they lost all
restraint and cold-bloodedly shot every Arab they found—man,
woman or child." (note 145) The ZOA report concludes that this report
of admissions is of questionable credibility because the specific
names of those who made such admission are not mentioned and there is
no possible prior outside source for such admissions. The report
confirms, however, that some, or perhaps most, of Kurzman's 10
Israeli sources were present at Deir Yassin. He clearly had some
access to obtain a reliable confession.
As to the damage to credibility of the claim by not naming the ones
who admitted the acts, there should be little. For those like the
authors of the ZOA report who might need an explanation as to why
openly admitting to cold-bloodedly shooting men, women, and children
could be a difficulty, here is brief explanation:
1) Shooting men, women, and children in cold blood is usually
considered an evil thing, even when done to Arabs, and generally does
not result in enhancing one's social status; in fact it subjects one
to shame and contempt;
2) It might be seen as a betrayal of comrades-–their reputation,
secrets and even government benefits (see #1);
3) It might be seen as helping anti-Israel, anti-Likud, anti-Semitic,
or Arab propaganda (see ZOA report "Introduction" and
"Conclusion");
4) It might subject one to criminal prosecution in Israel, Britain,
the Arab world, or international tribunals for murder or war crimes
or even perjury if prior testimony has been given;
5) It might damage one's credibility and reputation in general;
6) It might subject one to personal retaliation or violence.
The ZOA report further argues that Kurzman's book is "fiction"
because he supplies detailed dialogue among the combatants and "even
claims to know what individuals were thinking at particular moments."
If this stylized writing makes a work necessarily fiction, then how
to explain this section from the ZOA report arguing the presence
(again self-servingly) of foreign troops in Deir Yassin:
"In an alleyway, Lehi soldier Ezra Yachin came face to face with
an Arab armed with a rifle. 'Instantly he started to release the
bolt. The measure of those fateful seconds! Who would shoot first?
Who would survive?'"(note 33)
If novelistic subjective prose discredited a source, then the ZOA
report itself is discredited. In any event, Kurzman could be
effectively criticized if he was a journalist who had a record of
fabricating anonymous sources. There is none reported. Nor is he
accused of political bias. In fact, the ZOA report says that we
cannot know "whether Kurzman's claim is authentic or a creative
combination of speculation and assumption" (note 145). In other
words, we cannot DENY it just as we cannot credit it in full. On the
other hand, reconstructing events and dialogue and "using the
techniques of a novelist" does not render the source necessarily
false, just more "entertaining" as the ZOA itself did in the passage
quoted above. As to dialogue reconstruction, it can be derived from a
process called interviewing, a technique journalists employ. In any
event, Kurzman's account of the alleged admissions is not attributed
to the entertaining 11-page drama but to an explanation of sources.
Thus, there is some evidence of admissions by Irgun-Lehi members of a
massacre.
Israeli author Uri Avnery claims to have "tried to interrogate" some
of those involved at Deir Yassin. (note 70) He claims some admitted a
massacre when a local commander lost his head after a sniper attack.
Avnery is attacked as having a long record of "extremist political
activity." This a tendentious way of saying he has a political bias
and axe to grind, which he undoubtedly does, and which calls his
claims into significant question. More seriously, he is criticized
for not citing names of persons he interrogated or actual quotations.
The political bias is a fair enough criticism although as noted just
above there are many strong reasons the sources might wish to remain
private. Thus, the claim is advanced but not effectively confirmed by
Avnery. In addition, there appears to be some carelessness by Avnery
on dates and times indicating the quality of his scholarship is less
than rigorous.
We can thus conclude that the ZOA report confirms that there is some
evidence of admissions of massacre by participants, though not
convincing ones. Given the motives to keep quiet, it should come as
no surprise that admissions might not appear on the public record.
The ZOA report indicates nonetheless that there has been at least
some evidence of such admissions.
Further, it does not appear that the ZOA report categorically DENIES
that any admissions have been made by participants. This brings us to
the case of peculiar ZOA footnote 42 (note 42) on the testimony
Yehoshua Gorodenchik. For some reason the footnote attempts to
undermine the favorable, if not too weighty, self-serving testimony
in the text of attacker Gorodenchik relating to surrendering Arabs
pulling weapons, a sort of "she had a gun I swear" defense). Perhaps
this is related to a section in one of the history books NOT reviewed
by ZOA, Amos Perlmutter's sympathetic biography of Menachem Begin
("The Life and Times of Menahem Begin"). The author, in the chapter
on Deir Yassin, which the author concedes was a massacre, cites
Gorodenchik's testimony in the Jabotinsky archives as confirming that
a massacre-–a general slaughter of Arab civilians—did
indeed take place ("Dir Yassin" chapter).
18) The ZOA confirms that some members of the attacking group were
directly observed after the attack planning a massacre of
captives.
Whatever orders may have existed to prevent the initiation of a
massacre, the ZOA report puts forward as a reliable observation, the
Haganah man in Givat Shaul, Yona Ben-Sasson, who observes members of
the organization intending to slaughter captives of Deir Yassin in a
quarry. His recollection is that he talked them out of it. (The
planners of the massacre are described as "hotheads" but not with a
direct quote.) (note 58) All that is clear in this evidence and its
context is that some presumably Lehi and/or Irgunists at Deir Yassin
were observed planning at some point to kill captives and that they
obviously had not been totally dissuaded from such thinking by their
own commanders. The witness concludes that they refrained but we are
not left enough information to know how long or where he observed the
"hotheads" or "prisoners." Nor does the ZOA report say if he had
observed the general situation or just the quarries. In short, this
ZOA evidence, when stripped to examine what the observer observes,
only confirms that among the attackers there was an active intention
to massacre despite the reported orders of the commanders against
such actions.
19) The ZOA report confirms there are additional allegation of
atrocities, including rape, mutilation, and looting are that
unconfirmed and unrefuted.
The ZOA report notes that allegations of rape and mutilation and
looting appear to have been made by survivors and were recorded
originally by the British investigator Catling who concluded that
they did take place. There are, however, credible statements that no
evidence of rape or mutilation was found on the bodies by Doctor
Engel on Sunday April 11 (note 75) and by the two doctors on the next
day (note 78). One male survivor expresses his skepticism of rape or
attacks on pregnant women based on the absence of observing it or
hearing it discussed among survivors (note 77).
Nevertheless, assertion and denial are inconclusive. The bodies were
already undergoing observed removal when Dr. Engel arrived and two
days had passed (note 75), one cannot be sure if all bodies were
present. And it appears that the rape claimants were to some extent
alive (note 80) and some would not have been there as bodies. The
male survivor is expressing his personal belief and his observation
is simply as to the lack of discussion of rape among survivors. The
dynamics of openness on the issue of sexual assault is not treated in
the ZOA report so that renders this male survivor source of limited
value. In short, additional atrocities remain unconfirmed. [It
should be noted finally that the ZOA report suggests that Catling's
atrocity accounts need additional corroboration "from other sources"
(notes 80-81). This is not unreasonable. However, a look at the
source from which it comes, as we are referred by the ZOA authors,
Collins/Lapierre's O Jerusalem, shows the authors summarizing their
review of the Catling report by commenting that it contained
"corroborating physical evidence contained through medical
examination of the survivors by a doctor and nurse from Government
Hospital in Jerusalem." (p. 276)]
20) The ZOA report confirms that captives were driven through West
Jerusalem where crowds around them displayed hostility and a
contemporary witness on the scene with a basis for knowledge
suggested the prisoners were exhibited to boost public morale.
Conventional history has generally said that survivors of Deir Yassin
were paraded through West Jerusalem as prisoners and in some cases
spat on or otherwise jeered. The ZOA report addresses this. In a
confusing paragraph, the ZOA report concedes that prisoners were sent
"towards" Arab Jerusalem to be dropped off. While going there, the
ZOA report concedes, there was hostility from crowds around the
transport. One Haganah source on hand is cited to say that sending
the prisoners through West Jerusalem was done to boost public morale
(note 47).
The ZOA report appears to give greater weight to the (again,
self-serving) testimony of an Irgun official which says this was done
for unspecified "humanitarian reasons" (note 47). [Apparently
public expulsion from one's home is a humanitarian consolation for
the deaths of one's neighbors or family.] In any event, the ZOA
report appears to confirm that there was hostility directed at the
transport from people outside. It does claim, however, that this
hostility was from Orthodox in Mea Shearim being angered by vehicles
coming through after the onset of the Sabbath. But this explanation
is attributed to an overall commander of Lehi (possibly self-serving
information) who is not reported to even have been in Jerusalem at
the time (note 47). Further, since the onset of Sabbath was sundown,
it seems odd that the Irgun and Lehi would send a truck towards
hostile territory after dark.
Thus, the Haganah report appears to be the better credible
independent evidence of motive-–to boost public morale,
presumably by parading prisoners. The ZOA report supports this by
reporting the sending of prisoners through West Jerusalem directly
(an earlier account of prisoners indicates another route was taken by
earlier prisoners (note 47) and unchallenged evidence of some kind of
hostility encountered. Finally, when one considers the ZOA-admitted
history of prisoner exhibition by the Irgun (see # 3, above), the
case for the "parading" of prisoners is strongly sustained and not
refuted by the ZOA report. [Of course, conventional history
contains eyewitnesses to the parading. Jewish journalist Harry Levin
recalled three trucks from Deir Yassin. They were "driving slowly up
and down King George V Avenue, carrying men, women and children,
their hands held over their heads." He spotted in one truck "a young
boy, a look of anguished horror written on his face, his arms frozen
upright" (from Harry Levin, I Saw the Battle of Jerusalem, New York,
Schocken Books, 1950. Cited in Collins/Lapierre, p.279).]
21) The ZOA report reveals that remorse and recrimination for
accidental slaughter is lacking from attackers and apologists.
Although hard to quantify, one thing lacking in the ZOA report is
evidence of any recriminations or sadness over the large deaths of
civilians that the attackers caused. If unintentional, as they claim,
where are the heartfelt apologies-–even after time, as wartime
passions cool? There is one report of attackers discovering civilians
present in the Deir Yassin houses and being "horror-stricken"
[apparently unaware of the tendency of Arab villagers to live in
houses] but this is from another source, i.e., government
propaganda pamphlet from a Labor-run Ministry (note 114 ). But where
are the contemporary recriminations among the attackers? Where are
the recriminations between the attackers and Haganah over
ill-preparation? There is recrimination from one attacker over who
caused some killing-–Haganah or the attackers—but it is
alleged to be not credible (note 73).
Would not people who had caused the deaths of women and children by
accident at least at some point do more than simply issue
self-justifications? Would they not wonder what they could do next to
avoid this? And would they sit on the bodies for two days, even,
apparently, leaving wounded (according to unchallenged recollection
of Jacques de Reynier, the Red Cross representative (note 65) in the
village for two days. There appear to be no expressions of attacker
revulsion after the heat of battle cooled at the ghoulish or pitiable
presence of the corpses. And the ZOA report, while contesting his
characterization, does not challenge that the Red Cross saw at least
one Irgun-Lehi woman at the site (note 60), yet there is no
recollection of a sympathetic mother at the presence of dead
children. [To go beyond the ZOA source where even a doctor from a
humanitarian organization in a growing war zone describes the scene
as terrible, the man reported in the ZOA report as burying many of
the bodies, Yehoshua Arieli, commented that the sight was "absolutely
barbaric . . . all of the killed with very few exceptions were old
men, women, or children." (Collins/Lapierre p.279)]
Would those who killed women and children unintentionally then glibly
exaggerate the figure as Ra'naan did (see # 1, above)? Would there
not be a single voice over 50 years regretting the results saying "I
wish we could do it over so that lives could be saved"? The ZOA
report cites none of this. True, war is ugly and pity may be hard to
come by especially as the broader conflict is not over, but the human
silence of the allegedly innocent perpetrators about the innocent
victims suggests that maybe the perpetrators are not as innocent as
claimed. Their admitted use of the victims as means to sow terror
(see #1), their conspicuous lack of heartfelt pity or revulsion is
reminiscent of the Holocaust deniers whose unspoken attitude is "it
didn't happen but we're glad it did."
Conclusion:
Whitewash
The ZOA report, stripped of argumentation, irrelevancies, innuendo,
and self-serving testimony and examined for hard independent observer
evidence leads us to the same conclusion that conventional history
does: that many scores of villagers, women, men, and children at Deir
Yassin were deliberately massacred, intentionally killed in
non-combat situations. The massacre theory not only holds up well,
but is even reinforced, by the very evidence within the most recent
and hostile scrutiny of the massacre theory yet brought to bear (at
least in English). And this is seen without offering in response the
overwhelming affirmative testimony and evidence. Once again, it is an
attempted whitewash, and a poor one.
ZOA Argumentation Subtext: Innuendos of Anti-Semitism,
Anti-Israelism, Etc. Presence of Anti-Arab Prejudice
Additional points ought to be made about the argumentation of the ZOA
report. It is important to realize that the ZOA is engaged in a
not-so-subtle subtext. The subtext is an appeal to various emotional
concerns, including fears of anti-Semitism, and political and
sympathetic concerns about anti-Israel or anti-Zionist propaganda,
and a fear of "Arab propaganda." It is further noted-–and has
been noted—that in regard to Arab propaganda fears there also
appears a subtle appeal to dismissive prejudice against Arabs.
This is manifest in rare references to direct available Arab survivor
testimony even though they would be the most significant and possibly
numerous purported eyewitnesses to a massacre claim. While
self-serving statements from the attackers-–which advance
nothing-–are offered extensively, survivor testimony is only
occasionally cited (none of which denies a massacre). Survivor
testimony is referred to in sustained detail only in regard to the
issue of numbers of Arab deaths not to how they died. For some
reason, their actual recollections in the same report are left
unmentioned.
Is "being Arab" a sufficient reason to overlook testimony? It is
reasonable to assume that members of a group accused of specific act
of murder, like Irgun-Lehi members at Deir Yassin and their
organizations, have a specific motive to lie and therefore have
self-serving testimony, why would there be a motive to lie simply for
being Arab? Certainly, Irgun-Lehi testimony cannot be dismissed
solely because it is Jewish.
The assertion of there being a Deir Yassin massacre of over 254 with
possible atrocities is not in origin anti-Semitic. The ZOA report
indicates that the 254 figure was in origin from the Irgun itself, a
Jewish source. And it notes that the Labor Zionists, the main Jewish
authority in Palestine confirmed the figure and more importantly,
confirmed a "barbaric" event and issued a public apology to
Transjordan's King Abdullah (note 72). Since the source of massacre
and figure are the official Jewish nationalist organization and its
more nationalistic rival, it is almost certainly not anti-Semitic in
origin.
The implication that it is anti-Semitic comes from almost amusingly
crude innuendos of anti-Semitism in the text. To look at one case,
the Red Cross representative, Jacques De Reynier, is characterized as
being hostile to "the Jewish side." Although no evidence for this is
cited, it seems to mean his hostility for the Irgun-Lehi forces, whom
he describes in retrospect as criminals, apparently because of their
demeanor and presumably because of what he believed they did to the
people of Deir Yassin (note 60). And then there is some comic-bookish
prose about the Red Cross representative wanting to be helped "to
reveal the truth about Jewish savagery" (note 65). In another
instance, a former British Mandatory official wrote in his memoirs
that women at Deir Yassin were stripped and searched for money (note
103). Whatever his source of information, accurate or not, it is
hardly an anti-Jewish stereotype to portray plundering soldiers as
robbing their captives or stripping the women captives. It is about
the most universal form of brutality known-–robbing and sexually
humiliating.
Of course, none of this innuendo is based on the source or on
accurate general history. First of all, as the ZOA report admits, the
Labor Zionists WERE the "Jewish side," at least in terms of official
authority and organizational numbers (see ZOA "Introduction"). The
Irgun and Lehi were smaller independent Jewish nationalist rivals.
Secondly, the only thing Jewish that De Reynier is seen to discuss is
the doctor who was with him, whom he praises as courageous (notes
60-65), apparently in the face of people De Reynier evaluates
somewhat the same way modern Americans evaluate the Manson Family.
The doctor he takes with him is a member of the Jewish community's
official humanitarian organization (note 65)–-hardly an
expression of hostility to "the Jewish side." And it is clear he is
making distinctions among Jews as individuals and even as "sides."
[Finally, one can note that in an unmentioned (by ZOA) part of De
Reynier's recollection, he recalls with revulsion the S.S. forces he
encountered in Greece in World War II. (De Reynier, Jacques. A
Jerusalem Un Drapeau Flottait Sur la Ligne de Feu.)]
Given the Irgun and Haganah origin of the figure and accusation of
massacre it is also impossible to attribute the massacre story to
anti-Israel, anti-Zionist, or Arab propaganda. Had every Arab radio
station gone out of order in those days, anyone could, just by
reading Haganah and Irgun statements, have concluded that a massacre
of at least 250 or so had occurred.
Confirming Actual
Causes of Palestinian Displacement
Traditional, though now fading, Zionist (originally Labor Zionist)
and Israeli assertions held that Palestinians fled what became Israel
in 1948-49 because of alleged orders from Arab political and military
leaders to evacuate. It is also often said that this was against the
will or policy of the Zionist organizations. Finally, it is implied
that Arab fears which led to flight were irrational with the
implication that something in the defective "oriental" imagination,
as Arthur Koestler condescendingly implied (note 103) led to
exaggerated fears. Contrary assertions have held that deliberate
force, violence and terror was applied to cause Arabs to flee.
The ZOA report confirms now that forcing or frightening Arabs out was
an existing practice. Blowing up houses in Arab villages would cause
Arabs to flee and that this was apparently a Haganah tactic. The
apparently authentic letter of Haganah commander David Shaltiel to
the attackers needs to warn AGAINST a practice of blowing houses up,
a practice which causes the population to flee, as he prefers the
Deir Yassin population to remain to prevent foreign military forces
from moving in their ruined houses (note 7). [This corroborates
the New York Times correspondent's observation that the beginnings of
the Arab refugee problem in early 1948 resulted from Jewish
paramilitary units blowing Arab houses in various villages. (Dana
Adams Schmidt, Armageddon in the Middle East, p.3-5)]
The ZOA report confirms that expulsion was practiced at Deir Yassin.
First, the attackers attempted to warn the villagers to flee. Those
who did not flee-–or die or lay wounded there for two
days-–were transferred to Arab areas.
The ZOA report also confirms that there was a clear motive by the
Irgun to exploit civilian deaths for the sake of sowing terror among
the Arabs so that they would flee. Finally, the Haganah also
publicized the Deir Yassin atrocity (whether it was one is
irrelevant) yet later incorporated the Deir Yassin attackers into its
own fighting forces (note 74). Again, without having to listen to any
Arab sources who might be said to embellish in that irrational
oriental way, the Arabs of Palestine were confronted by a military
that contained the same forces-–operating with
impunity—that committed what the main Jewish authorities
characterized openly as a horrible atrocity with 250 men, women, and
children cruelly slaughtered. Would it require oriental logic or Arab
rhetoric, or the elusive Arab evacuation orders, to cause Arab
villagers to flee?
Additionally, the ZOA report cites with apparent approval a scolding
of the alleged Arab soldiers in Deir Yassin for not evacuating the
population (note 114, 40), which seems to mean that the ZOA at any
rate admits Arab forces were NOT evacuating the Palestinian
population at that time, contrary to myth. In fact, the ZOA seems to
think that evacuation of the population is the rational and
responsible thing for soldiers (had they really been there) and
civilians to have done. And they could have cited the alleged Arab
general evacuation orders we have heard about over and over in order
to illustrate that contention. But there are none cited, though it
would be the best evidence of the irresponsibility of the
non-evacuating alleged Arab soldiers. (Could that be because, as is
now well-settled, the orders or urgings did not exist? (In fact, in
the case of Deir Yassin, neither did the soldiers.)
Limited Criticism of
Labor Zionist Information
One complaint documented in the ZOA report is that historians have
tended to rely overly on each other in a co-dependent system of
citation that underutilizes critical evaluation of primary sources.
(See the latter sections of the report for a fairly good track down
of ultimate sources.) This is one of the few valuable parts of their
report. Interestingly, this confirms complaints often made by those
who criticize the English-language media and academia for an alleged
general pro-Israel bias on Middle East matters, namely that:
- Labor Zionist factual contentions
quickly become hardened conventional wisdom.
- Dissenting views get short shrift
or are misrepresented.
- Arabs are not listened to even
when they are right.
1) Ready Acceptance of Labor Zionist
Representations
As confirmed by the ZOA report, the two most salient allegations
about Deir Yassin, that there was a massacre and that 254 were
killed, was disseminated for public consumption in the New York
Times. The massacre allegation appears to have come originally from
an Arab source with Red Cross confirmation with a figure of 250. But
the dispatches did not stop and it was finally corrected to the 254
figure. The ZOA report notes that this was a figure and massacre
allegation ***endorsed by the Haganah-Jewish Agency [Labor
Zionists]***. And the ZOA further confirms that these Labor
Zionist endorsed casualty allegations have gone around the
historiographical world in secondary sources about the conflict with
little follow up investigation (notes 92-100).
Other original sources cited as ultimately authoritative for the
death toll or massacre rely on Arthur Koestler and Jon Kimche, Labor
Zionists without first-hand knowledge (notes 106, 109). In other
words, a Labor Zionist-approved claim passes quickly into near
permanent conventional wisdom even though it contains at least one
basic falsity. (The ZOA report of course claims that both the
massacre allegation and death toll were wrong).
2) Dissenting views-–even when true—get short shrift or are
misrepresented
The ZOA confirms that denials of the massacre by the Irgun and
subsequent apologists are barely mentioned in conventional English
language sources or are misrepresented [e.g., Begin said to have
"confessed" or "endorsed" a massacre (notes 131-139)]. Now, if
the Irgun denial of a massacre were true it would show that even
truth finds it difficult to pass through the Labor Zionist-oriented
consensus. But since it was true, this is not the best example. A
better illustration is that a clearly more accurate lower casualty
figure has barely passed into the mainstream despite assertion by
Menachem Begin decades ago and review by Arab survivors in 1948 (note
83, 87). And this leads to the next point.
3) Arabs are not listened to even when right if the Labor Zionist
conventional wisdom is contradicted
The ZOA cites the recent Arab survivor figures as probably the best
investigated and most reliable. But even thought the figure has been
of record since the middle 1980s, they have just begun to make an
impact.
The ZOA report ultimately complains of the same thing that many
"critics of Israel" do about current scholarship and conventional
wisdom. And the complaint is validated on the issue of the Deir
Yassin death toll, where a demonstrably false (agreed or agreeable by
all serious) figure has been hard to get past Labor Zionist-oriented
consensus.
Of course, if Labor Zionist contentions are true, there is no reason
they should not remain. Scholars need to report the Irgun-Lehi
denials and refute them (or show their refutation) especially as
their political descendants are in power in Israel. But the ZOA
report validates the above points, the excessive Labor Zionist
prevalence in intellectual consensus on the Middle East, the killing
by silence of different views, and the ignoring of Arab claims no
matter how correct.
Illustration: How
This Has Happened Before:
Labor Zionist consensus:
Arabs fled what became Israel as a result of obeying broadcast Arab
evacuation orders; here and there may have been a forced expulsion.
[This is no longer the Labor Zionist consensus but it has proven
hard to beat.]
Dissenting Views/Short Shrift Misrepresentation:
Arabs fled primarily through fear of violence, attacks and massacre
by Zionist forces, or forced expulsion, all part of intended result
of war. There were no general evacuation orders. When this response
is heard, this is usually misrepresented as being a contention that
there were written orders for expulsion, that ALL Arabs were to be
removed, or that all Arabs were expelled at gunpoint.
Arabs Not Listened to When Right
Although numerous Arabs recalled or argued the expulsions and attacks
and fears of reports like Deir Yassin or other acts of destructive
violence, and no written records of such broadcasts exist, Arabs were
disregarded.
Towards a More
Informed Consensus
Many other Labor Zionist contentions have entered public consensus in
the past. They include the allegations that Palestine was "empty" at
the time of Zionist-organized colonization, that the West Bank
occupation has been benign, that the Arabs were on the verge of
attacking Israel in 1967, that Israeli Arabs were treated as equals.
Will they too be subject to question and if proved wrong,
corrected?
Some have collapsed, but in the case of the benign occupation, it
required violent insurrection and a long-term drift of Labor Zionists
to the left. But what the ZOA report shows is that there needs to be
a review of the Labor Zionist consensus. It should not require
violence and long-term aggravation of a problem before they are
addressed. Fifty years of war, and stagnation in solving it, results
from a Labor Zionist-oriented consensus and the ignoring of Arab
contentions. As we remember Deir Yassin and its subsequent
scholarship, we find again and again this core set of problems:
uncritical Labor Zionist domination of conventional wisdom,
uncritical marginalization of dissenting views, and the ignoring of
accurate and legitimate Arab contentions.
In making that clear, the ZOA report deserves congratulations. In
attempting to deny the real victimization of fellow human beings, the
ZOA deserves scorn. In doing so in such a self-defeating and
transparent manner, it deserves our pity.
